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The Pathways to Work package of reforms (‘Pathways’, for short) is intended 
to encourage employment among people claiming incapacity benefits; that is, 
people claiming Incapacity Benefit (IB), Income Support (IS) on grounds of disability 
or Severe Disablement Allowance (SDA). The programme is a response to large 
increases in the numbers claiming incapacity benefits that occurred in the ten 
years up to 1995 and is part of the Government’s strategy to reduce the numbers 
receiving these benefits from 2.74 million in 2005 to 1.74 million or fewer by 
2015. Pathways was introduced on a pilot basis in three Jobcentre Plus districts in 
October 2003 and in a further four districts in April 2004. Since then, Pathways 
has been rolled out to additional districts. In April 2008, all new incapacity benefits 
claimants in Britain became eligible for Pathways. 
Under Pathways, an individual aged between 18 and 60 making a claim for 
incapacity benefits must attend an initial Work Focused Interview (WFI) with an 
IB Personal Adviser (IBPA) eight weeks after making their claim. Failure to comply 
with this requirement can result in benefits sanctions, although these have been 
rare in practice. Most people remaining on incapacity benefits must attend five 
further WFIs. There are two groups of people for whom the five follow-up WFIs are 
not required: those with particularly severe medical conditions and those judged 
likely to return to work within 12 months without additional help. Claimants from 
both these groups can still participate on a voluntary basis. In non-Pathways areas, 
only the initial WFI is required.
Participation in the other provision available under Pathways is voluntary. These 
programme components include:
•	 The	‘Choices’	package	offers	a	range	of	new	and	existing	programme	provision	
aimed at improving labour market readiness and opportunities. The two main 
programmes within Choices are the New Deal for Disabled People (NDDP) and 
the Condition Management Programme (CMP). The CMP, which is only offered 
to Pathways participants, is a new initiative, run in collaboration with local 
health providers, with the aim of helping individuals to manage their disability 
or health condition. Choices also covers smaller existing programmes including 
Workstep, Work Preparation, and Work Based Learning for Adults.
2•	 The	Return	to	Work	Credit	(RTWC)	offers	Pathways	participants	who	find	work	
of at least 16 hours a week a payment of £40 per week for up to a year if their 
gross annual earnings are no more than £15,000. The RTWC is only offered to 
Pathways participants.
•	 The	Adviser	Discretionary	 Fund	 (ADF)	 allows	 IBPAs	 to	make	awards	of	up	 to	
£300 per individual within a 12-month period to support activities or purchases 
to increase their chances of finding work. These funds are also available in 
non-Pathways areas but it was anticipated that their use would increase under 
Pathways.
Pathways is currently being evaluated by a consortium of research organisations 
using both quantitative and qualitative techniques to examine various aspects of 
the reforms. This report focuses on whether the benefits from Pathways exceeded 
its costs within the original seven Jobcentre Plus districts and on the extent to 
which the evidence from the initial seven pilot areas might also apply to the rest of 
Great Britain. The study is limited to new and repeat IB claimants. A similar study 
of existing IB claimants is set to be completed in 2009. 
Key findings
Overall, the financial benefits of Pathways that we estimated significantly exceed 
the estimated financial costs, with net measured benefits both to Pathways 
participants and to the Exchequer. As with other cost-benefit studies of this 
kind, there are uncertainties around these estimates. Below, we discuss two of 
these, how long the policy’s effects last and potential costs and benefits we do 
not measure.
The estimates of costs and benefits reported here are averaged over all individuals 
who made an enquiry about incapacity benefits, regardless of whether they 
ultimately claimed a benefit or took active part in Pathways. About 78 per cent of 
those making an enquiry became claimants.
•	 Participation in Pathways’ components. The cost and benefits of Pathways 
depend on the extent to which individuals who made an enquiry about incapacity 
benefits ultimately participated in the programme’s components. About 20 per 
cent of those who made an enquiry between April 2005 and March 2006 in 
the original seven Pathways pilot sites took part in at least one mandated work-
focused follow-up interview, almost ten per cent received RTWC awards and a 
little over five per cent were referred to CMP. All these programme provisions 
were only available in Pathways districts. Pathways had a small to negligible 
effect on participation in the remaining programme components. Thus, it seems 
likely that the benefits from and costs of Pathways are mainly attributable to the 
follow-up WFIs, the RTWC and CMP.
Summary
3Summary
•	 Pathways’ measured costs. The average net cost of Pathways for individuals 
who made an incapacity benefits enquiry was £340. Expenditures on the 
additional staff needed at Jobcentre Plus offices accounted for almost 
30 per cent of these costs, expenditures on CMP a little under 20 per cent and 
RTWC awards about 40 per cent. The cost of Pathways per enquiry is rather 
low because a fairly small percentage of individuals who made enquiries about 
incapacity benefits participated in the components of Pathways. The cost of a 
referral to CMP was a little over £1,000, on average, and the average RTWC 
award for those who received one was nearly £1,500 (compared to a maximum 
of £40 x 52 weeks = £2,080). The cost of Jobcentre Plus staff was £550 per 
person who attended at least one follow-up WFI. Although not all of the staff 
costs are attributable to people attending follow-up WFIs, most are. 
•	 Pathways’ measured benefits. In line with previous research, we find that 
Pathways increased the likelihood that individuals making an enquiry about 
claiming incapacity benefits would be in paid work 18 months later, and that 
it caused some individuals who would, in any case, have moved off incapacity 
benefits within 12 months to leave benefits somewhat more quickly. Pathways, 
thus, seems to have increased employment primarily among those who would 
have left incapacity benefits within a year even in the absence of the programme. 
It is not known how long the effects of Pathways last, however, so there is some 
uncertainty about the size of the benefits generated by the programme. If it 
is conservatively assumed that Pathways’ effects continue for 70 weeks, the 
measured benefits are estimated to be £1,041 per person making an incapacity 
benefits enquiry, with £526 of this amount accounted for by increases in the 
disposable incomes of the individuals making enquiries about incapacity benefits 
and £515 accruing to the Exchequer. If, instead, it is more optimistically assumed 
that programme effects persist for 150 weeks, Pathways’ benefits are estimated 
to total £2,023, with £935 accruing to individuals and £1,088 to the Exchequer. 
The increases in the disposable incomes of individuals are mainly attributable to 
the increased earnings that result from Pathways. In addition, when individuals 
enter employment because of Pathways, they receive tax credits and RTWC. 
The increases in income more than offset the reductions in Government benefit 
payments and increases in tax payments that also accompany earnings increases. 
Benefits to the Exchequer are attributable to a variety of sources, the most 
important of which are reductions in outlays on incapacity benefits payments, 
increases in tax receipts and increases in National Insurance contributions.
•	 Pathways’ net measured benefits to the Exchequer. Combining the cost 
and benefit estimates discussed in the previous two bullet points implies that 
the Exchequer’s budgetary position improved by £175 per incapacity benefits 
enquiry as a result of Pathways if programme effects lasted for 70 weeks 
(benefits of £515 less costs of £340) or by £748 per enquiry (£1,088 – £340) 
if programme effects continued for 150 weeks. This corresponds to a return 
to the Exchequer of £1.51 (£515/£340) for each pound invested in Pathways 
if programme effects lasted for 70 weeks or £3.20 (£1,088/£340) per pound 
invested if Pathways’ effects lasted for 150 weeks.
4•	 Pathways’ net measured benefits to society. Net measured benefits for 
society as whole – that is, the sum of the net benefits that accrued to individuals 
making enquiries and the net effect on the Exchequer’s budgetary position – are 
£701 (£526 + £175) if programme effects continued for 70 weeks or £1,683 
(£935 + £748) if they continued for 150 weeks, implying returns of £3.06 or 
£5.95 respectively per pound invested.
Omitted costs and benefits 
There are a number of potential costs and benefits that were not incorporated 
into the cost-benefit estimates reported above because they are difficult or costly 
to estimate and, in some cases, are not naturally measured in pounds. These 








individuals) tax and benefit payments;
•	 deadweight	losses	that	result	from	taxes;
•	 reaction	of	the	public	to	reductions	in	the	incapacity	benefits	rolls.
Some of these omitted factors will have increased the benefits of the policy and 
others will have reduced them. However, any conclusions about the importance 




However, individuals who were already receiving incapacity benefits at the time 
Pathways was introduced could choose to participate in Pathways voluntarily, 
and some did so. Individuals who were already claimants at the introduction of 
Pathways were found to be more likely to have moved off incapacity benefits 
within 12 months after the programme had been implemented. These effects 




is the possibility that individuals who did not receive incapacity benefits could, 
nonetheless, be indirectly affected by Pathways. This could occur, for example, 
if Pathways affected their local Jobcentre Plus office or their personal adviser, 
while those applying for jobs might have experienced greater competition in 
the labour market. These possibilities were examined for Department for Work 
and Pensions (DWP) benefit recipients who were not mandated onto Pathways 
and usually could not have participated in the programme. With one important 
exception, there was no statistically significant evidence of any effect of the 
programme on their likelihood of moving off whatever benefit they were 
receiving. The exception was for individuals receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance 
(JSA) in Pathways sites that began operations in October 2003. These individuals 
were found to have been 3.5 percentage points less likely to move off benefit 
within six months after the programme had been implemented; however, a 
similar effect did not appear to occur in the sites that introduced Pathways in 
April 2004. 
•	 The	RTWC	strengthens	the	financial	incentive	for	claimants	of	incapacity	benefits	
to move into work of at least 16 hours a week, though the importance of this 
incentive varies with individual circumstances and the fact that it is limited to 
those earning no more than £15,000 a year creates an incentive for some people 
to take lower-paid jobs than they otherwise would. A large number – possibly 
a majority – of those moving from Pathways into paid work did not receive 
the RTWC, although evidence suggests that many of these individuals did not 
meet the eligibility criteria. Many claims did not last for the full year, with the 
average length of claim being 36 weeks (70 per cent of a year). Incomplete 
take-up of the RTWC does not necessarily imply that it was failing to meet its 
objectives and measures to boost take-up could either increase or reduce the 
cost-effectiveness of the payment.
Wider relevance of the findings
As Pathways is being introduced for new claimants of incapacity benefits 
throughout Great Britain, it is useful to ask how relevant the findings described 
above, which pertain to only the original seven pilot sites, are to the remainder of 
the country. 
•	 Excluding	London,	the	original	pilot	areas	appear	broadly	similar	to	the	rest	of	
Great Britain. This is true in terms of both the observed individual characteristics 
of those moving onto incapacity benefits (their sex, age, health and whether or 
not they are only in receipt of National Insurance credits) and the historic local 
authority (LA) average six-month cumulative exit rate from incapacity benefits. 
6•	 In	 contrast,	 considerable	 differences	 are	 found	 between	 those	moving	 onto	
incapacity benefits in London, which is not represented among the original pilot 
sites and those moving onto incapacity benefits in both the original seven pilot 
areas and elsewhere in Great Britain. In particular, several areas of London have 
much lower historic cumulative six-month exit rates from incapacity benefits 
than is seen anywhere in the original seven pilot areas. 
•	 The	available	evidence	does	not	suggest	 that	 the	effects	of	Pathways	on	the	
chances of new incapacity benefits claimants’ leaving the benefit after six 
months would differ in the original pilot sites from the rest of Great Britain 
outside London. However, extrapolating the estimated effects of Pathways in 
the initial seven pilot areas to London – which accounts for around one-in-
nine individuals moving onto incapacity benefits in Great Britain – would be 
questionable because many parts of London differ greatly from all of the original 
pilot areas in ways that are associated with differential programme effects.
•	 Extrapolating	the	findings	on	the	effects	of	Pathways	to	the	rest	of	Great	Britain	
(outside London) is more difficult, to the extent that the programme introduced 
in the rest of Great Britain differs from the one that operated in the pilot sites. 
One important difference is that the scheme in the original pilot areas was 
operated by Jobcentre Plus, whereas the programme that is being extended to 
most of the rest of the country is, instead, being operated by the private and 
voluntary sectors. Pathways might also have different effects when operating 
in the context of the Employment and Support Allowance that is set to replace 
incapacity benefits for new claimants from October 2008. 
Overall, the findings in this report provide a favourable impression of the benefits 
of the Pathways for those moving onto incapacity benefits and for the Exchequer. 
They suggest that the measured financial benefits of the programme exceed the 
measured costs, both for those making incapacity benefits enquiries and for the 
Exchequer and hence, for society as a whole. Moreover, with the exception of 
London, it appears likely that these findings can be generalised to the whole of 
Great Britain, at least to the extent that the model of Pathways which is rolled out 
in the remainder of the country is similar to the one that operated in the original 
pilot sites. 
Considerable uncertainty surrounds our estimated net benefits, both because of 
uncertainty over how long the effects of Pathways persist and because of potentially 
large costs and benefits that we do not measure. However, Pathways was found 
to have positive net measured benefits, even when it was conservatively assumed 
that programme effects lasted for only 70 weeks. If its effects lasted longer, the 
net measured benefits would be larger. The unmeasured costs of the policy would 
have to outweigh the unmeasured benefits significantly if the programme were 




1.1 The policy background
The Pathways to Work package of reforms (‘Pathways’, for short) is aimed at 
encouraging employment among people claiming incapacity benefits; that 
is, people claiming Incapacity Benefit (IB), Income Support (IS) on grounds of 
disability or Severe Disablement Allowance (SDA). Based on proposals outlined 
in the 2002 Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) Green Paper ‘Pathways 
to Work: helping people into employment’, these reforms were introduced on 
a pilot basis in three Jobcentre Plus districts – Renfrewshire, Inverclyde, Argyll 
and Bute, Bridgend, Rhondda, Cynon and Taff and Derbyshire – in October 2003 
(these areas are referred to as the ‘October areas’ in the remainder of this report). 
Four further districts – Essex, Gateshead and South Tyneside, East Lancashire and 
Somerset – became part of the pilot in April 2004 (and are referred to as the ‘April 
areas’). Since then, Pathways has been rolled out to a further 14 districts to cover 
one-third of the country.
Since April 2008, all new incapacity benefits claimants in Great Britain have been 
subject to Pathways. Existing claimants are free to participate in Pathways on 
a voluntary basis, though mandatory participation for existing claimants is now 
being piloted in the original seven Jobcentre Plus districts. From October 2008, the 
new Employment and Support Allowance is set to replace incapacity benefits for 
new claimants. Key features are that it will have a revised medical assessment (the 
‘Work Capability Assessment’) and that it will be more generous to those assessed 
to have the most severe disabilities. From 2009, existing claimants of incapacity 
benefits who are aged under 25 will also have to undertake the Work Capability 
Assessment and participate in Pathways (DWP, 2007b).
8Pathways was introduced as a response to the large increase in the numbers 
claiming incapacity benefits. At the time of the 2002 Green Paper, there were 
roughly 2.7 million claimants – more than the combined number of unemployed 
people claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) and lone parents claiming IS. The 
overwhelming majority of people starting an incapacity benefits claim expect to 
work again (Woodward et al., 2003). Many do – in 2004, almost 60 per cent 
left benefit within a year. However, for those who remain on benefit beyond this 
point, the chances of leaving declines markedly – 29 per cent are still claiming 
after another eight years (see the 2002 Green Paper for further details). A key 
aim of Pathways is to intervene early so as to reduce the incidence of prolonged 
benefit dependency.
1.2 Pathways
Under Pathways, an individual aged between 18 and 60 making a claim for 
incapacity benefits must attend an initial Work Focused Interview (WFI) eight 
weeks after making their claim. Failure to comply with this requirement can result 
in benefits sanctions, although these have been rare in practice. Most people 
remaining on incapacity benefits must attend five further WFIs. There are two 
groups of people for whom the five additional WFIs are not required: those with 
particularly severe medical conditions and those judged likely to return to work 
without additional help. However, they can still participate on a voluntary basis. 
WFIs are carried out by specially trained IB Personal Advisers (IBPAs). In non-
Pathways areas, in contrast, only the initial WFI is required.
Those exempted on the basis of the severity of their medical condition are identified 
through the Personal Capability Assessment (PCA). Under Pathways, the aim is to 
fast-track this process to take place within 12 weeks of making the initial claim so 
that the results are available by the time of the second WFI, although in practice 
this is not often achieved (see Bewley et al., 2007). Those with the most extreme 
forms of illness or disability are exempted from the PCA process itself in addition 
to the WFIs. Those exempted from further participation on the grounds that they 
are likely to return to work without the need for any assistance, are identified 
during the first WFI using a ‘screening tool’. This consists of a questionnaire, the 
answers to which are used to rate the probability of an unassisted return to work 
within 12 months. 
Introduction
9Participation in all other provision available under Pathways is voluntary. There are 
several elements:
•	 The	‘Choices’ package offers a range of new and existing programme provision 
aimed at improving labour market readiness and opportunities. The two main 
programmes within Choices are the New Deal for Disabled People (NDDP) and 
the Condition Management Programme (CMP). The CMP is a new initiative, 
run in collaboration with local health providers, with the aim of helping 
individuals to manage their disability or health condition. A number of smaller 
existing schemes are also available. These include: Work-Based Learning for 
Adults (in England), Training for Work (Scotland), Programme Centres, Work 
Trials, Work Preparation, Workstep, Access to Work and some local schemes in 
particular areas. The CMP is only offered in Pathways areas, while the remaining 
components of the Choices package are available in non-Pathways areas. It was 
expected that Pathways participants would be encouraged to enrol in these 
programmes by their IBPAs during their WFIs and thus, that participation in them 
would increase, although in some cases the extent to which this was possible 
may have been constrained by the funding available for the programmes. 
•	 The	Return to Work Credit (RTWC) offers Pathways participants who find 
work of at least 16 hours a week, a weekly payment of £40 for a year if their 
gross annual earnings are no more than £15,000. The RTWC is only offered to 
Pathways participants.
•	 The	Adviser Discretionary Fund (ADF) allows IBPAs to make awards of up to 
£300 per person within a 12 month period to support activities or purchases 
that increase the chances of finding work. These funds are also available in 
non-Pathways areas but it was anticipated that their use would increase under 
Pathways.
1.3 The evaluation of Pathways
The evaluation of Pathways is being carried out by a consortium of research 
organisations led by the Policy Studies Institute (PSI) and including the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies, Mathematica Policy Research, the National Centre for Social 
Research (NatCen), the Social Policy Research Unit and David Greenberg of the 
University of Maryland. The evaluation is multi-faceted and involves qualitative 
analyses, large-scale quantitative surveys, impact analyses, cost-benefit analyses 
and a literature review of relevant programmes in the USA. The evaluation has 
already resulted in a number of reports.1 Of particular relevance to this report is 
Bewley, Dorsett and Haile (2007), which examined the effects of Pathways on 
employment, earnings and benefit receipt. Findings from their study provide a key 
input to the research reported here. 
1 All aspects of the evaluation will be considered in a synthesis report to be 
produced following completion of the analysis for new claimants in the 
original seven Jobcentre Plus districts.
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The focus in this report is on whether the benefits from Pathways exceeded its 
costs within the original seven Jobcentre Plus districts. The study is limited to new 
and repeat incapacity benefits claimants. A similar study of existing incapacity 
benefits claimants will be published in 2009. 
The individual chapters of this report cover a number of different topics, but 
they are all relevant to determining the benefits and costs of Pathways. Because 
the topics vary, the data sources and methodologies do as well. Specifically, the 
following chapter provides estimates of the extent to which Pathways succeeded 
in increasing participation in the various components of Pathways. Chapter 3 
presents an in-depth study of the RTWC. Estimates of the costs of Pathways are 
presented in Chapter 4, while Chapter 5 analyses the financial benefits of Pathways 
to participants and to the Exchequer. Chapter 6 reports the findings from the 
cost-benefit analysis. Because cost-benefit analyses always require a number of 
assumptions, the chapter investigates how robust the cost-benefit findings are 
to alternative assumptions. Chapter 7 looks at whether Pathways has indirect 
effects on those not mandated to participate in the programme – for example, IB 
claimants who could participate voluntarily and JSA recipients. Chapter 8 examines 
the extent to which Bewley, Dorsett and Haile’s (2007) study of Pathways’ effects 
on employment, earnings and benefit receipt – the programme’s key potential 
benefits – might be germane to all of Great Britain. This is important because, 
like the rest of our study, their analysis is limited to the seven original Pathways 
districts. Conclusions from the various analyses are summarised in Chapter 9. 
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2 Participation in Pathways’  
 components
2.1 Summary
Determining the cost of Pathways requires estimates of the utilisation of its 
components and estimates of payments provided by the programme (see Chapter 
4). This chapter uses administrative data to examine the receipt of each of the 
components and financial incentives Pathways offers among individuals who 
became benefit claimants during the 2005/06 fiscal year. 
Although several of the key components of Pathways (follow-up Work Focused 
Interviews (WFIs), the Return to Work Credit (RTWC) and the Condition 
Management Programme (CMP)) are only provided to programme participants, 
others (New Deal for Disabled People (NDDP), the smaller Choices programmes 
and the Adviser Discretionary Fund (ADF)) are also available to incapacity benefits 
claimants who are not Pathways participants but use of these resources was 
expected to increase among programme participants. Although for the first 
group of Pathways’ components it is only necessary to estimate overall take-up, 
a difference-in-differences approach is used to compare take-up by claimants in 
the seven original Pathways sites with take-up by claimants in similar comparison 
sites in order to estimate Pathways’ effect on the percentage of claimants that 
participated in each of the second group of components.
The take-up of Pathways’ various components is of considerable interest in and of 
itself, as the extent to which Pathways influences employment, earnings and the 
receipt of incapacity benefits will likely reflect the degree to which its components 
are used by participants.2
2 In the case of follow-up WFIs, the RTWC and the CMP, this ‘increase’ (or 
‘effect’) on participation is from zero to whatever the take-up rate is under 
Pathways. In the case of Pathways’ remaining components, it is the difference 
between take-up with and without Pathways.
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The key findings are as follows:
•	 Pathways‘	largest	effect	on	participation,	by	far,	is	on	the	mandatory	follow-up	
WFIs, with 25 per cent of those moving onto incapacity benefits between April 
2005 and March 2006 taking part in at least one follow-up interview.3 Many 
of the 75 per cent of the claimants who did not participate in a follow-up WFI 
were exempted, either because of the severity of their disability or because 
they appeared likely to return to work without the intervention. Others left 
incapacity benefits prior to when an interview was scheduled or failed to attend 
a scheduled interview.
•	 About	12	per	cent	of	incapacity	benefits	claimants	in	the	original	seven	Pathways	
sites received RTWC, which was only available to programme participants.
•	 Almost	seven	per	cent	of	the	incapacity	claimants	in	the	original	seven	Pathways	
sites were referred to CMP. Only Pathways participants were eligible for CMP.
•	 Pathways	had	only	small	effects	on	participation	in	the	remaining	programme	
components, which, as mentioned above, are also available to incapacity benefits 
claimants who are not Pathways participants. The largest of these effects was a 
1.6 percentage point increase in participation in the NDDP and a 1.6 percentage 
point increase in ADF awards.
•	 Because	Pathways’	largest	effects	on	participation	relate	to	follow-up	WFIs,	the	
RTWC and the CMP, it seems likely that most of the effects of the programme 
on employment, earnings and the receipt of incapacity benefits resulted from 
these programme components. 
2.2 Introduction
This chapter investigates the extent to which Pathways influences the receipt 
of the various components it encompasses. More specifically, for people who 
3 This 25 per cent figure, which is based on administrative data, differs 
from a survey of incapacity benefits recipients in which 79 per cent of the 
respondents stated that they ‘remembered meeting specifically with an IBPA 
(or someone likely to have been an IBPA)’ (Bailey et al. 2007, p. 37). There are 
at least two reasons for this difference: First, the survey counted the initial 
WFI as well as follow-up WFIs in determining whether at least one WFI had 
been attended by respondents. Second, as indicated in the survey report (p. 
37), although ‘efforts were made in the survey interview to correctly identify 
as WFIs from the wide range of contacts that customers may have had with 
Jobcentre Plus staff…a higher proportion of customers attended a meeting 
with an IBPA according to survey data than was recorded in administrative 
records…There is thought to be under-recording in the administrative data 
but it is also likely that a proportion of the meetings picked up by the survey 
questions were not official WFIs….However, meetings with IBPAs identified 
in the survey are referred to as WFIs’.
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made an enquiry about claiming incapacity benefits in the 2005/06 fiscal year, 
and for people who actually became benefit claimants during the same period, it 
reports the percentage who participated in follow-up WFIs4, the percentage who 
participated in each of the Choices components and the percentage who received 
an RTWC or ADF award. In addition, and more importantly, the chapter estimates 
the increases in these participation rates that were attributable to Pathways. We 
refer to this latter measure as ‘Pathways’ impact on participation’.
There are two reasons why estimating Pathways’ impact on participation is 
importan:. First, it seems unlikely that Pathways will have much of an effect on 
employment and the receipt of incapacity benefits unless it increases the extent 
to which incapacity claimants participate in programme services (including WFIs5) 
and receive financial incentives. Second, as will be seen in Chapter 4, estimates 
of Pathways’ impacts on participation in services and financial incentives play a 
critical role in determining the cost of the programme.
The next section of the chapter describes the data that we use to measure 
participation in each of Pathways’ components and discusses a few measurement 
issues. The following section presents our findings. The chapter ends with some 
brief conclusions. 
2.3 Data and measurement issues
The first step in our analysis is to determine the number of people who made 
enquiries about receiving incapacity benefits, the number who became claimants 
and the number who participated in each component of Pathways. To do this, we use 
administrative data from the Pathways database, which provides all the necessary 
information. A participation rate for a particular programme component is then 
computed by dividing the number of individuals participating in the component 
by the number of individuals making enquires or the number becoming claimants. 
Thus, two alternative measures of the participation rate are used. The first is the 
number of people participating in the component as a percentage of the number 
making enquiries and the second is the number participating in the component as 
a percentage of the actual number of claimants. 
Our analysis is limited to the original seven Pathways sites and to the 12 months 
from April 2005 to March 2006. Note that some people who participated in a 
particular component of Pathways between April 2005 and March 2006 may 
have made an enquiry or become an incapacity benefit claimant prior to April 
4 Not all of those who made an enquiry ultimately became claimants during 
the 2005/06 fiscal year. This topic is further discussed below.
5 Because follow-up WFIs are the only mandated component of Pathways, 
it may also have an impact on the receipt of incapacity benefits by causing 
claimants to leave the benefit or not claim the benefit in order to avoid the 
interviews. This in turn, could increase employment.
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2005. For example, an individual may have made an enquiry in January 2005, 
begun receiving benefits in March 2005 and found a job and received an RWTC 
award in June 2005. The first two events will be outside our 12-month observation 
window and not counted but the last event will be inside the window and will be 
counted. A second individual may have made an enquiry in January 2006, begun 
receiving incapacity benefits in March 2006 and received a RTWC award in June 
2006. In this case, the first two events will be inside the 12-month window and 
counted but the last event will be outside the window and not counted. However, 
as long as Pathways had come close to reaching a steady state by April 2005, 
that is, as long as the programme population was neither growing very much 
nor shrinking appreciably over time in the research sites, which seems to be a 
reasonable approximation6, the estimates of participation rates will not be greatly 
distorted. In a steady state there would be as many of the first type of individuals 
as the second, so participation rates would be accurately measured.
As indicated above, we need to measure not only the rate of participation in 
each of Pathways’ components, but Pathways’ impact on these rates. One way of 
viewing Pathways’ impact on participation rates is that it is the difference between 
the participation rate that exists under Pathways and the rate that would exist in 
the absence of Pathways. 
Three programme components – follow-up WFIs, the RTWC, and the CMP – are 
offered only to Pathways participants. Consequently, without Pathways there 
would be no participation in these components and the rate of participation 
(i.e. the take-up rate) that exists under Pathways is identical to Pathways’ impact 
on participation. Thus, we use the rate of participation in these programme 
components as our measure of Pathways’ impact on participation.
The remaining components of Pathways – the NDDP, Workstep, Work Preparation, 
Work Based Learning for Adults and ADF awards – are available to incapacity 
benefits claimants who are not Pathways participants as well as to claimants who 
are Pathways participants. On the one hand, one might expect participation in these 
programmes to increase because incapacity benefits claimants will be encouraged 
to participate during the follow-up WFIs. On the other hand, some individuals 
who otherwise would have participated may have left the incapacity benefits rolls 
or never become claimants in order to avoid the follow-up WFIs. We expected 
the first effect to dominate. However, Pathways only provided additional funding 
for the NDDP. So any increases in participation in Work Preparation, Work Based 
Learning for Adults and ADF awards amongst those who took part in follow-up 
WFIs would have to come at the expense of those who did not.
6 For example, Department for Work and Pensions‘ (DWP’s) Pathways to Work 
Performance Summary for June 2006 and May 2007 indicate that in March 
2005 there were 7,182 Pathways starts and in March 2006 there were 6,900 
starts in the seven original Pathways’ districts.
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To estimate impacts on participation in these components of Pathways, we 
use extracts from incapacity benefits administrative data. These data indicate 
whether or not an incapacity benefits claimant participated in each of the five 
programmes listed above.7 The data do not, however, provide information on 
the personal characteristics of the claimants. Moreover, the data exclude some 
short-term incapacity benefits claimants – specifically, those who receive benefits 
for six weeks or less and, in addition, fall between two successive scans of new 
claimants. Because these people, who account for about 17 per cent of all new 
incapacity benefits claimants over a year, are presumably unlikely to participate in 
the programme components listed above as a result of Pathways, the estimates of 
programme impacts on participation may be slightly overstated. However, as will 
be seen, the estimated impacts are already very small.
Our impact estimates are based on claimants located in the seven original Pathways 
sites and in a set of non-Pathways comparison sites were carefully matched to 
the Pathways sites on the basis of their economic and social composition (see 
Bewley, Dorsett, and Haile (2007) for further discussion of the comparison sites). 
The analysis is based on two cohorts of claimants in each set of sites: a pre-
Pathways cohort and a post-Pathways cohort. The pre-Pathways cohort became 
incapacity benefits claimants between 1 August 2002 and 31 July 2003, while 
the post-Pathways cohort became claimants between 1 August 2004 and 
31 July 2005. The members of both cohorts were given up to 12 months to begin 
participating in the each of Pathways components being examined.8 Thus, it was 
assumed that if Pathways had an impact on participation, it would occur within a 
year of becoming an incapacity benefits claimant.
To estimate Pathways’ impact on participation, a simple difference-in-differences 
approach was used. This involved making the following computation:







Where Pc is the percentage of a cohort that participates in a particular programme 
component such as NDDP, the subscripts path and comp respectively indicate 
whether the value of Pc is for claimants located in a Pathways’ site or a comparison 
site and the subscripts post- and pre- respectively indicate whether the value 
of Pc pertains to individuals who became incapacity claimants before or after 
Pathways was rolled out. The first term in parentheses in the equation measures 
the difference between the participation rate in Pathways sites and the rate in the 
7 ‘Participation’ means that they at least started the programme or, in the 
case of the NDDP, registered for the programme. In the case of CMP, we 
know the number of people who were referred to the programme, not the 
number who actually started or completed the programme.
8 Although the first Pathways expansion phase commenced in October 2005, 
none of the comparison areas became expansion areas. The remaining 
expansion took place sufficiently late that it should not have affected our 
analysis.
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matched comparison sites, while the second term adjusts for the possibility that the 
participation rate differed between the two sets of sites prior to the introduction 
of Pathways. This approach will provide an accurate estimate of Pathways’ impact 
on participation if the only reason for a change in the difference between the two 
set of sites between the pre- and the post-Pathways periods is the introduction of 
Pathways. In other words, it is necessary to assume that participation rates in the 
components of Pathways did not change differentially between the programme 
and the matched sites except as a result of the introduction of Pathways.9
In using the results from the difference-in-differences approach, there is an 
additional assumption that must be maintained. As discussed above, the estimates 
of programme impacts on participation pertain to individuals who became 
incapacity benefits claimants between August 2004 and July 2005. These people 
are then observed over the 12 months following the beginning of their claim. 
So the earliest of these new claimants are observed between August 2004 and 
July 2005 and the most recent are observed between July 2005 and June 2006. 
The participation rates measure participation among new claimants during the 
12 months between April 2005 and March 2006. Thus, there is some overlap 
between the time spans over which impacts are estimated and the period over 
which participation rates are measured but they do not perfectly dovetail. As a 
result, it is necessary to assume that programme impacts on participation remained 
constant over time.
To obtain accurate difference-in-differences estimates of impacts on participation, 
it is important that any difference in participation in Pathways sites and comparison 
sites for the pre-Pathways cohort (i.e. the value of (Pcpath,pre – P
c
comp,pre)) not be 
affected by the introduction of Pathways. However, it is possible that it was 
affected, especially in the sites in which Pathways was rolled out in October 2003. 
As previously indicated, the pre-Pathways cohort became incapacity benefits 
claimants between 1 August 2002 and 31 July 2003. So the earliest members 
of this cohort are observed between August 2002 and July 2003 and the most 
recent members are observed between August 2003 and July 2004. Although 
these people were not required to participate in Pathways, they could volunteer 
and a small fraction did so. Moreover, the very fact that Pathways was taking 
place in their Jobcentre Plus districts may have affected their behaviour even if 
they did not volunteer, and there is an indication in Chapter 7 that it was modestly 
influenced. These effects presumably took place after Pathways was introduced, 
and they only distort the impact on participation estimates if they took place 
while the pre-Pathways cohort was being observed. Thus, they are more likely to 
affect estimates of participation impacts for the October 2003 sites than for the 
April 2004 sites. To the extent that this bias exists, it should reduce the estimated 
impact on participation rates, by increasing Pcpath,pre. However, estimated impacts 
on participation rates are a bit larger in the October 2003 sites than the April 2004 
sites, the opposite of what would be expected if the bias were large.
9 For further discussion of the differences-in differences approach, see 
Section 7.3.
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2.4 Findings
Participation rates and Pathways’ estimated impact on these rates are reported 
in Table 2.1. For each programme component, the table shows the percentage 
participation rate that we estimate would have existed in the absence of Pathways, 
the rate that actually existed in the presence of Pathways and the difference 
between these two values – that is, the percentage point impact of Pathways 
on participation. In the case of the three Pathways’ components that are only 
available to programme participants (i.e. follow-up WFIs, the RTWC and the CMP), 
the programme’s impact on participation is, of course, simply the participation 
rate in the presence of Pathways because there would have been no participation 
in these components in the absence of the programme. 
Participation rates are presented in Table 2.1 for individuals in all seven of the 
original Pathways sites. In addition, they are also reported for a subset of these 
people: those who resided in the four areas where Pathways was introduced in 
April 2004. The reason for presenting separate values for the April sites is that 
the analysis of Pathways’ effects on earnings, a key benefit of the programme, 
emphasises findings for these four sites, rather than findings that pertain to all 
seven sites (see Bewley, Dorsett and Haile 2007). Thus, as discussed further in 
Chapter 4, we use the participation rates in Table 2.1 to estimate costs for both 
the seven combined sites and for the four April sites alone.
Table 2.1 has two panels. The top panel reports participation as a percentage of 
all those individuals who made an enquiry about incapacity benefits between 
April 2005 and March 2006. For reasons discussed in Chapter 4, these are the 
estimates that are used in estimating the costs of Pathways. The bottom panel 
reports participation as a percentage of all those who actually became incapacity 
benefits claimants. This second group, which is obviously a subset of the first, 
excludes those individuals who did not follow up their enquiry and those who 
made an unsuccessful claim for benefits. By definition, individuals who do not 
become claimants do not participate in Pathways and hence, do not generate 
programme costs. Therefore, the values in the bottom panel are probably more 
readily interpreted than those in the top panel and hence, provide the focus of the 
discussion below. Because only 78.4 per cent of those making an enquiry in the 
seven original sites became claimants, the estimates for these sites in top panel are 
only 78.4 per cent as large as those in the bottom panel. For a similar reason, the 
estimates for the four April sites in the top panel are only 78.0 per cent as large 
as those in the bottom panel.
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Pathways’ impact on participation in most of its components is small, although 
most of the impact estimates are statistically significant at conventional levels. The 
largest impact estimate by far is on follow-up WFIs, the programme’s only mandatory 
component. Just over a quarter of the individuals who became incapacity benefits 
claimants in the seven original Pathways sites between April 2005 and March 
2006 took part in at least one follow-up WFI during the following year. Still, nearly 
75 per cent of these claimants did not participate in such an interview. There are 
a number of reasons for this, including being exempted because of the severity 
of their medical condition, being exempted because they were deemed likely to 
return to work without the need for follow-up WFIs,10 exiting incapacity benefits 
prior to having a scheduled follow-up WFI, and failing to attend a scheduled 
WFI. 
More than one in ten incapacity benefits claimants in the seven original Pathways 
sites received RTWC and more than one in 20 was referred to CMP. Both of these 
provisions were only available to Pathways participants. 
As shown in Table 2.1, Pathways had little impact on participation in programmes 
that were also available to non-Pathways participants. For example, Pathways 
increased the participation rate for NDDP by less than two percentage points. Its 
impact on the receipt of ADF awards was of similar magnitude. Finally, participation 
rates for the Workstep, Work Preparation, and Work Based Learning for Adults 
programmes would have been very low in the absence of Pathways, and the 
programme did virtually nothing to increase these already low rates.11 Given the 
limited funding available for these programmes and the fact that their funding 
was not increased under Pathways, these findings are unsurprising.
2.5 Conclusions
Participation in follow-up WFIs under Pathways was moderate and RTWC receipt 
and participation in CMP, the other two programme components that were only 
available to Pathways participants, was lower. At least, in part, because of limited 
funding, the effect of Pathways on the take-up of its pre-existing components 
appears to have been small or negligible. Thus, it seems likely that most of the 
costs of Pathways are attributable to these three programme components and that 
most of the benefits of Pathways emanate from those. Chapter 4 demonstrates 
that almost all of the cost of Pathways does indeed result from follow-up WFIs, 
the CMP and (especially) the RTWC.
10 This screening was intended to exclude about a third of those not excluded 
because of the severity of their medical condition.
11 Although the estimated impact for the Workstep programme is negative, it 
is extremely small and does not differ statistically from zero.
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3 The Return to Work  
 Credit
3.1 Summary
A key part of Pathways is the Return to Work Credit (RTWC). This is a payment 
of £40 a week, payable for up to a year, which is intended to help encourage 
claimants of incapacity benefits to move off benefits and into paid work. The 
RTWC is a significant part of the Pathways package – for example, it represents 
about 40 per cent of the total Exchequer cost of Pathways (see Chapter 4 for more 
details). Given this significance, this chapter presents evidence intended to shed 
light on the impact of the RTWC.
Claimants of incapacity benefits often face weak financial incentives to move into 
paid work, not least because of the loss of Incapacity Benefit (IB) itself. The RTWC 
can strengthen these incentives but its importance depends on the individual 
circumstances of the claimant: whether £40 a week is a lot or a little depends 
on the claimant’s earning power and whether they have other sources of income 
(such as a working partner). Moreover, the fact that the RTWC is available only 
if earnings do not exceed £15,000 a year, might lead some people to move into 
lower-paid work than they otherwise would, in order to meet this requirement.
Analysis of data on the number of Pathways participants and the number of RTWC 
recipients shows:
•	 a	 large	number	–	possibly	a	majority	–	of	 those	moving	 from	Pathways	 into	
paid work do not receive the RTWC. However, evidence suggests that many of 
these individuals earn more than £15,000 a year and some work for less than 
16 hours per week and therefore, do not qualify for the RTWC;
•	many	RTWC	claims	do	not	last	for	the	full	year,	with	the	average	length	of	claim	
being 36 weeks;
•	 incomplete	 take-up	of	 the	RTWC	does	not	necessarily	 imply	 that	 it	 is	 failing	
to meet its objectives and measures to boost take-up could either increase or 
reduce the cost-effectiveness of the payment.
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3.2 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 1, a key part of Pathways is the RTWC. This is a payment 
of £40 a week, payable for up to a year, which is intended to help encourage 
incapacity benefits claimants to move off benefits and into paid work. Those who 
have been claiming incapacity benefits (or Statutory Sick Pay (SSP)) in a Pathways 
area for at least 13 weeks and then move directly into employment or self-
employment are potentially eligible for the RTWC. The (additional) key qualifying 
criteria are that the individual must be employed for at least 16 hours a week, 
must be earning no more than £15,000 a year and must expect to remain in work 
for at least five weeks. The payment is not subject to either Income Tax or National 
Insurance contributions, and is not treated as income for the purposes of any 
means-tested benefit or tax credit. 
The RTWC is a key part of Pathways – for example, the cost of RTWC payments 
represents 40 per cent of the total Exchequer cost of Pathways (see Chapter 4 for 
more details). Therefore, the cost-effectiveness of this component is potentially 
an important determinant of the cost-effectiveness of the overall reform package. 
This chapter helps to shed light on this issue by setting out two key factors: First, 
in Section 3.3, we describe the impact that the RTWC has on potential recipients’ 
incentives to work. This is done by documenting the budget constraints faced 
by different example claimants of incapacity benefits both with and without the 
RTWC in place. Second, in Section 3.4, we report the numbers receiving the 
RTWC, and in particular how these relate to the numbers who are estimated to 
have moved into paid work. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.3 The RTWC and financial incentives to work
The RTWC is intended to increase the financial incentive for claimants of incapacity 
benefits to move into paid work. The impact of the RTWC on incentives is relatively 
straightforward: it provides a stronger financial incentive to be in receipt of an 
incapacity benefit for at least 13 weeks and then to work at least 16 hours a 
week (but no additional incentive to work for more than 16 hours per week) 
for an expected annual salary of no more than £15,000. These incentives could 
have a range of outcomes: First, they could lead to some individuals remaining 
on incapacity benefits for 13 weeks or longer who would otherwise have left 
benefits sooner. Second, they could lead to some individuals choosing to work 
16 hours a week or longer who would otherwise have not. Third, they could lead 
to individuals expecting to earn no more than £15,000 a year when previously 
they would have expected to earn a greater amount. 
What is not straightforward is the overall financial incentive to enter work – taking 
into account not just the RTWC but also other taxes, benefits and tax credits – 
faced by claimants of incapacity benefits. In this section we illustrate the impact of 
RTWC on financial work incentives by looking at examples of ‘budget constraints’ 
that claimants might face. A budget constraint depicts the relationship between 
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hours of paid work and net income after all taxes and benefits have been taken into 
account. Clearly this relationship will vary according to the specific circumstances 
of an individual claimant. It is impossible to show every conceivable variant, so 
here we merely show three illustrative examples.
Figure 3.1 shows the budget constraint created by the 2006/07 tax and benefit 
system for our first example person. This is a single person with no dependent 
children, who claimed IB after age 45, has been sick or disabled for at least a year 
but is still below State Pension Age; we assume that the individual receives no 
other non-means-tested benefits (such as Disability Living Allowance (DLA)) and 
has no savings or other private sources of income; they are paying £80 a week 
in rent and £13.88 a week in Council Tax (after the 25 per cent single resident 
discount) and would earn £5.05 an hour (the minimum wage from 1 October 
2005 to 30 September 2006) and be contracted into the State Second Pension if 
they moved into work. The dark line shows the budget constraint in the absence 
of RTWC; the light line includes RTWC.12
Figure 3.1 Budget constraint in 2006/07 for example IB recipient:  
 single individual without children, minimum wage
12 Strictly, Figure 3.1 is shown assuming that the permitted work higher limit 
applies. In 2006/07 this applied for the first 26 weeks of work, and for a 
further 26 weeks if it could help improve capacity for full-time work. The 
budget constraint in fact looks little different when the permitted work 
lower limit applies. From 2007/08 onwards the permitted work higher limit 
applies for the first 52 weeks.
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The figure shows that, out of work and receiving IB, the individual’s net income 
would be £161.95 a week: this comprises £78.50 in IB, full Housing Benefit (HB) 
of £80 and £3.45 in Income Support (IS); the £13.88 Council Tax bill is exactly 
offset by £13.88 Council Tax Benefit (CTB).
The first four hours of work (approximately) are rewarded with net income of 
£5.05 an hour, because small earnings are disregarded for means-tested benefits 
and their income is too low to face Income Tax or National Insurance Contributions. 
Gross earnings beyond that yield little or no additional net income (the budget 
constraint is flat) because of Income Tax and (more importantly) withdrawal of IS 
and then HB and CTB. If the individual works 16 hours or more, however, two 
things happen: they lose entitlement to IB, but this is outweighed by gaining 
entitlement to Working Tax Credit (WTC). The incentive to work that this provides 
is significantly boosted if they also receive £40 a week in RTWC: at 16 hours, their 
net income is £199.68 without RTWC but £239.68 with RTWC, a 20 per cent 
increase. The RTWC is not subject to Income Tax or National Insurance contributions 
and does not count as income for means-tested benefits, so it simply shifts the 
budget constraint up by £40 for all work of 16 hours or more (until earnings reach 
£15,000 a year, which for this person would imply a 57-hour working week). 
The case depicted in Figure 3.1 involved numerous assumptions about the 
individual’s circumstances. To give a flavour of what effect this might have, Figure 
3.2 shows the budget constraint (with and without RTWC) facing a very different 
individual: someone with a potential wage rate of £10 an hour, with a partner 
earning £288.46 a week (£15,000 a year) and two children (aged between one 
and 16), paying £120 a week rent and £21.15 a week Council Tax.
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Figure 3.2 Budget constraint in 2006/07 for example IB recipient:  
 higher-wage individual with working partner and two  
 children
Even when out of work and on IB, this individual has a net family income of 
£410.61 a week: his partner’s earnings (net of Income Tax and National Insurance 
contributions), Child Benefit and Child Tax Credit (CTC), as well as IB and (partial) 
HB. At 16 hours, RTWC makes the difference between net income of £451.34 
and £491.33, a much smaller proportionate difference (nine per cent) than in the 
previous example. And the RTWC does nothing at all to increase the incentive for 
this person to work full-time, since 29 hours of work would be enough to put 
their earnings above the £15,000 maximum for entitlement to RTWC. Indeed, 
this individual might reasonably decide to work part-time rather than full-time 
precisely in order to secure entitlement to the RTWC: net income at 20 hours’ 
work including RTWC (£503.34) would actually be higher than that at 30 hours’ 
work (£493.33).
These examples have assumed that the individual’s health status remains 
unchanged (or is regarded as such for determining benefit entitlement) even when 
the individual moves into work, so that they remain entitled to disability premiums 
in means-tested benefits and tax credits, for example. But it is also possible that 
moves into work reflect improved health or even that financial incentives to work 
promote efforts towards rehabilitation.
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Figure 3.3, therefore, shows the budget constraint facing our first example 
individual (as in Figure 3.1) if they are assumed to lose all disability-related 
entitlements at the same time as losing entitlement to IB. This would be the case 
if, for example, an improvement in health led immediately to them moving into 
paid work (for example if they were returning to a job that had been held open 
for them) or if they continued to receive IB between their health improving and 
moving into paid work.
Figure 3.3 Budget constraint in 2006/07 for example IB recipient:  
 single individual without children, minimum wage,  
 with no disability-related entitlements unless  
 receiving IB
 
Figure 3.3 shows a sharp fall in income at 16 hours of work, unlike the slight rise 
shown in Figure 3.1. This is because people without children must work 30 hours 
a week to qualify for WTC if they do not qualify on grounds of disability but only 
16 hours if claiming on grounds of disability. Thus, an individual moving off IB and 
into paid work of 16 hours or more as their health improves loses their IB, but 
does not become entitled to WTC unless they work at least 30 hours a week. In 
this example, they would be worse off working part-time than when they were 
on IB. Receipt of the RTWC changes this, though it is still only work of 30 hours 
or more (which confers entitlement to WTC, albeit without the disability element) 
that shows any significant financial reward.
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These examples are not intended as a comprehensive guide to work incentives 
facing IB claimants. Rather, they are intended to illustrate a few of the complexities 
that influence work incentives for this group, the variety of incentive patterns that 
can result and the impact that the RTWC might have in changing the options 
facing IB claimants.
3.4 Receipt of the RTWC
This section sets out the numbers estimated to receive the RTWC compared to 
both the number of participants in Pathways and the numbers estimated to move 
from Pathways into paid work (Section 3.4.1). It then goes on to examine data on 
the distribution of the length of RTWC claims (Section 3.4.2). 
3.4.1 Numbers receiving the RTWC
Only a relatively small proportion of those moving onto incapacity benefits have 
gone on to receive the RTWC. As shown in Chapter 2 (Table 2.1), the number 
of individuals moving onto the RTWC between April 2005 and March 2006 as 
12.2 per cent of the number mandated onto Pathways in the seven original pilot 
areas. In part, this low proportion will reflect the fact that not all of those who 
moved into incapacity benefits participated in Pathways – it was not compulsory 
for those whose medical condition was deemed particularly severe and those who 
were deemed likely to move into paid work anyway.
A similar statistic for those who were deemed to have entered Pathways can be 
derived from the most recent published DWP ‘Pathways to Work Performance 
Summary’. By the end of January 2007, as shown in column 3 of Table 3.1, out of 
the 427,290 individuals who had started receiving an incapacity benefit and were 
deemed to have entered Pathways, a total of 37,450 had received the RTWC. 
Note that this ‘receipt rate’ of 8.7 per cent will underestimate the final proportion 
who move onto the RTWC, since some of those mandated onto Pathways by 
January 2007 will move onto the RTWC at a later date. This is also consistent with 
the fact that the ‘receipt rate’ implied by Table 2.1 is greater than that suggested 
by the data presented in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Numbers moving onto Pathways, the RTWC or into paid 







No job start 
recorded
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pathways entrants 455,780 28,480 427,290 n/a
Of whom:
 Subsequent job entry recorded 67,410 7,660 59,760 n/a
 Subsequent RTWC recipients 43,820 6,360 37,450 25,010
Source: Tables 1, 6 and 7 of Blyth, B. (2007).
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The number of existing claimants of incapacity benefits who volunteered to 
participate in Pathways, and of these, the number who were recorded as having 
moved into paid work and the number who went on to receive the RTWC, are 
shown in column 2 of Table 3.1. Of the 28,480 existing recipients of incapacity 
benefits who chose to participate in Pathways by the end of January 2007, 
6,360 – some 22 per cent – had already received the RTWC. The fact that this is 
much higher than the 8.7 per cent observed among those who participated in 
Pathways as a result of moving onto an incapacity benefit is consistent with at 
least three (not mutually exclusive) possibilities: First, that Pathways has a larger 
impact on the employment outcomes of those existing claimants who volunteered 
for the programme than those who participated as a result of moving onto an 
incapacity benefit. Second, that those who volunteered for the programme were 
disproportionately those who were more likely to move into paid work even in 
the absence of the programme. Third, those who did move into paid work having 
participated in Pathways as a result of moving onto incapacity benefits were less 
likely to receive the RTWC. The 6,360 existing claimants of incapacity benefits who 
received the RTWC represented 83 per cent of the number recorded as having 
moved into paid work (7,660). However, among new IB claimants who were 
deemed to have entered Pathways, the numbers who received the RTWC appear 
much lower relative to the numbers recorded as having moved into paid work. By 
January 2007 a total of 59,760 of those who had moved onto an incapacity benefit 
and who were deemed to have entered Pathways were recorded as having moved 
into paid work but only 37,450 of these individuals had received the RTWC. This 
suggests that among this group only 63 per cent of those who moved into paid 
work had actually received the RTWC. 
In fact the true percentage is likely to be significantly below this as it seems that 
many individuals have moved into paid work but have not been recorded as doing 
so in the data. This is highlighted by the fact that of the 43,820 individuals who 
had received the RTWC, over half (25,010) did not show up in the employment 
data used by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) as having moved into 
paid work (but were then added into the numbers thought to have moved into 
paid work and, therefore, are included in the 67,410 figure). Under the assumption 
that all individuals who receive the RTWC have moved into paid work (i.e. that 
no payments are being made either fraudulently or due to a mistake by either the 
recipient or Jobcentre Plus), only 43 per cent of RTWC recipients who have moved 
into paid work are actually being identified in the raw data as having moved 
into paid work ((43,820–25,010)/43,820). If this level of underestimation is true 
among all those who had moved into paid work, regardless of whether or not they 
actually received the RTWC, the true number who had moved from Pathways into 
paid work would be 98,775 rather than 67,410 (i.e. (67,410–25,010)/0.43)). If 
one assumes that 85 per cent of these were individuals who were deemed to have 
entered Pathways as a result of being a new claimant of an incapacity benefit (i.e. 
59,760/67,410), this would imply that a total of 87,566 individuals had moved 
from being mandated on Pathways into paid work. Of these, only 37,450 – or 
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43 per cent – had received the RTWC. (Note that this 43 per cent is not the same 
as the 43 per cent cited already.)
Of course, this low figure will partly reflect individuals who have moved into paid 
work but are not eligible for the RTWC since they are working less than 16 hours 
a week or earning more than £15,000 per year, or expect to be in paid work for 
less than five weeks or because they received an incapacity benefit for less than 
13 weeks. 
Using survey data, one can estimate the likelihood of individuals meeting the 
hours and earnings requirements to qualify for the RTWC. Amongst those making 
an enquiry about claiming an incapacity benefit who subsequently worked and 
declared both earnings and hours, 12 per cent worked less than 16 hours a week 
and a further 30 per cent earned more than £15,000. Since virtually none of 
these individuals both worked less than 16 hours a week and earned more than 
£15,000, only 58 per cent of those taking a job fulfil both of these RTWC criteria. 
As a result the take-up rate among those eligible for the RTWC is estimated to 
be around three-quarters (i.e. 0.43/0.58=0.74). Furthermore, the eligibility rules 
are stricter than what we can test with these data: some will not have received 
incapacity benefits for 13 weeks and others might not expect to work for more 
than five weeks. Both of these factors would tend to increase the estimated take-
up rate further.13
Incomplete take-up is also likely to reflect individuals who were eligible for the 
RTWC not taking up their entitlement, either because they were not aware that 
they were eligible or because they believed that the costs of claiming outweigh 
the benefits. However, the costs of claiming might be expected to be low: the 
application form for the RTWC is a very simple two-page form14 and these individuals 
have all successfully claimed an incapacity benefit in the fairly recent past (which, 
in addition to suggesting that they should not have any great difficulty completing 
the application form, might also suggest that they are not unwilling to claim the 
RTWC for reasons of stigma). This is supported by evidence from a qualitative 
13 A further potential bias is that these data are based on individuals who 
made an enquiry about incapacity benefits, not all of whom will have gone 
onto claim an incapacity benefit. If those who made an enquiry but did not 
claim and then moved into paid work were more (less) likely to meet the 
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study of RTWC recipients which found that ‘the first [RTWC] application…was 
mostly a quick and easy process’.15
3.4.2 Duration of RTWC claims
Individuals who move onto the RTWC do not automatically qualify for an award 
for the whole year. The claims process operates as follows:
•	within	five	weeks	of	moving	into	paid	work,	individuals	have	to	make	a	claim	
for the RTWC; 
•	 after	 ten	weeks,	 recipients	 have	 to	 present	 evidence	 of	 their	 earnings	 (or,	 if	
self-employed, that they are trading). If sufficient evidence is produced then the 
payment is extended through to 26 weeks;
•	 after	22	weeks	recipients	are	automatically	sent	a	new	claim	form	and	told	that	
they must re-apply in order to continue to receive the payment for the final 
26 weeks;
•	 in	addition,	recipients	are	supposed	to	inform	Jobcentre	Plus	if	they	no	longer	
comply with the qualifying criteria – for example, if they cease to work at least 
16 hours per week or if their earnings rise above £15,000 per year.
Many recipients do not get the payment for the full year. Total expenditure on 
the RTWC in the seven original Pathways areas between April 2005 and March 
2006 was £12.3 million, and this was shared among a total of 8,585 recipients. 
Since RTWC payments are always £40 per week, this means that recipients were 
qualifying for the payment for an average of 36 weeks (12.3m/(40 x 8,585), which 
is 70 per cent of a year). Under the assumption that RTWC recipients claimed for 
either 26 weeks or for a full year (i.e. that all recipients were able to provide the 
required documentation at week ten and that none informed Jobcentre Plus that 
they had become ineligible at any other point), this would imply that only 38 per 
cent of recipients received the RTWC for the full year and that 62 per cent had 
their claim stopped at the half-way point. For more than 38 per cent of recipients 
to receive the RTWC for a full year, some claims would have to have ceased before 
the halfway mark. Early internal DWP estimates suggest that 45 per cent of RTWC 
awards made up to February 2005 ended exactly at the halfway stage, which 
suggests that some claims did indeed end before this point (or that some ended 
between the 26-week and one-year points).
If the motivation for the RTWC was to provide a 12-month increase in the incomes 
of those who had moved from incapacity benefits into paid work, then low take-
up rates would suggest that the policy was not as effective as it might be in 
meeting its objective. However, the motivation for the RTWC is to help encourage 
15 Page 33 of Corden, A. and Nice, K. (2006), Pathways to Work from Incapacity 
Benefits: A study of experience and use of Return to Work Credit, Research 
Report No. 353,, London: Department for Work and Pensions (http://www.
dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rports2005-2006/rrep353.pdf).
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incapacity benefit claimants to move off benefits and into paid work. Therefore, it 
is not necessarily the case that incomplete take-up of the RTWC (either initially or 
after 26 weeks) implies reduced effectiveness of Pathways. Those who moved into 
paid work but did not claim the RTWC presumably did not need this incentive – 
rather, they would have moved into paid work even in the absence of Pathways or 
else it was other components of the programme, such as Work Focused Interviews 
(WFIs) or the elements of the Choices package, that encouraged them to move 
into paid work. The same argument applies to individuals who remained in paid 
work for more than 26 weeks but only received the RTWC for a proportion of the 
time that they were eligible for it. Thus, not paying the RTWC to these individuals 
simply represents a saving to the Government.
On the other hand, if low take-up reflected widespread ignorance of the scheme 
(or high costs of claiming), then some of those who could have been persuaded 
to move off benefits and into paid work by the RTWC might not have been and 
low take-up does represent lower effectiveness. 
Correspondingly, measures to boost take-up of the RTWC could increase or 
reduce the cost-effectiveness of the policy. Cost-effectiveness would be reduced if 
any increase in RTWC take-up reflected payments to individuals who would have 
moved into paid work without the RTWC and rather than an increased impact 
of Pathways on the labour market outcomes of other individuals. For the cost-
effectiveness of Pathways to be preserved, any increase in RTWC take-up among 
those who would have entered paid work without the payment would have to 
be accompanied by a commensurate increase in the impact of Pathways on the 
numbers moving into paid work. 
3.5 Conclusions
Since the RTWC is a key part of Pathways, the contribution that it makes to both 
the benefits and the costs of Pathways are potentially an important determinant 
of the cost-effectiveness of the overall reform package.
Claimants of incapacity benefits often face weak incentives to move into work, not 
least because of the loss of IB itself. The RTWC can strengthen these incentives but 
its importance depends on the individual circumstances of the claimant: whether 
£40 a week is a lot or a little depends on the claimant’s earning power and whether 
they have other sources of income (such as a working partner). And the fact that 
the RTWC is available only if earnings do not exceed £15,000 a year might lead 
some people to move into lower-paid work than they otherwise would, in order 
to meet this requirement.
The analysis in this chapter has shown that a large number – possibly a majority – 
of those moving from Pathways into paid work do not receive the RTWC and not 
all of these fail to meet the hours and earnings eligibility criteria. In addition, many 
successful claims for the RTWC do not last for the full year. The average length 
of claim is 36 weeks (or 70 per cent of a year). However, the aim of RTWC is to 
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encourage claimants of incapacity benefits to move off benefits and into paid 
work. Therefore, limited take up of RTWC does not necessarily mean that it has 
failed to meet this aim. Those who moved into paid work but did not claim the 
RTWC, presumably did not need this incentive – rather, they would have moved 
into paid work even in the absence of Pathways or else it was other components 
of the programme, such as WFIs or the elements of the choices package, that 
encouraged them to move into paid work. Furthermore, any measures to boost 
RTWC take-up could potentially reduce rather than increase its cost-effectiveness. 
For the cost-effectiveness of Pathways to be preserved, any increase in RTWC 
take-up among those who would have entered paid work without the payment 
would have to be accompanied by a commensurate increase in the impact of 
Pathways on the numbers moving into paid work.




Programme costs are of considerable importance for future planning and are 
obviously essential for conducting a cost-benefit analysis. This chapter provides 
estimates of the additional costs engendered by Pathways. That is, the costs are 
net of expenditures that would have occurred in the absence of Pathways, such 
as those resulting from initial, as opposed to follow-up, Work Focused Interviews 
(WFIs). These net cost estimates are averaged over everyone who made an enquiry 
at a Jobcentre Plus office about claiming incapacity benefits, even if they never 
participated in Pathways or even received incapacity benefits. This is necessary 
to make the cost estimates compatible with the benefit estimates presented in 
Chapter 5, which are also averages across everyone who made an incapacity 
benefits enquiry. The cost estimates pertain to the original seven Pathways sites, 
as do the benefit estimates.
A wide variety of administrative data, as well as the estimates from Chapter 2 
of Pathways’ effects on participation in the programme’s components, are used 
in this chapter to estimate net costs that result from five different sources: (1) 
staff costs at Jobcentre Plus (the salaries and non-salary expenditures, including 
travel costs, office expenditures, the rental cost of office space and computer 
purchases and maintenance, associated with the staff time required to administer 
the screening tool and to conduct the follow-up WFIs); (2) the costs of the Choices 
components; (3) payments made to individuals through the Return to Work Credit 
(RTWC) and the Adviser Discretionary Fund (ADF); (4) costs resulting from fast-
tracking Personal Capability Assessments (PCAs); and (5) indirect taxes, such as 
VAT, that result from Government expenditure on Pathways. 
The key findings are as follows:
•	 The	average	net	cost	of	Pathways	per	individual	who	made	an	incapacity	benefit	
enquiry was £340. If these costs are adjusted to pertain only to individuals who 




around £100 per individual who made an incapacity benefits enquiry, with about 
three-quarters of these costs attributable to staff salaries and the remainder 
resulting from various non-salary expenditures. Staff costs mainly result from 
the additional Incapacity Benefit Personal Advisers (IBPAs) who were needed to 
conduct the mandatory follow-up WFIs, but other additional personnel were 
needed as well. If staff costs were averaged over only people who attended at 
least one follow-up WFI, rather than over everyone who made an enquiry, they 
would be around £550.
•	When	averaged	over	all	the	individuals	who	made	an	incapacity	benefits	enquiry,	
the cost of Choices package is around £64, with about 80 per cent of this cost 
attributable to referrals to the Condition Management Programme (CMP). The 
cost of a referral to CMP is a little over £1,000, on average, but only about five 
per cent of those making an incapacity benefits enquiry were subsequently 
referred.
•	 A	 little	 over	 40	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 total	 cost	 of	 Pathways,	 £138	 per	 Incapacity	
Benefit (IB) enquiry, resulted from payments to individuals, and almost all of this 
cost is attributable to the RTWC. Fewer than ten per cent of those making an 
incapacity benefits enquiry received a RTWC award but the average award for 
these people was £1,431.




This chapter provides estimates of the costs of Pathways in the seven original 
Pathways pilot districts. Like the rest of the analysis in this report, it focuses on 
the costs for new and repeat incapacity benefits claimants. Because Pathways 
has now been rolled out to all new and repeat claimants, the cost estimates are 
of interest on their own. For example, they may help in planning for any further 
extensions of the policy. In addition, they are essential to the cost-benefit analysis, 
which is reported in Chapter 6.
The key objective of the cost analysis is to estimate the additional costs that 
result from Pathways (‘net costs’), rather than the sum of costs resulting from 
Pathways and costs that would accrue even in the absence of Pathways (‘gross 
costs’). For example, an initial WFI is required of most incapacity benefits claimants 
in non-Pathways areas, as well as in Pathways districts; but follow-up WFIs are 
required only in the latter. Gross costs would include the costs of all the WFIs that 
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occur, including the initial WFI; but net costs include only the costs of the follow-
up interviews.16
Net costs are comparable to the benefit estimates used in the cost-benefit 
analysis, while gross costs are not. The reason for this, as will be seen in Chapter 
5, is that the benefit estimates rely on estimates of the net effects of Pathways 
on employment, earnings and benefit receipt. That is, they rely on estimates of 
the differences between what employment, earnings and benefit receipt would 
have been in the absence Pathways and what they were in the presence of the 
programme. Estimates of net costs have an identical interpretation.
Because the estimates of benefits that are used in the cost-benefit analysis are 
averaged over everyone who made an enquiry at a Jobcentre Plus office about 
claiming incapacity benefits (see Chapter 5), costs are similarly averaged over 
all these people. This allows Pathways’ costs and benefits to be appropriately 
compared. It means, however, that costs are averaged over people who never 
participated in Pathways, as well as individuals who did actively participate. 





participating in Pathways because they found employment or for other 
reasons;
•	 some	initially	qualified	for	incapacity	benefits	but	failed	their	PCA	before	actively	
participating in Pathways. (Because fast-tracking PCAs is part of Pathways, they 
did participate in the programme, in a sense, by receiving an earlier PCA than 
they otherwise would have);
•	 some	qualified	for	incapacity	benefits	but	were	deemed	unlikely	to	work	because	
of the severity of their disability or health problem and consequently were not 
required to participate in Pathways. (These people, who were also exempt from 
the PCA, could voluntarily participate in Pathways, but most did not);
•	 some	qualified	for	 incapacity	benefits	but	were	screened	out	of	Pathways	by	
the screening tool, which predicted that they were likely to find employment 
on their own within 12 months. (However, these people could volunteer for 
Pathways and in fact, as suggested in Chapter 3, had a strong incentive to do 
so just before taking a job because they would then qualify for the RTWC.)
16 Strictly speaking, the discussion in the text oversimplifies. The screening tool 
is administered during the initial WFIs in the Pathways areas but not in the 
non-Pathways areas. The cost of the extra staff time required to administer 




Although their exact number is unknown, the groups listed above account for a 
substantial proportion of those who made an initial incapacity benefits enquiry 
(perhaps, as many as half17). It is apparent that most of them added little, if anything, 
to the costs of Pathways. However, Pathways may have influenced the behaviour 
of many of these people. For example, individuals who did not pursue their initial 
enquiry about incapacity benefits may have been dissuaded from doing so because 
they wished to avoid WFIs. Therefore, it was reasonable to use a broad sample in 
estimating the impacts of Pathways. Nevertheless, it should be recognised that if 
the costs of Pathways were averaged across only people who actively participated 
in the programme, they would appear considerably larger than the estimates used 
in the cost-benefit analysis. We return to this issue below. 
Because we provide separate cost estimates for the different components of 
Pathways, it is also important to recognise that even individuals who actively 
participated in Pathways did not participate in all its components. For example, 
some people returned to work before ever participating in a follow-up WFI but 
did receive RTWC payments. Others participated in follow-up WFIs, which were 
mandatory for recipients of incapacity benefits who were out of work, but did not 
participate in the programmes included in the Choices package, such as New Deal 
for Disabled People (NDDP) and CMP, which were voluntary. 
By averaging the costs of each component of Pathways over the same base group 
– all the individuals who made an enquiry about incapacity benefits, regardless 
of whether they actually participated in any component – the costs of the 
different components can be appropriately compared to one another, as well as 
to the benefits of Pathways. However, in this chapter we not only report the cost 
estimates we use in the cost-benefit analysis; we also try to provide some sense 
of the cost of each component of Pathways for those people who actually receive 
the service.
As with the participation rates presented in Chapter 2, the estimates of net costs 
reported in this chapter are estimated for all seven of the original Pathways districts 
and, in addition, are also estimated for just the four April districts. 
Pathways entailed a number of different types of cost. For the purposes of this 
chapter, we divide costs into three major categories: staff costs (e.g. the cost of 
staff time required to administer the screening tool and to conduct the follow-up 
WFIs), the cost of the Choices components and payments made to individuals 
as a result of Pathways (e.g. RTWC payments). These three cost components are 
discussed in the following three sections of the chapter and estimates of the 
17 As discussed in Chapter 2, about 78 per cent of those who made an enquiry 
went on to become claimants. Hence 22 per cent of those making an 
enquiry did not become claimants (the first two points listed above). More 
than another ten per cent of those recorded as making enquiries became 
short-term claimants. The size of the remaining groups is not known but is 
thought to be appreciable.
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costs of each are presented. Because Pathways attempted to fast-track PCAs, an 
additional section attempts to determine whether this resulted in any additional 
cost. The final section of the chapter pulls together the cost estimates presented 
earlier to provide an estimate of Pathways’ total net cost per incapacity benefits 
enquiry. It also considers the implications of the programme’s effects on indirect 
taxes such as VAT.
4.3 Cost of staff
The key additional personnel that were needed for administering Pathways were 
IBPAs who conducted the follow-up WFIs mandated by the programme. However, 
operating Pathways also required additional staff who filled other roles. These 
included supervisory personnel, Administrative Support Officers who set up WFI 
appointments and perform a number of other administrative tasks, Disability 
Employment Advisers, Work Psychologists, Financial Assessors, personnel that 
interacted with employers to help develop job openings for Pathways participants, 
staff that provided in-work support and individuals who were involved in appeals 
hearings that resulted from sanctions or when individuals were denied incapacity 
benefits. In addition to the field staff involved in administering Pathways, there 
were also central administrative personnel who oversaw the operation of Pathways 
in all the sites in which it was implemented. As well as salary costs, the additional 
staff needed for Pathways also engendered non-salary expenditures such as 
work-related travel costs, training, office supplies (e.g. stationery), the costs of 
conferences and (most importantly) overhead costs (for example, office space, 
telephones, computers and office furniture).
The staff costs that are reported in this section include estimates of the salaries paid 
to all the additional personnel that were required for Pathways and the non-salary 
costs that resulted from employing these people. These cost estimates pertain to the 
12-month period from April 2005 to March 2006. With the exception of overhead 
costs, the estimates were obtained from administrative project expenditure data 
that became available in May 2006.18 The administrative data list reimbursement 
amounts paid to each district in which Pathways is operating. The figures distinguish 
between salary (which includes Government payments for pensions and employer 
National Insurance contributions) and non-salary expenditures but do not break 
down salary expenditures by type of staff (e.g. IBPAs compared to other staff).19 The 
figures are reported as aggregate sums. To estimate costs per incapacity benefits 
18 We are indebted to George Malcolm of Jobcentre Plus for providing us with 
these data and for his patience in helping us to interpret them.
19 The Pathways cost model for new and repeat incapacity benefit claimants, 
which is used to project the future cost of Pathways, suggests that a little 




enquiry, it was therefore necessary to divide these figures by 78,600, the number 
of people who made such an enquiry during the same period.20
The amounts of the reimbursements for salary that were made to each Jobcentre 
Plus district are based on estimates of the number of additional workers of 
different types that each district required to operate Pathways for new and repeat 
claimants. These estimates, in turn, are based, in part, on the number of new and 
repeat incapacity benefits claimants who were expected to be added to the rolls 
each year and the follow-up WFIs that were expected to be conducted for these 
claimants. The number of additional workers who appear to have been needed in 
each salary classification is multiplied by the annual salary paid to a worker in that 
category and then summed across the categories to obtain an estimate of total 
expenditures on salary. 
Although the resulting estimates are reasonable approximations, they may not 
be exact. It is possible, for example, that a given district may have been allotted 
funds that were sufficient to allow it to hire more staff than it actually needed to 
operate Pathways. If so, it could use some of these surplus staff to perform non-
Pathways tasks that otherwise would have been insufficiently staffed. Alternatively, 
the district may not have been allocated sufficient staff to operate Pathways and 
hence, used staff that otherwise would have performed non-Pathways tasks. 
There is no strong evidence one way or the other as to whether too many/few 
staff to operate Pathways was provided to each district. Thus, we use the amounts 
reported in the administrative cost records.
As previously indicated, the cost study, like the estimates of Pathways’ benefits, 
is limited to people who made an enquiry about incapacity benefits. However, 
the administrative cost records include expenditures on existing claimants (i.e. 
people who were receiving incapacity benefits when Pathways was rolled out) 
who voluntarily participated in Pathways, as well as on individuals who made an 
enquiry about incapacity benefits.21 Existing claimants who participate voluntarily 
constitute only 3.5 per cent of the total number of people in these two groups, 
however.22 To exclude the cost of dealing with existing claimants from total staff 
costs, the cost figures from the administrative records have been multiplied by 
0.965 (1 – 0.035). 
As mentioned above, the administrative cost records do not include the cost of 
overheads. However, DWP provided data on the rental value of the space occupied 
by Jobcentre Plus staff at four of the seven original Pathways pilot districts. The 
estimate of the annual cost of accommodation that is used in this study, £4,156, 
20 We are indebted to Deborah Pritchard of Department for Work and Pensions 
(DWP) for providing us with this figure.
21 The cost records do not include expenditures on continuing incapacity benefit 
claimants who have been recently mandated to participate in Pathways.
22 They account for an even smaller proportion of the total number of follow-
up WFIs: only 2.4 per cent.
Cost analysis
39
is calculated by averaging over the values for these four districts. In addition, 
standard figures exist that are used by DWP cost analysts to determine other 
overhead items. Although they are somewhat dated, they appear to be the best 
available estimates of overheads.23 The overhead figures that are used in the study, 
which pertain to annual costs and are the same for each staff member regardless 
of position, are listed below:
 Communications £1,335
 Accommodation  £4,156
 Desks and pedestals £1,000
 Personal computers £1,500
 IT services  £1,700
 Total   £9,691
To use these figures for the cost analysis, we first determined the average annual 
salary cost of a member of Pathways staff. To do this, we used the 2005/06 
Pathways projection model for new and repeat incapacity benefits claimants. This 
model provides predictions of both the number of required staff and the total 
annual salary bill for these staff. We simply divided the second of these numbers 
by the first. The resulting estimate is £25,014. We then computed an ‘overhead 
rate’ of 0.3874 by dividing the total overhead amount of £9,691 by £25,014. 
Finally, the overhead rate was multiplied by the total salary cost figures from the 
administrative records to obtain total expenses on overhead.
Staff costs per incapacity benefit enquiry are reported in Table 4.1. Because they 
are based on the number of additional staff required to operate Pathways, rather 
than the total number of Jobcentre Plus staff who have responsibility for recipients 
of incapacity benefits, they are estimates of net cost, not gross costs. As previously 
mentioned, these estimates are reported separately for all seven of the original 
Pathways sites and for just the four April districts.
23 Attempts to determine the source of these figures were unsuccessful so 
there is some uncertainty about them. However, they do not have very much 
effect on our estimates of total cost.
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Table 4.1 Pathways net staff costs per IB enquiry  
 (April 2005 – March 2006)
Seven original 
sites
Four April sites 
only
Total field staff salaries £68.99 £65.57
Central administrative staff salaries 4.29 4.29
Field staff overhead 26.69 25.37
Central administration staff overhead 1.72 1.72
Field staff travel and support 1.45 1.59
Central administrative staff travel and support 0.56 0.56
Other field office costs (e.g. conferences, IT) 1.59 1.74
Other central administrative office costs 1.91 1.91
Total £107.20 £102.75
 
Total net staff costs appear rather modest, not much in excess of £100 per 
incapacity benefit enquiry. They are quite similar for the April districts and the 
seven original sites. Almost all the staff costs resulting from Pathways (89 per cent) 
are attributable to the salaries of the additional field staff required to deal with 
Pathways participants and the overhead costs generated by these staff. 
An important reason why the staff costs of Pathways appear as low as they do is 
because they are averaged over everyone who made an enquiry about incapacity 
benefits between April 2005 and March 2006. As pointed out earlier, this is 
necessary to make the cost estimates comparable to the estimates of Pathways’ 
benefits that appear in Chapter 5. However, only a minority of these people ever 
actually attended a follow-up WFI: some did not receive incapacity benefits, some 
were excused from participating in WFIs, some found jobs prior to an appointment 
for a follow-up WFI and some failed their PCA before their first follow-up WFI 
was scheduled. This is important because most of the work performed by the 
staff employed to run Pathways either directly involved administering repeat WFIs 
(e.g. the work of IBPA and Administrative Support Officers) or was triggered by 
the WFIs (e.g. the work of Disability Employment Advisers, Work Psychologists 
and individuals involved in appeal hearings). If the staff costs of Pathways were 
computed by averaging over only those people who had at least one follow-up 
WFI between April 2005 and March 2006 (15,560), rather than all the individuals 
who made enquires about Pathways during the 12-month period (78,600), they 
would be about five times larger than the estimates appearing in Table 4.1. 




4.4 Cost of Choices
The Choices package consists of a number of programmes that existed prior to 
Pathways. These include the NDDP, Work Preparation, Workstep and Work Based 
Learning for Adults. In addition, the package includes a new programme, CMP, 
which was introduced exclusively in Pathways sites when the Pathways pilots 
started. As indicated in Chapter 2, Pathways had virtually no effect on the take-
up of Work Preparation, Workstep and Work Based Learning for Adults. In this 
section, therefore, we limit our efforts to estimating costs of NDDP and CMP 
resulting from Pathways. 
The cost estimates for these two programmes include outlays for staff training, 
accommodation, travel and so forth. However, most of the costs resulted from 
paying staff salaries. Table 4.2 provides estimates of the costs of NDDP and CMP 
attributable to Pathways, as well as some additional pertinent information. We 
briefly describe each of the two programmes below and then interpret the figures 
appearing in the table.
Table 4.2 Net costs of Choices per IB enquiry (April 2005 –  
 March 2006)
Seven original sites Four April sites only
New Deal for Disabled People
Impact of Pathways on NDDP registration* 1.22 0.34
Average cost of NDDP per registrant £804-£1062 £804-£1062
Average cost per incapacity benefit enquiry £11.39 £3.17
Condition Management Programme
Impact of Pathways on CMP referrals* 5.23 4.30
Average cost of CMP per referral £1033.79 £1121.86
Average cost per incapacity benefit enquiry £54.07 £48.24
Total cost of Choices £65.46 £51.41
*In percentage points.
The NDDP is the major Government employment programme available to people 
claiming incapacity benefits. NDDP is delivered locally by ‘Job Brokers’, a mixture 
of voluntary, public and private sector organisations. Although Job Brokers vary 
enormously in size and in how they operate, most help clients with job search and 
attempt to increase clients’ confidence in their ability to work. Many also attempt 
to develop clients’ work-related skills and monitor clients’ progress in jobs after 
they are placed, sometimes intervening when the client encounters problems on 
the job. Job Brokers receive a payment from the DWP for each client they register, 
for each client they place in a job and for each placed client who continues to 
work for at least three months. 
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Greenberg and Davis (2007) recently completed a cost analysis and a cost-benefit 
analysis of NDDP. Their cost analysis was based on detailed cost data that were 
collected from 19 Job Brokers in 2003. Their cost estimates pertain to both 
new and existing incapacity benefits claimants, as Job Brokers had no way of 
separating their costs for the two groups. Although there was some uncertainty 
concerning exact costs, they found that the cost of serving an average participant 
was between £804 and £1,062 in 2005 prices. They argue that the true cost is 
probably towards the bottom of this range. 
Although the cost of dealing with an NDDP participant is fairly high, the amount 
spent on NDDP as a result of Pathways is small. The reason for this is that Pathways 
did not increase registration in NDDP by very much. As indicated in Chapter 2, 
around six per cent of those making an enquiry about incapacity benefits in the 
seven original Pathways’ sites would have registered for NDDP in the absence 
of Pathways. Pathways increased this by just 1.22 percentage points (Table 2.1). 
Thus, as shown in Table 4.2, Pathways’ impact on NDDP registration in the seven 
original sites resulted in a cost of between £9.81 (0.0122 x £804) and £12.96 
(0.0122 x £1,062) per incapacity benefit enquiry. Because this range is not very 
wide, we simply use the mid-point of £11.39 for purposes of the cost analysis. 
The increase was even smaller in the April Pathways sites because the impact on 
participation in NDDP in those areas was smaller, only about a third of a percentage 
point. Hence, in those areas, the cost was between £2.73 and £3.61, with a mid-
point of £3.17.
The objective of CMP is to help move claimants of incapacity benefits into work 
by helping them to manage their health problem better in a work context. 
Arrangements to accomplish this vary somewhat. Most CMP participants are people 
with mental health or musculo-skeletal problems. These people also make up the 
bulk of people receiving incapacity benefits. After an initial assessment, a range of 
services are provided by occupational therapists, physiotherapists, psychologists, 
counsellors, and others. The exact services that are offered to an individual depends 
on their condition but can include coping skills, advice, information about exercise 
and confidence building. Services are sometimes arranged on a one-to-one basis 
and sometimes in a group or classroom setting. Greater costs are sustained in 
delivering the CMP in rural areas, where staff and participants incur travel costs 
and space to provide services must sometimes be rented, than in urban areas.
CMP is managed by the NHS and delivered by a mixture of NHS and private 
providers. The NHS is reimbursed for its expenditures on the basis of contracts 
negotiated with DWP. However, decisions about which individuals to refer to CMP 
are mainly made by IBPAs at Jobcentre Plus offices. The reimbursement amounts 
may be more or less than actual costs because they are based on projections of 
the number of people who will receive CMP services each year, projections that 
will inevitably be inexact. Thus, as discussed below, the cost estimates that we 
report here are based on actual expenditures. 
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Information on the costs of CMP between April 2005 and March 2006 has been 
supplied to us by the CMP project managers at the seven Pathways sites. Because 
all the individuals who are referred to CMP engender some costs, even if they 
do not actually receive the services offered or even undergo an initial assessment 
– for example, records must be transferred and appointments booked – we 
have obtained information on average costs per referral. However, a substantial 
proportion of individuals who are referred are also assessed and a large fraction of 
the latter actually does receive some services. In the one Pathways site for which 
we have the required information, 80 per cent of those referred were assessed 
and 70 per cent of those assessed continued with the programme. 
As shown in Table 4.2, average costs per referral are nearly £1,034 in the original 
seven Pathways’ sites.24 This estimate is for both new and existing incapacity 
benefits claimants, as CMP operations do not differentiate between the two 
groups. However, between April 2005 and March 2006, most of those referred 
to CMP would have been new claimants. As seen in Chapter 2, only about five 
per cent of all those making an enquiry about incapacity benefits in the seven 
original Pathways’ sites are subsequently referred to CMP. Thus, the cost of CMP 
per enquiry is only £54.08 (0.0523 x £1,034). The cost in the four April sites, 
which is computed similarly, is about £6 less.
4.5 Cost of payments to individuals
Pathways provides important financial support to a subset of its individuals. 
The forms of this support include the RTWC, the ADF, and cost reimbursements 
for travel to WFIs and to Choices programmes. In this section, we estimate the 
amount of these payments.25 Table 4.3 provides summary information about these 
payments. The figures in this table for the seven original sites are similar to those 
for the April sites so our discussion again focuses on the former.
The RTWC is described in some detail in Chapter 3. Although the weekly RTWC 
payment of £40 can, in principle, continue to be received for up to a year, as seen 
in Chapter 3, a person who qualifies for the RTWC on average receives it for a 
24 The figure in Table 4.2 is a weighted average of cost per referral in the 
individual sites, with the weights consisting of the number of referrals in each 
site. The unweighted average of costs per referral is £1,052, with a standard 
deviation of £202: the values vary across the sites, but not greatly. CMP costs 
per referral have probably fallen over time as various improvements have 
been made, and may still be falling. For example, as there were no CMP 
service precedents, senior practitioners were initially heavily used. Over time, 
as experience developed, more junior staff were integrated into operations.
25 Most of the costs of administering these payments is included in the estimates 
of staff costs that are reported in Section 4.3.
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bit less than 36 weeks.26 Thus, individuals who qualified for the RTWC received 
£1,431, on average.
Of all the people who made enquiries about incapacity benefits, only 9.54 per 
cent ultimately received RTWC payments. Thus, the RTWC payment per incapacity 
benefit enquiry was about £136 (0.0954 x £1,431).
The ADF provides funds that IBPAs can use to help support Pathways participants 
in job search or immediately after finding work. For example, the funds can be 
used for tools and uniforms, travel costs, child care and short work-related courses. 
As shown in Table 4.3 (estimated using data from the Pathways database), the 
average payment was £107.
Table 4.3 Net costs of payments to Pathways participants per IB  




Four April sites 
only
RTWC
Impact of Pathways on receipt of RTWC* 9.54% 7.80%
Average payment per RTWC recipient £1431.15 £1448.34
Average payment per enquiry £136.49 £113.01
ADFs
Impact of Pathways on receipt of ADF* 1.22% 0.80%
Average payment per ADF recipient £106.91 £73.92
Average payment per enquiry £1.30 £0.82
Reimbursed Pathways participants expenses 
(mainly travel costs to WFIs and Choices)
Average payment per enquiry £0.14 £0.13
Total cost £137.93 £113.96
*In percentage points.
26 As indicated in Chapter 3, this figure was computed by first dividing total 
RTWC expenditures in the seven original Pathways sites between April 2005 
and March 2006 (£12,280,700) by the number of RTWC awards over the 
same period (8,585) and then dividing this figure by £40. The value for 
RTWC costs, which was obtained from Pathways’ administrative project 
expenditure records, includes expenditures on RTWC awards made to both 
new and repeat incapacity benefit claimants and existing claimants who 
volunteered for Pathways. Thus, the value was divided by the total number 
of RTWC awards received by both groups. Because more than seven times 
as many new and repeat claimants received RTWC awards as volunteering 




In Chapter 2, we found that only 4.69 per cent of those who made enquiries 
about incapacity benefits would have received an ADF award in the absence of 
Pathways and that Pathways increased this by just over one percentage point. Thus, 
Pathways increased ADF payments by only £1.30 (0.0122 x £107) per enquiry.
Pathways allows for reimbursement of certain expenses that participants incur as 
a result of the programme. These reimbursements mainly covered travel to WFIs 
and the Choices programmes. The amounts of these reimbursements are available 
in the same administrative project expenditure data that we used for computing 
staff costs. Thus, in determining the cost of reimbursing Pathways participants 
expenditures, we followed the same procedures as we used in estimating staff 
costs (see Section 4.3). As can be seen in Table 4.3, outlays to reimburse Pathways 
participants for their travel expenses were extremely small, only about 14 pence 
per incapacity benefit enquiry.
4.6 Cost of fast-tracking Personal Capability  
 Assessments
As noted in Chapter 1, one goal of Pathways was to fast-track the PCA so that it 
took place within 12 weeks of the start of an incapacity benefits claim. Because, 
prior to the introduction of Pathways, some claimants left benefits after 12 weeks 
but before their PCA was scheduled (often not until around week 20), the number 
of PCAs increased to the extent that PCAs took place earlier. As a consequence, 
the cost of Pathways also increased. The increase in cost that is associated with 
fast-tracking the PCA is considered in this section.
About three-quarters of the claimants who undergo a PCA receive a full physical 
examination. This examination costs £44.61 per claimant. The remaining quarter 
of those who undergo a PCA is subject to only a scrutiny review, a paper review of 
the case, which costs £6. These values are identical in Pathways and non-Pathways 
areas. Hence, the costs of PCAs will only increase as a result of Pathways if a higher 
proportion of claimants receive examinations or scrutiny reviews in Pathways areas 
than in non-Pathways districts. However, in addition to examinations and scrutiny 
reviews, a Capability Report, which attempts to indicate what a claimant is able 
to do, is produced for most claimants who are examined in Pathways areas but 
not for claimants who are examined in the non-Pathways areas. The Capability 
Report, which is intended for use by IBPAs during WFIs, costs £8.34.
A recent analysis of PCA has been conducted by DWP (2007b). This analysis found 
that during the year prior to the introduction of Pathways, 33.7 per cent of the 
claimant population in the seven original Pathways districts were fully examined 
and another 11.1 per cent underwent scrutiny reviews.27 These percentages were 
slightly smaller in the matched non-Pathways districts. In addition, Capability 




Reports were produced for nearly 30 per cent of the claimants in Pathways districts. 
Using difference-in-differences methods similar to those described in Chapter 2, 
the DWP PCA analysis further found that Pathways increased the percentage of 
incapacity benefits claimants who underwent an examination by 3.0 percentage 
points and the percentage who were subject to a scrutiny review by 1.0 percentage 
points. By bringing forward the PCA, Pathways also increased the percentage of 
claimants who received a second PCA within one year of starting their claim by 
0.6 percentage points (from 0.5 per cent ). 
Taking all these impacts of Pathways into consideration, the programme appears 
to have increased the costs of PCA examinations by £1.61 per claimant and the 
costs of scrutiny reviews by £0.06 per claimant. An additional cost of £2.47 per 
claimant arose because Pathways provided for Capability Reports. Thus, as a 
result of Pathways, PCA-related costs per claimant increased by a total of £4.14. 
However, only about 78 per cent of all those who make enquiries about incapacity 
benefits actually become claimants. Thus, if measured per enquiry, rather than per 
claimant, PCA costs that resulted from Pathways were only £3.23 (£4.14 x 0.78).
4.7 Total cost of Pathways
Table 4.4 summarises the average net costs of Pathways for each individual who 
made an incapacity benefit enquiry between April 2005 and March 2006. The total 
average cost was £314 in the seven original Pathways’ sites and £271 in the four 
sites that rolled out Pathways in April 2004. Over 80 per cent of these amounts 
are attributable to staff salaries, the CMP, and (especially) RTWC payments.
Table 4.4 Net costs of Pathways per IB enquiry (April 2005 –  
 March 2006)
Cost component Seven original sites Four April sites only
Staff
Salaries £73.28 £69.86
Other staff costs 33.92 32.89
Choices
New Deal for Disabled People 11.39 3.17 
CMPe 54.07 48.24
Accelerated PCAs 3.23 3.23
Payments to Pathways participants
RTWC 136.49 113.01
ADF 1.30 0.82
Reimbursed Expenses 0.14 0.13




In interpreting these figures, it is important to bear in mind that they are averaged 
over everyone who made an incapacity benefit enquiry. About 22 per cent of 
those making enquiries never became a benefit claimant. If we adjust the total 
cost estimate for the seven original Pathways’ sites by reasonably assuming that 
these people did not incur any costs whatsoever, the value would be slightly in 
excess of £400 (that is, £314/(1-.22) = £402).
More importantly, costs are as low as they appear because Pathways had only 
moderate effects on the proportions of those making enquiries who received 
WFIs, the Choices components and the various types of payments to Pathways 
participants. As previously discussed, the cost of many of the individual programme 
components was substantial for those who actually received the service or the 
payment award. 
The cost estimates presented in Table 4.4 relate to the Government’s cash outlays. 
But the true resource cost of the policy is not what the Government spends: it 
is the value of what the inputs used by the Government to provide Pathways 
could have produced if utilised in the private sector. There is a close relationship 
between these two: roughly speaking, the amount the Government might have 
to pay to use the inputs might be the remuneration they could command in the 
private sector. However, one important difference is VAT: some of the inputs have 
VAT charged on them, whereas others do not. This causes the cost of resources 
to the Government to differ in a way that does not reflect the underlying value of 
the resources themselves. Thus, for example, there is no VAT on the services of a 
Government employee but there is VAT on the services of an external contractor. 
This may be reflected in a higher cash outlay for services provided by the external 
contractor; but this extra VAT paid by the Government (to itself, ultimately) does 
not reflect a fundamentally higher resource cost to the economy of using the 
contractor, rather than the employee. If these two (otherwise identical, say) 
individuals were employed in the private sector, they might both produce goods 
or services worth the same amount. This resource cost could be measured by 
including or by excluding the VAT that would be added to this amount when 
the produce was sold. These measures would reflect the resource cost in market 
(i.e. VAT-inclusive) or producer (i.e. VAT-exclusive) prices, which are equally valid 
metrics as long as used consistently for measuring costs and benefits. Our slight 
preference is for market prices as this better represents the everyday notion of the 
value of a pound.
To measure the real resource cost, we deduct from the cash outlays in Table 4.4 an 
estimate of the VAT actually paid on the different components. On the assumption 
that inputs are paid the value of what they could produce elsewhere, this gives 
the real resource cost in producer (i.e. VAT-exclusive) prices. We then add on an 
estimate of the indirect taxes that would be charged on what these real resources 
could produce in the private sector. This is done by assuming that the indirect 
tax rate is 20.4 per cent, the average tax rate on expenditure taking into account 
varying VAT rates and excise duties (see Chapter 5 for more detail). By adding 
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indirect taxes to the real resource cost in producer prices, total costs are valued at 
market prices. These adjustments for indirect taxes are not needed for payments 
to Pathways participants since these represent a transfer of, rather than a use of, 
real economic resources and are, therefore, automatically expressed in market 
prices.
The final estimates of the overall costs of Pathways per IB enquiry are given in 
Table 4.5.
Table 4.5 Overall estimated costs of Pathways per IB enquiry  
 (April 2005 – March 2006)
Cost component Seven original sites Four April sites only
Real resource costs in producer prices
Staff
Salaries £73.28 £69.86




Accelerated PCAs 3.13 3.13
Indirect taxes (market price adjustment) 34.78 31.11
Transfer payments
Payments to Pathways participants
RTWC 136.49 113.01
ADF 1.30 0.82
Reimbursed expenses 0.14 0.13
Total net costs (in market prices) £339.65 £294.14
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5 Estimating the financial  
 benefits of Pathways
5.1 Summary
This chapter presents estimates of the financial benefits of Pathways for both 
individuals and the Exchequer. The analysis is done in three stages: First, we 
estimate how receipt of incapacity benefits, employment, hours of work and 
earnings, both with and without the policy, are related to observed individual 
characteristics. Second, we simulate these outcomes for a sample of individuals 
who have recently moved onto Incapacity Benefit (IB) and model their tax and 
benefit position in each of these different states. Third, we use the estimated 
impacts of Pathways on employment and benefit outcomes, combined with the 
tax and benefit positions associated with each of these outcomes, to estimate the 
impact of the policy on the finances of both individuals and the Exchequer under 
a variety of different assumptions as to how long the programme’s impact might 
last.
The main findings are as follows:
•	Where	the	policy	effects	are	on	an	individual	who	would	otherwise	be	in	receipt	
of the long-run rate of IB, we estimate that Pathways increases their net family 
income by £5.49 per week on average (excluding any payments to Pathways 
participants). In addition, it saves the Exchequer £7.70 per week on average. 
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•	 Of	this	Exchequer	gain,	only	£1.98	represents	a	reduction	 in	spending	on	 IB.	
There are significant additional contributions from increased income tax and 
National Insurance receipts and reduced payments of Income Support (IS), 
income-based Jobseeker‘s Allowance (JSA), Housing Benefit (HB) and Council 
Tax Benefit (CTB). This reflects the fact that the impact estimates suggest that 
the main effect of Pathways is not to move people off IB who would otherwise 
have stayed on it, but to move people who would have left IB without Pathways 
into employment instead of into unemployment or being economic inactive. 
In addition, increased employment means increased Working Tax Credit 
(WTC) payments, which far outweighs the reduction in Child Tax Credit (CTC) 
from increasing the incomes of those with children. Increased indirect taxes 
(predominantly VAT) on the sale of goods and services produced by individuals 
moving into work are also important.
•	 The	 total	 financial	 benefits	 of	 Pathways	 depend	 on	 how	 long	 the	 weekly	
impacts last. Cautiously assuming that the impacts persist for 70 weeks – since 
the impact is estimated to have started three to four months after IB claim, 
this corresponds to 19 to 20 months after the IB claim – the results imply that 
the overall benefit of Pathways is £1,041 per incapacity benefits enquiry, with 
individuals gaining £526 and the Exchequer gaining £515. Alternatively, if the 
impacts last for 150 weeks, then the overall benefit of Pathways is £2,023, with 
individuals gaining £935 and the Exchequer £1,127.
5.2 Introduction
Bewley et al. (2007) estimated the impact of the original seven Pathways pilots 
on affected individuals’ benefit receipt, employment and earnings. This chapter 
estimates the financial implications of those impacts for the individuals concerned 
and for the Exchequer.
Estimating these financial implications is not as simple as it might appear. 
For both individuals and the Government, it depends on how the changes in 
circumstances affect overall tax and benefit payments. The complexity of the tax 
and benefit system and the wide variation in individual circumstances mean that 
such consequences can vary widely and simply looking at the tax and benefit 
position of a single ‘representative’ individual need not give a reliable picture. 
The average change in net Exchequer transfers (benefits plus tax credits less taxes 
paid) for affected individuals need not be close to the change in net transfers 
for the ‘average’ affected individual. Even for each affected individual, there is 
considerable uncertainty as to how they would be affected by the policy and 
again the change in net transfers averaged across different possible impacts need 
not match the change in net transfers associated with a single ‘best guess’ of the 
impact. Finally, we need to think about how the impact might vary over time. The 
costs of Pathways analysed in the previous chapter are incurred up front, but the 
benefits may last a long time; taking account only of the benefits that accrue up 
to a certain point in time and ignoring any longer-term benefits would, therefore, 
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understate the net benefits of the policy because there are no corresponding 
longer-term costs.
Ideally, therefore, we would like to calculate the complete time path of the tax 
and benefit position of each individual affected by the policy in the original seven 
pilot areas with and without the policy in place, taking full account of uncertainty 
around the estimated impact of the policy. Unfortunately, that is not possible. 
One problem is that data on individuals’ outcomes of interest are available only 
for a relatively short period (and for some outcomes only at a single point in 
time) after they were subjected to the policy, so we must make assumptions as 
to the longer-term impact of the policy and see how different assumptions affect 
our estimates of the financial benefits of the policy. A second problem is that no 
dataset contains enough information both to estimate the impact of the policy on 
employment, earnings and benefit receipt and to calculate the full tax and benefit 
position of affected individuals. 
The Pathways to Work Evaluation Dataset (hereafter PED) – not the 
administrative Pathways database but the surveys of individuals who made an 
enquiry about claiming and incapacity benefit collected by National Centre for 
Social Research (NatCen) – contains information on a sample of individuals who 
made an enquiry about claiming incapacity benefits in pilot and comparison 
areas both before and after the reform was implemented in the pilot areas. It has 
been used to estimate the impact of the reform on benefit receipt, employment, 
earnings and a self-reported measure of the extent to which health affects everyday 
activities (Adam et al., 2006, and Bewley et al., 2007). The policy was found to 
increase the proportion of those making an enquiry who were in employment 
and reduce the proportion who were receiving incapacity benefits (but there is 
evidence that these are not necessarily the same people). However, the PED does 
not contain enough information about claimants and their families to enable us to 
calculate their tax and benefit position: some characteristics (such as housing costs 
and any partner’s private income) that are important in determining a family’s net 
Exchequer transfer are not contained in the PED dataset.
The Family Resources Survey (FRS), contains all the information needed to 
calculate the net Exchequer transfer position from direct taxes, tax credits and 
benefits and is set up for use with the Institute for Fiscal Studies’ tax and benefit 
microsimulation model (TAXBEN), which plays a major role in estimating Pathways’ 
effects on taxes and benefit payments. However, the FRS cannot be used to evaluate 
the impact of the policy on employment or on exit from incapacity benefits since 
the sample size of new IB claimants in Pathways pilot areas and the comparison 
areas is extremely small.
To estimate the financial benefits of Pathways, therefore, we cannot use the 
policy’s estimated impact on individuals subjected to the policy and observed in 
the PED; we must instead use what the PED can tell us about the impact of the 
policy to predict what its impact would be on similar individuals in the FRS for 
whom we can estimate net transfers. We use data from the PED to estimate how 
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the receipt of incapacity benefits, employment, hours of work and earnings, both 
with and without the policy, are related to individual characteristics observed in 
both the PED and the FRS. We then use the same characteristics to predict those 
outcomes for individuals in the FRS both with and without the policy. Together 
with other characteristics observed in the FRS (which we assume are unaffected 
by the policy), this allows us to estimate the effect of the policy on their tax and 
benefit payments. In Section 5.3, we describe and compare the two data samples 
used in this exercise. Section 5.4 presents the estimation of individuals’ incapacity 
benefit receipt, employment, hours of work and earnings with and without their 
being subjected to the policy. Finally, the calculation of taxes and benefits and our 
estimates of the overall benefits of Pathways are presented in Section 5.5.
5.3 How different are FRS and PED?
The PED contains data for individuals moving onto incapacity benefits in the original 
seven pilot areas and matched comparison areas before and after Pathways was 
introduced in the pilot areas. As discussed in Chapter 1, the pilots began earlier 
in some of the areas (the ‘October 2003 areas’) than in others (the ‘April 2004 
areas’). In both cases, however, the ‘post-policy’ group for whom we predict 
outcomes, are individuals making an enquiry between August and November 
2004 and interviewed at around the same time, as shown in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Dates of the outcome interview
October 2003 areas April 2004 areas
Pre Post Pre Post
First date recorded 20 April 2005 2 March 2006 14 June 2005 26 February 
2006
Last date recorded 19 October 
2005




From the original PED sample of 5,784, Bewley et al. (2007) removed 147 individuals 
for whom key information such as benefit and employment status was missing. 
We remove another 208 individuals by restricting the sample to the 18 to 59 
age group, as they were the only individuals who were mandated to participate 
in Pathways, and remove a further eight individuals who report being employed 
for an hourly wage that seemed implausibly low (below £2) or high (above £30). 
Our final sample size, at 5,421, is thus some six per cent smaller than the original 
dataset. Unsurprisingly given this relatively small reduction, our reduced sample 
has very similar characteristics to the original sample. 
The PED consists of a sample of individuals who were recorded as making an 
enquiry about claiming incapacity benefits in a specific period. The FRS is a random 
cross-sectional survey of the population and does not contain information about 
benefit enquiries or claim dates as such. Instead, subject to the same age and 
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hourly wage restrictions as described for the PED sample, we use a sample of 
individuals who recently moved onto IB by selecting individuals if they report that 
they receive IB and that they have been unable to work for less than a year. 
The FRS dataset has only a relatively small sample of such individuals in any one 
year, so we pool together ten years of data (FRS 1996/97 up to FRS 2005/06), 
appropriately uprating the data (earnings in line with average earnings growth, 
rents in line with average rents, etc.) to simulate April 2006 data corresponding to 
the timing of the outcome interviews for the post-policy groups as shown in Table 
5.228. Our selected FRS sample includes, as a result, 892 individuals.29
We predict outcomes for a sample of individuals in the FRS, using models of those 
outcomes estimated using individuals in the PED. In order to do this, we require 
that:
•	 the	datasets	record	similar	characteristics	of	individuals.	This	is	because	we	can	
only model outcomes as depending on characteristics observed in both datasets 
and we would like the model to be as rich as possible; 
•	 the	 FRS	 contains	 a	 sample	 of	 individuals	who	 look	 similar	 to	 the	 sample	 of	
interest in the PED. The more similar the distributions of characteristics in the 
two datasets, the more reliable predictions will be (since there will be no need 
for excessive extrapolation), and the more results for the FRS sample will reflect 
likely results for the PED sample. 
We next take a closer look at each of these considerations in turn.
5.3.1 The characteristics observed
The characteristics recorded in both the PED and the FRS that we use to model 
outcomes consists of age, sex, ethnicity, age left full-time education, experience, 
whether single, whether ever worked, whether any partner is in work, whether there 
are any children in the household and the number of children in the household.30 
A key omission is health. Both datasets contain information about individuals’ 
health, but the information is different: the FRS has information on functional 
disabilities (difficulty doing particular things) whereas the PED has information on 
physical disabilities (problems with arms, eyes, mental health, etc.). The typology 
being different, they could not be matched properly. In particular, there was no 
direct counterpart in the FRS to the category of ‘mental health problem’ in the 
28 For the FRS 1996/97 and 1997/98, only individuals unable to work in the 
last 28 weeks are selected. The information is not available for the 52 week 
threshold.
29 Three of our sample of 892 were removed from the analysis because they 
did not report the amount of IB received, precluding calculation of their tax 
and benefit position. However, the remainder of this section relates to the 
full 892.
30 In the modelling we also include age squared and allow the effects of age 
and sex to interact with some of the other variables.
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PED, which proved important in the impact analysis of Pathways (see Section 5.2 
of Adam et al., 2006).
One concern would be that excluding details of individuals’ health from our control 
variables could lead to a different estimate of the overall impact of Pathways on 
the key outcomes of interest. However, having carried out the estimations both 
with this smaller set of variables and with the larger set used in Bewley et al., 
(2007), we find that the differences are minimal. Excluding details of individuals’ 
health conditions does not, then, change our estimate of the overall impact of 
the policy. It is still possible that it could change our estimate of the financial 
benefits of the policy, however, if both the impact of the policy and other factors 
which affect net transfers are different for those with mental health conditions, 
for example.
5.3.2 The similarity of the samples
Table 5.2 compares the characteristics listed above for the two different samples.






Non white 4.9% 8.1%
Live with partner 52.5% 62.2%
Partner in work 32.7% 35.0%
Kids in the households 27.4% 19.7%
Age completed education 16.37 16.16
Left education before age 16 31.2% 39.9%
Left education at age 16 42.6% 39.8%
Left education after age 16 25.8% 19.8%
Ever worked 76.8% 80.9%
Sample size 5,421 892
 
The two samples are similar in many respects but differ in their sex composition 
(the PED has markedly more women), ethnicity (a higher proportion are white in 
the PED, perhaps suggesting that the areas in which pathways was piloted are less 
ethnically diverse than the country as a whole), family composition (the PED has 
more single individuals) and educational attainment (the PED has more educated 
individuals). Although the average age at which individuals left full-time education 
is slightly higher in the PED, a smaller proportion of individuals in PED completed 
their education before age 16. The distribution of ages in the two datasets is very 
similar, except for a higher density of younger individuals (age 18 to 22) in the 
PED, as shown in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1 Distribution of age in the FRS and PED samples
5.4 Estimating benefit and labour market outcomes 
To estimate the net transfer from the Exchequer to those who recently moved 
onto IB, both with and without Pathways pilots in place, we need to construct a 
model to predict whether individuals move off IB, whether they move into work, 
their hours of work and earnings if in work and how each of these is affected by 
the policy. Even assuming that other characteristics that affect tax and benefit 
payments (such as housing costs and any partner’s earnings) are unaffected by the 
policy, it is not feasible to model all these outcomes jointly. 
A natural approach would be to estimate a discrete choice model of the effect of 
Pathways on employment and IB receipt jointly and to estimate separate continuous 
models of hours of work (broadly a choice variable) and hourly wages (broadly 
an individual characteristic related to productivity), which together determine 
earnings, conditional on moving into work but taking into account that those 
observed moving into work may be a selected sample. However, this approach has 
two important disadvantages in the modelling of hours of work:
•	 it	imposes	the	assumption	that,	conditional	on	employment,	hours	of	work	are	
not affected by the policy;
•	 hours	of	work	are	very	badly	predicted	by	linear	(OLS)	estimation,	because	the	
distribution of hours does not really look like a continuous choice. As shown 
in Figure 5.2, individuals tend to work either full-time (around 37-40 hours a 
week) or part-time (around 18-20 hours a week).



















Figure 5.2 Estimated distribution of weekly hours (both cohorts)
 
For present purposes, however, we do not need to predict hours of work precisely. 
The net transfer to an individual depends on earnings and on their hours’ category: 
benefit and tax credit entitlements depend on whether people work at least 16 
or at least 30 hours but not on precise hours within those ranges. Rather than 
estimating continuous models of hours of work and hourly wage, therefore, an 
alternative which solves both of the problems above is to model discrete hours 
category (1 to 15, 16 to 29 or at least 30 hours per week) jointly with employment 
and IB receipt and to model earnings continuously for each hours category. This is 
our preferred approach and we examine the two parts of this estimation below.
5.4.1 Modelling employment, hours of work and benefit status
We model the probability of an individual experiencing each of six possible outcomes, 
with and without being subject to Pathways (the difference in probabilities being 
the policy effect):
1 Employed 1-15 hours a week, not receiving IB.
2 Employed 16-29 hours a week, not receiving IB.
3 Employed 30 or more hours a week, not receiving IB.
4 Employed 1-15 hours a week, receiving IB.



















Note: Estimates produced using a kernel.
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5 Not employed, receiving IB.
6 Not employed, not receiving IB.31
We model these six outcomes as a multinomial logit, which means imposing 
the independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. This assumption 
implies that adding another alternative does not affect the relative odds between 
the first alternatives.32 Given the sample size involved, a multinomial probit, which 
does not impose this assumption, cannot be estimated (does not converge) with 
more than 4 or 5 outcome states.
Having estimated the model, we use it to predict the probability of each individual 
being in each state with and without the policy. Table 5.3 shows the means of the 
predicted probabilities (or equivalently, the predicted proportion of individuals in 
each state) for both the PED sample and the FRS sample.
Table 5.3 Predicted impact of Pathways at time of final interview















(1) 1-15 hours, no IB 3.9 2.2 +1.7 2.9 1.6 +1.3
(2) 16-29 hours, no IB 9.3 7.8 +1.4 8.2 6.9 +1.4
(3) 30+ hours, no IB 24.7 21.7 +3.0 22.2 19.3 +2.9
(4) 1-15 hours, IB 0.9 1.4 –0.5 1.3 1.9 –0.6
(5) Not employed, IB 42.7 44.3 –1.6 48.3 49.6 –1.3
(6) Not employed, no IB 18.4 22.6 –4.2 17.1 20.8 –3.6
31 In principle there are two other possible combinations: receiving IB while 
working either 16-29 or 30 or more hours a week. A few individuals in PED 
do appear to be in these positions. However, all of these individuals also 
report having earnings above £85 a week, and the rules on permitted work 
while receiving IB make the combination of working 16 or more hours and 
earnings £85 a week almost impossible, and we suspect that these cases 
reflect recording errors in PED. Since there are so few cases, making separate 
outcomes difficult to model in any case, we assume they actually are not 
claiming benefit receipt.
32 A classical example of IIA in practice is due to McFadden (1974): Consider 
commuters who initially choose with equal probability between commuting 
with a red bus or with a car. IIA implies that when adding a third alternative, 
for instance commuting with a blue bus, commuters should maintain the 
same odds ratio between commuting with a car or a red bus and therefore 
choose each transport possibility with a probability of one third.
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This gives an overall employment effect of +5.7 percentage points for the PED 
sample (+1.7 +1.4 +3.0+ –0.5 = +5.7). This number can be compared to the 
effect found on both cohorts with the same methodology and data in Bewley et 
al. (2007) (+4.4 percentage points) and again on the same data when restricting 
the sample to the 18 to 59 age group (+5.3 percentage points). 
Ideally, we would like to estimate the model separately for the October 2003 and 
the April 2004 areas – particularly given that the estimation may be biased for the 
October 2003 areas. Indeed Bewley et al. (2007) preferred estimates from just the 
April 2004 areas (with no age restriction). However, there is a trade-off involved in 
this: separate estimation for the two sets of areas significantly reduces the sample 
sizes and therefore, the precision of the estimation. If we restrict ourselves to the 
April 2004 areas with the age restriction, we find a policy effect on employment 
of +7.1 percentage points (compared with the +7.4 percentage points of the 
Bewley et al. estimation).33 Table 5.3 also shows an overall effect on IB receipt 
of –2.1 percentage points (–0.5 + –1.6 = –2.1). When the model is applied to 
the FRS sample, the predicted effects are similar, but not identical, reflecting the 
differences shown in Section 5.3.2: an employment impact of +4.9 percentage 
points and an IB receipt impact of –1.9 percentage points. Appendices A.1 and 
A.2 show separate results for the October 2003 and April 2004 cohorts and results 
based on a model with four outcomes: employed/not employed, with and without 
receiving IB, i.e. excluding hours of work from the model.34
We would also ideally like to estimate how these impacts changed over time. Table 
5.3 uses outcomes at the time of final survey interview (around 18 or 19 months 
after the initial IB enquiry). We can attempt to construct outcome measures for 
each month from IB enquiry to the final interview.35 However, the information we 
have for a month-by-month analysis is much less precise: we have relatively robust 
recall data on employment histories for month eight up to month 18 (described in 
Section 5.1 of Bewley et al., 2007), but no information from these data on benefit 
status month by month. We have imputed a benefit status month by month using 
the information on employment at each month and inferring the benefit status 
33 The Bewley et al. estimation has a larger sample size (104 extra observations) 
as it does not impose any age restriction.
34 The reduced number of outcomes allows more precise estimation of the 
model, but ignores the joint determination of employment and hours of 
work. Compared with the results in Table 5.3, the estimation with four 
outcomes shows the policy as leading to a slightly bigger increase in the 
probability of moving off IB and into work, but a slightly smaller reduction in 
the probability of staying out of work and off IB; the difference is accounted 
for by a bigger decline in the probability of moving into work while remaining 
on IB.
35 The final survey interview is the limit of our information on employment 
outcomes. The implications of different possible outcomes beyond this 
period are discussed in section 5.5.
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from the one we observe at the last interview,36 but even these assumptions leave 
substantial gaps in the data for many of the months.
For the months for which we have sufficient observations, the effect of the policy 
does not appear to have varied much, consistent with the results in Bewley, et al., 
2007). Figure 5.3 plots the difference in the means of the outcome probabilities 
predicted for the FRS sample. The figure shows that the policy substantially 
reduced the size of the group which is out of work and not on IB while increasing 
the number of people employed and not receiving IB. The strongest effect seems 
to come from the individuals in full-time employment. In general, the results look 
very similar to those estimated for the time of final interview. The estimates are 
relatively stable over time; the one marked trend is for an outcome that is very 
rarely observed – moving off IB and into work of less than 16 hours, which seems 
to be made initially less likely and then more likely by Pathways – and we are not 
confident that this represents a genuine trend rather than being an artefact of 
our imputation of outcomes for the early months. For our analysis we, therefore, 
use the estimates for the time of final interview reported in Table 5.3, assuming 
that once they appear these impacts are constant for the duration of Pathways’ 
impact.
36 The rules we applied are as follows: if the individual is working at the last 
interview and they are not on IB, we assume they have been on IB up to 
the point they have found a job. If the individual is not employed at the last 
interview and they are on IB, we assume they have always been on IB while 
out of work and off IB while in work. If the individual is employed and on IB 
at the last interview, we assume they have always been on IB. Finally, if the 
individual is not employed and not on IB, we assume that they have either 
never been on IB or left IB with its first employment spell and never been 
back on IB.
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Figure 5.3 Difference in predicted probabilities (six outcomes),  
 month by month estimate, FRS sample
 
5.4.2 Estimating weekly earnings
The aim here is to predict the earnings that each individual in our FRS sample 
would have, with and without Pathways in place, if they moved into work of 
1-15, 16-29 or 30 or more hours per week. The simplest approach to doing this is 
to estimate a linear (OLS) regression for each hours category, regressing the (log) 
weekly earnings of individuals observed being employed in the relevant hours 
category in PED on the characteristics listed in Section 5.3.1, and then to use the 
estimated impacts of those characteristics on earnings to predict earnings for the 
FRS sample.37,38 Potential biases in the OLS estimation and alternative approaches 
are discussed in Section A.3.
Figures 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 compare the distributions of actual log earnings for 
individuals observed being employed in each hours category in the PED with the 
37 The earnings figure reported in the PED is net earnings. We compute the 
corresponding gross earnings figure using the Income Tax and National 
Insurance contributions system from the two fiscal years 2005/06 and 
2006/07. As noted in Section 5.2, we remove from our sample individuals 
who report an hourly wage of less than £2 or more than £30.
38 The log earnings equation is used to predict log earnings. The natural 
estimator of actual earnings, the exponential of predicted log earnings, is 
biased; to obtain unbiased earnings predictions, we scale down (divide) the 
exponential of predicted log earnings by the exponential of half the variance 
of predicted log earnings (Greene 2002).
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distribution of log earnings that a simple linear (OLS) regression predicts for the 
same group; for all individuals in the PED sample (whether employed in that hours 
category or not); and for all individuals in the FRS sample. It is striking that the 
predicted earnings distributions are much less dispersed than the actual earnings 
distributions. This is unsurprising. Because the background characteristics included 
in our regressions are not the only things explaining individuals’ earnings, we fail to 
explain a large part of the observed variation in earnings. Predictions based purely 
on what our regressors do explain, therefore, do not display such variation. Using 
these predictions would yield inaccurate estimates of the benefits of Pathways: 
because the tax and benefit system is not linear in earnings, average net transfers 
for a group of moderate earners need not equal the average for some very high 
earners and some very low earners.
Figure 5.4 Distribution of actual and OLS central predictions of log 
 weekly earnings if employed 1-15 hours
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Predicted for inwork in PWD
Predicted for all in PWD
Predicted for all in FRS
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Figure 5.5 Distribution of actual and OLS central predictions of log 
 weekly earnings if employed 16-29 hours
Figure 5.6 Distribution of actual and OLS central predictions of log 
 weekly earnings if employed 30 or more hours
We solve this problem by adding random variation to our central prediction for each 
individual. To add the appropriate amount and distribution of random variation, 
we could add to each prediction a value drawn randomly from the residuals of 
the relevant regression. However, we improve upon this: to reflect more fully the 
uncertainty surrounding the earnings prediction for each individual, we take 100 
random draws from the distribution of residuals for each individual, estimate the 
tax and benefit position in each case (i.e. 100 times for each individual) and then 
take the average of those to estimate the expected net transfer for each individual. 
Figures 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 show the effect of adding this random variation on the 
distribution of predicted earnings.
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Figure 5.7 Distribution of predicted earnings from OLS regression  
 if employed 1-15 hours, with and without adding in  
 residuals
Figure 5.8 Distribution of predicted earnings from OLS regression  
 if employed 16-29 hours, with and without adding in  
 residuals 
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Figure 5.9 Distribution of predicted earnings from OLS regression  
 if employed 30 hours or more, with and without adding 
 in residuals
5.5 Results
Section 5.4 described how we predicted whether individuals observed claiming 
short-run incapacity benefits in the FRS would move off benefit, into employment, 
and (if in employment) at what hours and earnings, both with and without being 
exposed to Pathways. Having made these predictions, we calculate the personal 
tax liabilities and the benefit and tax credit entitlements appropriate to each 
individual’s circumstances using the IFS tax and benefit microsimulation model, 
TAXBEN.39 To do this, we assume that the outcomes modelled in Section 5.4 are 
the only characteristics affecting the individual’s tax and benefit position that are 
affected by the policy – for example, that there is no impact on eligibility for 
Disability Living Allowance (DLA), that the individual remains disabled for the 
purposes of calculating entitlement to disability premiums in means-tested benefits 
and tax credits and that any partner’s labour market status does not change. 
Modelling the impact on all these (and many other) outcomes simultaneously 
would be unfeasible. 
One feature cannot be ignored, however. The FRS sample used contains individuals 
receiving short-run incapacity benefit when interviewed. But we are modelling 
possible positions they might end up in some months later and how they are 
affected by Pathways. By that time, they might have moved onto a higher rate 
of IB, meaning that they would lose more benefit and the Exchequer would save 
more, if they were to move off IB. The right rate of IB to use depends on how long 
after the individual became sick (claimed Statutory Sick Pay (SSP) or IB) we wish to 
39 TAXBEN is described in Giles and McCrae (1995). For simplicity, we assume 
full take-up of benefits and tax credits.



















Source: Those employed for the relevant number of hours from the PED.
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measure outcomes. This issue is discussed further below; but in what follows we 
present results for both the short-run (higher) rate of IB, which applies from weeks 
28 to 52 of sickness, and the long-run rate, which applies after 52 weeks.
For each individual in the FRS sample we have predicted a probability of ending 
up in each of six employment/hours/IB receipt states. We calculate the tax and 
benefit position for each individual and therefore, their family’s net income in each 
state.40 Figure 5.10 shows what the average disposable family income would be 
across all individuals in each of the six states (excluding any payments to Pathways 
participants, particularly RTWC payments). Thus, for example, if all 889 individuals 
remained out of work and on IB (the fourth bar from the top in the chart), on 
average, their net family income would be £270 per week if at this point they 
were entitled to long-run IB; £247 per week if they were entitled to the short-
run higher rate. If they all moved off IB and into work of more than 30 hours 
a week (the first bar from the top), their average net family income would be 
£381, or £380 if off IB less than a year after becoming sick.41 Note that this does 
not mean that individuals who move off IB and into full-time work are typically 
£134 (i.e. £381–£247) per week better off as a result. The figures vary widely 
between individuals and some are far more likely than others to make this move, 
so individuals actually changing positions might experience very different financial 
consequences, even on average.
40 In fact, as discussed in Section 5.4.2, we make 100 different earnings 
predictions for each individual and calculate their tax and benefit position 
in each case. Here, and in all that follows, we take the mean of these 100 
results for each individual.
41 This small difference arises because disability premiums in HB and CTB 
normally become payable after a year.
Estimating the financial benefits of Pathways
66
Figure 5.10 Average net family income (excluding RTWC) in each of  
 six modelled states
 
As well as working out net family income for each individual in each state, we also 
calculate their entitlements to individual benefits and tax credits and their liability 
to individual taxes in each state. Applying each individual’s predicted probability of 
being in each state with and without the policy in place, we estimate the impact 
of the policy on net family incomes and tax and benefit payments. 
The results are shown in Table 5.4. Where the policy effects are felt more than 
a year after the individual became sick or disabled, we estimate that exposing a 
recent IB claimant to Pathways increases their net family income by £5.49 per 
week on average, excluding any payments to Pathways participants. In addition, 
it saves the Exchequer £7.70 per week on average. Only £1.98 of the Exchequer 
saving represents a reduced IB bill. Significant savings come from increased Income 
Tax and National Insurance receipts and reduced payments of IS, income-based 
JSA, HB and CTB, reflecting the fact that the impact estimates in Table 5.4 (as 
well as results elsewhere in this report and in Bewley et al., 2007) suggest that 
the main effect of Pathways is not to move people off IB who would otherwise 
have stayed on it, but to move people who would have left IB in any case into 
employment instead of into unemployment or being economically inactive. Finally, 
increased indirect taxes (predominantly VAT) on the sale of goods and services 
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produced by individuals moving into work, are extremely important.42,43 On the 
other side of the ledger, increased employment means increased WTC payments, 
which far outweighs the reduction in CTC from increasing the incomes of those 
with children. 
The sum of these benefits to the individual and to the Exchequer is £13.20 per 
week. If third parties are unaffected44, this represents the total measured financial 
benefit to society (gross of the costs discussed in Chapter 4 and excluding RTWC). 
This total benefit is the market value of the additional production in the economy: 
if we assume that individuals are paid the value of what they produce, Pathways 
increases the size of the economy by the earnings, plus employer National Insurance 
contributions and VAT, of the additional people that move into work. The tax and 
benefit implications of individuals’ changed status determine only how resources 
are divided between the recent IB claimants and the Exchequer.
42 We assume individuals’ earnings (plus employer National Insurance 
contributions on those earnings) are equal to the value of the goods and 
services they produce. This will be true under certain market conditions. 
We also assume an average indirect tax rate of 20.4 per cent: this differs 
from the standard 17.5 per cent VAT rate both because of excise duties on 
fuel, alcohol and tobacco and because of reduced and zero rates of VAT. 
The average indirect tax rate of 20.4 per cent was calculated by applying 
the relevant VAT and duty rates to total expenditure in each consumption 
category as recorded in the 2005/06 Expenditure and Food Survey. An 
alternative methodology developed by Mendoza et al. (1994) and refined 
by Carey and Rabesona (2003), using total indirect tax revenues and total 
national consumption as recorded in the National Accounts, yields a very 
similar estimate of 20.6 per cent.
43 As with the cost analysis in Chapter 4, we measure the benefits of the 
policy in market (VAT-inclusive) prices. An alternative would be to measure 
everything in producer (VAT-exclusive) prices, in which case we would not 
add VAT on the value of production to the Exchequer benefits but would 
instead deduct a proportion of families’ disposable income so as to reflect 
the income’s purchasing power in VAT-exclusive terms. The effect of these 
adjustments would be to reduce both the benefits to the individual and the 
total benefits to the Exchequer by a common factor, namely 17.0 per cent 
(i.e. 0.204/(1 + 0.204)). The use of either market or producer prices is valid, 
provided it is applied consistently across both costs and benefits. We slightly 
prefer market prices because the concept corresponds to the everyday notion 
of the value of £1, it would seem slightly odd, for example, to scale down 
the value of the RTWC from £40 to reflect its ‘true’ purchasing power after 
VAT and excise duties are stripped out.
44 See Chapter 7 for the evaluation of indirect effects of Pathways.
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Table 5.4 Financial benefits per person per week of impact
28-52 weeks from 
start of incapacity
After a year from 
start of incapacity
Benefits to the individual*
Increase in family disposable income £5.80 £5.49
Total £5.80 £5.49
Benefits to the Exchequer
Reduced IB payments £1.48 £1.98
Reduced IS/income-based JSA £1.24 £1.23
Reduced HB £0.72 £0.63
Reduced CTB £0.32 £0.30
(Increased Tax Credits) (-£1.25) (-£1.27)
Increased Income Tax £1.23 £1.19
Increased Employee NICs £0.63 £0.63
Increased Employer NICs £0.74 £0.74
Increased indirect taxes £2.24 £2.24
Other £0.05 £0.05
Total £7.39 £7.70
Total benefit to society* £13.20 £13.20
* To these must be added benefits to the individual of £137.93 (total, not per week) from pay-
ments to Pathways participants (RTWC, ADF, etc.). These are the same as counted for the cost 
analysis, so they cancel out when calculating the net costs and benefits to society, but they are 
important when separating out costs and benefits to individuals and to the Exchequer.
Source: Authors’ calculations using the IFS tax and benefit model, TAXBEN, run for the April 
2006 tax and benefit system on uprated data from the FRS 1996/97 to 2005/06 and variables 
estimated from the Pathways to Work Database as described in the text.
The total benefits of Pathways depend on how long these weekly impacts last: 
how long after an individual moves onto incapacity benefits Pathways starts 
having an effect; and how long after an individual is exposed to Pathways the 
individual’s chances of being on benefits or in employment are no longer affected 
by the policy. The evidence from Bewley et al. (2007) suggests that Pathways 
has an impact quite quickly, perhaps from the third month after the individual 
moves onto incapacity benefits. As explained in Section 5.4.1, we assume that this 
impact is constant for as long as it lasts. The key question is, therefore, how long 
the impact of Pathways persists. We do not have a clear answer to this. Bewley 
et al. (2007) suggests that the impact on employment lasts until at least the final 
survey interview, implying an impact that lasts at least 70 weeks, but that is the 
limit of our data: we have no way of knowing whether the impact fades out 
immediately after that point or continues long afterwards.
We, therefore, use two baseline scenarios: a ‘pessimistic’ scenario in which the 
impacts last for 70 weeks and an arbitrarily chosen ‘optimistic’ scenario in which 
the impacts last for 150 weeks or almost three years. We also explore more extreme 
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cases: that the impacts last for only 40 weeks – as Bewley et al. (2007) suggests 
might be the case for the impact on benefit receipt – and that the impacts last for 
250 weeks, close to five years.
Table 5.5 shows (the present value of) the total gross benefits of the policy to 
individuals, to the Exchequer and in total – now including the value to individuals of 
payments to Pathways participants, as estimated in Chapter 4 – for these different 
possible durations of impacts. We assume that the first 40 weeks of impacts are 
those for between 28 and 52 weeks after the individuals became sick or disabled 
(i.e. the left-hand column in Table 5.4) and that impacts beyond that are those 
for more than 52 weeks after the start of sickness/disability.45 For our baseline 
case, we convert streams of weekly effects into a capital value using a 3½ per 
cent discount rate, as recommended in HM Treasury’s ‘Green Book’ (2003) and in 
Boardman et al. (2006). In line with the recommendation of Boardman et al., we 
also show the impacts using alternative low (one per cent) and high (five per cent) 
discount rates. Finally, Table 5.8 shows results from relaxing our assumption that 
nothing other than the outcomes modelled in Section 5.3 is affected by the policy. 
Specifically, it shows the benefits of Pathways if we assume that all individuals 
who move off IB and into work have sufficiently improved health that they are 
no longer eligible for disability premiums in means-tested benefits or tax credits. 
In reality, this is likely to apply to some individuals but not all, so the truth will lie 
somewhere between our baseline scenarios and this alternative extreme.
The choice of discount rate proves unimportant, since we are examining impacts 
after only a few years at most: the discount rate really matters when policies 
have costs and benefits spanning several decades or even longer (as with major 
infrastructure projects, environmental policies or educational interventions, 
for example). Assuming that no disability premiums are available for workers 
somewhat reduces the benefit of Pathways to individuals and increases the benefit 
to the Exchequer since it means reduced transfers to individuals who move off IB 
and into work. Total benefits are unaffected since, as noted above, such transfers 
affect only the distribution of gains between the individual and the Exchequer.
45 This slightly understates the Exchequer benefits and overstates the individual 
benefits for people who moved onto IB from SSP (and are, therefore, 
mandated onto Pathways at the point that they move straight onto the short-
run (higher) rate of IB, moving onto the long-run rate 24 weeks later) and 
it slightly overstates the Exchequer benefits and understates the individual 
benefits for people who did not move onto IB from SSP (and who, therefore, 
have 28 weeks on the short-run (lower) rate of IB before moving onto the 
short-run (higher) rate and then the long-run rate). However, we have no 
way of distinguishing these cases in the data.
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Table 5.5 Present value of total financial benefits per person:  








With 3.5 per cent discount rate
40 weeks £367 £292 £659
70 weeks £526 £515 £1,041
150 weeks £935 £1,088 £2,023
250 weeks £1,416 £1,763 £3,180
With one per cent discount rate
70 weeks £532 £523 £1,056
150 weeks £963 £1,127 £2,090
With five per cent discount rate
70 weeks £522 £510 £1,041
150 weeks £919 £1,066 £2,023
With no disability premiums for workers
70 weeks £459 £581 £1,041
150 weeks £791 £1,232 £2,023
Source: authors’ calculations using the IFS tax and benefit model, TAXBEN, run for the April 
2006 tax and benefit system on uprated data from the FRS 1996/97 to 2005/06 and variables 
estimated from the Pathways to Work Database as described in the text.
Unsurprisingly, the key unknown affecting the overall benefits of Pathways is how 
long its impacts last. If the impact lasts twice as long, the gross benefits almost 
double, except that the estimated £138 gain to individuals from payments to 
Pathways participants does not vary with the assumed duration of the impact. 
Thus, if the impacts last for 150 weeks rather than 70 weeks, individuals gain 
£935 rather than £526 and the Exchequer gains £1,088 rather than £515; the 
total benefits are £2,023 rather than £1,041. Research into the longer-run impact 
of Pathways is the key to determining how large its benefits really are.
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6 Assessing the costs and  
 benefits of Pathways
6.1 Summary
This chapter first brings together the cost estimates from Chapter 4 and the benefit 
estimates from Chapter 5 to provide bottom line estimates of Pathways’ net 
financial benefits (that is, its financial benefits less its costs). It then considers costs 
and benefits that were excluded from these estimates because they are difficult 
or costly to measure and, in some cases, are not naturally valued in pounds. Each 
of these potential programme costs and benefits are examined in the chapter 
with whatever available information could be brought to bear (e.g. responses to 
questions in the survey of new and repeat incapacity benefit claimants in the seven 
original Pathways’ pilot districts and findings from previous relevant studies). 
The key findings are as follows:
•	 Looking	only	at	the	financial	costs	and	benefits	that	appear	in	Chapters	4	and	
5, individuals who made enquiries about incapacity benefits were better off by 
£526 as a result of Pathways if programme benefits persist for only 70 weeks 




to people making enquiries and to the Exchequer – are £701 if programme 
benefits continue for 70 weeks and £1,683 if they persist for 150 weeks.
•	 A	large	number	of	factors	that	might	potentially	alter	these	findings	are	examined	
in this chapter. These include possible programme effects on the:
– work-related expenditures of Pathways participants;
– non-work time available to Pathways participants;
– benefit payments and employment status of non-Pathways participants;
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– utilisation of the NHS;
– health status of Pathways participants;
– quality of life of Pathways participants;
– costs of administering (for the Government) and claiming/complying with (for 
individuals) tax and benefit payments;
– deadweight losses that result from taxes;
– reaction of the public to reductions in the incapacity benefits rolls.
Some of these are almost certainly benefits of the policy, notably the reduction in 
the excess burden of taxation that Exchequer savings permit. Others are almost 
certainly costs, such as expenditures and loss of time associated with starting 
work. Still others are more ambiguous: the effects of Pathways on the health 
and quality of life of participants and on the benefit payments and employment 
outcomes of people not mandated to participate in Pathways, for example, could 
be either positive or negative. However, Pathways was found to have positive 
net measured benefits even when it was conservatively assumed that programme 
effects lasted for 70 weeks. If its effects lasted longer, the net measured benefits 
would be larger. The unmeasured costs of the policy would have to outweigh 
the unmeasured benefits significantly if the programme were not to be beneficial 
overall.
6.2 Pathways’ measured net benefits
Comparing the £340 cost of Pathways per Incapacity Benefit (IB) enquiry estimated 
in Chapter 4 with the ‘baseline’ estimates of benefits of Pathways in Chapter 5, 
Pathways in the original seven areas had a net measured benefit to the Exchequer 
of £175 (£515 – £340) per IB enquiry if the impacts of the policy are assumed to 
last for 70 weeks or £748 (£1,088 – £340) if the impacts last 150 weeks.
In addition, we measured financial benefits to the individuals making enquiries; 
on average, these were £526 (70 week impact) or £935 (150 week impact).
This suggests an overall measured financial gain to society as a whole of £701 
(70 weeks) or £1,683 (150 weeks).
These estimated costs and benefits are summarised in Table 6.1. The biggest cost of 
Pathways was the Return To Work Credit (RTWC); staff salaries and the Condition 
Management Programme (CMP) were also relatively costly elements. On the 
benefits side, the gains were quite evenly divided between Pathways participants 
and the Exchequer; and the Exchequer benefits were themselves a fairly even 
combination of savings in IB, Income Support (IS)/income-based Jobseeker‘s 
Allowance (JSA), Income Tax, National Insurance contributions and indirect taxes.
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Table 6.1 Present value of total measured financial benefits per  












70 weeks £526 £515 £340 £175 £1,041 £340 £701
150 weeks £935 £1,088 £340 £748 £2,023 £340 £1,683
Note: Assumes 3.5 per cent discount rate. See Chapters 4 and 5 for details.
6.3 Omitted costs and benefits
The cost-benefit analysis has so far considered only costs and benefits that could 
be directly estimated or inferred using micro-simulation techniques. There are 
other potentially important costs and benefits that cannot be obtained by using 
either of these approaches. The monetary values of these costs and benefits are 
unknown. Indeed, some are not even naturally valued in monetary terms. 
Table 6.1 lists some of the costs and benefits that were omitted in computing the 
estimates that appear at the start of this chapter. This list is not intended to include 
all the possible benefits and costs that might result from Pathways; just those we 
feel are of the greatest potential importance. For each of the listed items, the table 
indicates the group that is most likely to be affected. The Exchequer and incapacity 
benefits claimants were considered above. ‘Third parties’ refers to everyone else 
(e.g. friends and relatives of Pathways participants, claimants of other benefits, 
other potential workers and the general public). The remainder of this chapter 
briefly considers each of the items listed in Table 6.2.





Loss of non-market time 
Changes in tax and benefit compliance costs 
Changes in health status 
Other changes in quality of life 
Changes in tax and benefit administration costs 
Changes in NHS utilisation 
Indirect effects on benefit and employment 
outcomes

Value placed on reductions in IB rolls 
Reductions in deadweight costs of taxation 
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6.3.1 Omitted costs and benefits to Pathways participants
One effect of Pathways was to increase the number of participants who moved 
into paid work. In Chapter 5 we measured the benefit to individuals of moving 
into work as being the resulting increase in their disposable income. But moving 
into work can also entail significant work-related expenses, such as childcare and 
commuting costs, that we do not measure. Travel costs may be especially large for 
some disabled people.
Perhaps even more important than work-related expenses incurred, is the time that 
individuals must give up when they go to work. This time may be of considerable 
value to those relinquishing it, compared with the enjoyment or otherwise of time 
spent in work. Since these individuals chose to move into work, we can infer that 
they received some net benefit from doing so: they must have expected that the 
increase in income, plus any non-financial benefit they derived from working, 
would exceed the value of the time given up plus any work-related expenses 
incurred.46 However, the benefit to the individual of moving into work would equal 
the increase in net income that we measure only if no work-related expenses were 
incurred and if time spent in work were as valuable to the individual as the non-
market time they lost. At the other extreme, if the decision to move into work 
was a marginal one, that would imply that there was little benefit to the individual 
from doing so.47
The value of lost time is not only an issue for those moving into work. In particular, 
our analysis also ignored the time spent travelling to, and participating in, follow-
up Work Focused Interviews (WFIs) (initial WFIs were compulsory in non-Pathways 
areas too so time taken for them was not an impact of the policy). This affected 
many more people than the number moving into work, although of course the 
time involved in attending a small number of WFIs is far smaller than time involved 
in taking a job.
46 Inferring that those who move into work must be better off than if they 
did not do so does not, of course, imply that they are better off than in the 
absence of Pathways: that also depends on the other factors considered in 
this subsection.
47 Lost non-market time is difficult to value. There is at least some previous 
research that suggests that the value of this lost time is substantial, probably 
not less than a quarter of the increase in disposable income obtained by 
affected families and quite likely more (Bell and Orr, 1994; Greenberg, 1997, 
and Greenberg and Robins, 2008), possibly almost the entire value of the 
income gain. If the value of time was between 25 per cent and 100 per 
cent of the increase in disposable income, this would imply that the gain to 
individuals from moving into work was between zero and £395 (rather than 
£526) if Pathways’ impacts lasted for 70 weeks and between zero and £701 
(rather than £935) if Pathways’ impacts lasted for 150 weeks. The value of 
time might be very different for different groups, however – it is thought to 
be higher for those with children than for those without, for example – and 
the studies cited above did not pertain to sick or disabled people.
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Pathways caused some claimants to exit the IB rolls and also caused some to become 
entitled to other benefits or tax credits. For example, some former IB recipients 
became eligible for Working Tax Credit (WTC) after taking a job. A subset of these 
workers will later have lost their job and become entitled to JSA. In addition, new 
workers will usually be liable for Income Tax and National Insurance contributions. 
In order to receive a benefit or tax credit, individuals must submit a claim. They 
might also have to provide supporting evidence of eligibility, go through an appeals 
process, deal with errors such as tax credit overpayments or PAYE coding errors, 
or inform the relevant agency of a change in their circumstances. All of this takes 
time and effort and may be stressful. Anyone whose circumstances changed as a 
result of Pathways in such a way that they became – or stopped being – entitled 
to a benefit or tax credit might, therefore, have faced changed costs of claiming 
or complying with the system. To some extent various changes in entitlements 
and liabilities tend to offset each other; but the biggest costs are likely to be one-
off costs associated with moving into a new situation, rather than ongoing costs 
of being in any particular position, and in that sense change in general is likely 
to increase rather than reduce costs. Nevertheless, it is hard to believe that these 
changes in compliance costs would be large relative to the measured gains and 
losses summarised in Section 6.3.1. 
It is possible that Pathways had an effect on participants’ health. This was not the 
direct motivation for Pathways – even the CMP delivered through the NHS was 
intended to help people manage their health condition better in a work context, 
rather than to improve the health condition itself – but health effects might 
nonetheless have arisen. These effects could be positive (if Pathways helps them 
to become more active, for example) or negative (if the stress of WFIs aggravates 
a health problem, say). We have no firm evidence of whether Pathways had any 
impact on participants’ health. Pathways reduced (from 50 per cent to 39 per 
cent) the proportion of individuals who reported having a health condition or 
disability that affected their day-to-day activity ‘a great deal’ and there is some 
indication that Pathways slightly decreased the proportion who reported having 
a health problem that restricted their day-to-day activity at all, although the 
estimate of this latter effect does not approach conventional levels of statistical 
significance (see Bewley, Dorsett and Haile, 2007). But this is, at most, suggestive 
evidence: it is a self-assessed measure rather than an objective assessment and in 
any case changes could reflect a reduction in the extent to which a given level of 
health leads to difficulties in daily activities rather than any improvement in actual 
health.
In addition to affecting health status, Pathways could potentially affect participants’ 
quality of life in a variety of other ways. Some of these operate through Pathways’ 
effects on work: for example, work might be stressful and unpleasant or it could 
improve one’s self-esteem or outlook on life. These non-financial costs and benefits 
of work were discussed above. But Pathways could also affect participants’ quality 
of life more directly. For example, having to attend follow-up WFIs might be viewed 
as unpleasant, result in anxiety and make some Pathways participants less happy; 
or coping skills acquired through the CMP might increase levels of satisfaction. 
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The two waves of survey of new and repeat IB claimants provide some information 
about changes over time in the reported quality of life of Pathways participants 
after they entered the programme. Specifically, respondents were asked about 
their level of satisfaction with their home, the area where they lived, their friends 
and family, their financial situation, their control over their life and their life in 
general. There was a modest movement between the two survey waves on all 
these measures from both the satisfaction and dissatisfaction ends of the scale 
towards the middle (i.e. ‘neither’), with slightly more movement away from the 
satisfaction end of the scale than from the dissatisfaction end.48 These findings 
are far from definitive, but if Pathways was having very much of an impact on life 
satisfaction, then one might expect some movement towards the satisfaction end 
of the distribution between the two survey waves. If anything, the trend seems 
to have been in the opposite direction. The movement towards the middle could 
be explained by some Pathways participants’ being anxious about the mandatory 
WFIs but becoming less so over time and others having high hopes for Pathways 
which were subsequently disappointed. Alternatively, it may have had nothing to 
do with Pathways, reflecting instead other changes in the lives of some Pathways 
participants (e.g. in health status). 
6.3.2 Omitted costs and benefits to the Exchequer
Some of the unmeasured costs and benefits of Pathways for claimants discussed 
in the previous subsection have parallel costs and benefits for the Exchequer. 
Pathways’ effects on the benefits and tax credits to which people were entitled 
(and the taxes for which they were liable) could potentially change the cost to 
individuals of claiming their entitlements or complying with their obligations. 
Those same changes also have implications for the cost to the Government of 
administering the tax and benefit system: processing claim forms, sending out 
payments, issuing tax codes and so on. As with the costs to individuals, Pathways 
will have many offsetting effects on these administrative costs and it is not clear 
whether the effect on the net benefits of Pathways is positive or negative. However, 
the cost per claimant of administering individual benefits is not large. For example, 
the costs of administering IB and IS are £2.01 and £3.29 per claimant per month, 
respectively (Greenberg and Davis, 2007, p. 44). The one-off costs of dealing with 
changes in circumstances of the kind caused by Pathways are likely to be larger 
than these average figures but are still unlikely to be a major part of the costs and 
benefits of Pathways.
NHS utilisation could also be affected by the programme. Pathways could potentially 
either increase or decrease the use of the NHS, resulting, respectively, in decreases 
or increases in programme net benefits. One reason for this might be changes in 
individuals’ health status of the kind discussed above. But NHS utilisation might 
change even if health status did not. The use of NHS services could increase, 
for example, as part of participants’ efforts to make themselves ready to work. 
48 We are indebted to Martin Wood for providing us with these estimates.
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Alternatively, it could decrease if those participants who find jobs feel less need 
or simply have less time to avail themselves of NHS services. In addition, CMP 
could increase the ability of individuals who participate in this component of 
Pathways to cope with their health problems without using NHS services. People’s 
experiences with the Pathways process itself (especially CMP) might make people 
more or less willing to use NHS services in future. Unfortunately, there is no direct 
evidence on how or even whether Pathways affected the utilisation of health 
services, beyond the findings described above regarding Pathways’ effect on the 
extent to which individuals reported that their health condition affected their day-
to-day activities. Whether these effects translated into a decrease in using NHS 
services is unknown.
6.3.3 Omitted costs and benefits to third parties
The driving force behind the measured benefits of Pathways was its impact on 
increasing the chances of those mandated onto Pathways moving off benefits 
and/or into paid work. But it is possible that Pathways also had an indirect impact 
on the benefit and employment outcomes of some people not mandated onto 
the policy. There are several possible reasons for this: First, incapacity benefits 
claimants who were not mandated onto Pathways (because they were existing 
claimants or outside the relevant age range) could participate in Pathways 
voluntarily and, therefore, benefit from it. Second, claimants of Department for 
Work and Pensions (DWP) benefits who were not mandated onto Pathways might 
either have gained from additional resources (such as staff training) provided to 
operate Pathways or suffered if resources (such as advisors’ time) were diverted 
away from them to concentrate on Pathways participants. Third, some of the 
additional jobs taken by Pathways participants might have come at the expense 
of others competing for the same jobs. Note that this third effect could not be 
permanent: the number of jobs available is not fixed and in the long run firms 
would expand production to absorb the increase in labour supply. However, in the 
short-run, the increased competition for jobs could make a difference, particularly 
in areas where unemployment was high, because firms could not readily expand 
production and/or wages could not adjust downwards to induce employers to 
offer more jobs. This is potentially important because the cost-benefit findings 
that we emphasise in this report assume that Pathways’ impacts persist for only 
70 or 150 weeks.
Chapter 7 examines whether Pathways had an effect on the rate of benefit exit 
for people not mandated onto Pathways. To prefigure those results, there is 
some evidence that existing recipients of incapacity benefits (particularly those 
who could volunteer for Pathways) were slightly more likely to move off benefit 
within 12 months of Pathways’ being implemented. However, JSA recipients in 
the October 2003 areas were around 3½ percentage points less likely to move 
off the benefit within six months of Pathways’ being implemented, although this 
negative impact was smaller at 12 months and not apparent at all in the April 
2004 areas. Recipients of most other benefits were unaffected.
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Apart from their employment and benefit outcomes being indirectly affected by 
Pathways, the programme has two potential benefits to third parties that we 
have so far ignored: First, as shown in Bewley, Dorsett and Haile (2007), Pathways 
increased the number of incapacity benefits claimants leaving benefit and the 
number moving into work. If third parties value the reduction in IB rolls and 
increase in employment in and of itself – that is, beyond any tax savings they may 
receive – then this is a benefit of the programme, albeit one that is very difficult 
to measure. This benefit could accrue to friends and relatives of the individuals 
concerned or to members of the general public pleased to read about it in the 
newspapers. It seems unlikely that any such benefit is large, however.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, it is not clear that pounds gained or lost 
by Pathways participants should be treated as identical to pounds gained or lost 
by the Exchequer. Costs to the Government imply that taxes must be higher 
than they would otherwise be and benefits accruing to the Government imply 
that taxes can be lower than they would otherwise be. If the net benefits to the 
Exchequer that are reported at the start of this chapter result in correspondingly 
lower taxes, economic distortions that are caused by taxes would be reduced. For 
example, taxes on earnings reduce incentives to work and taxes on investment 
reduce incentives to invest. These distortions (usually called ‘deadweight losses’ or 
‘excess burden’ by economists) result in losses in economic efficiency. The scope 
for reducing deadweight losses by using Exchequer savings to cut tax rates (or, 
equivalently, to increase valuable public spending without the need for additional 
distortionary taxes) is a potentially significant addition to the net benefits of the 
policy.49
49 For example, after reviewing a number of US studies, Boardman et al. (2006, 
pp. 428-429) conclude that the loss to the economy from each additional 
dollar of taxes that are collected in the US is on the order of 40 cents or 40 
per cent. Less evidence is available for the UK but DWP economists have 
concluded that the efficiency loss from an additional pound of taxes in the UK 
is around 25 pence or 25 per cent (DWP, 2006). These percentages applied 
to the net Exchequer benefits shown in Table 6.1 would imply appreciable 
additional benefits. For example, applying the 25 per cent figure to the 
estimates of net Exchequer benefits in Table 6.1 implies that the additional 
benefit to taxpayers is £44 if the impact of Pathways is assumed to last for 
70 weeks and is £187 if the impact continues for 150 weeks. Alternatively, 
the 40 per cent figure implies an additional benefit to taxpayers of £70 if the 
impact continues for 70 weeks or £299 if the impact of Pathways continues 
for 150 weeks. However, the size of deadweight costs is a controversial issue 
and estimates vary widely. Furthermore, each tax instrument has a different 
marginal excess burden, so the benefit to the economy would depend a 
great deal on which tax(es) were reduced: the gains in economic inefficiency 
from cutting stamp duties, for example, would be far greater than those 
from cutting council tax.
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6.4 Conclusions
This chapter has discussed a large number of costs and benefits that Pathways 
might have but that we have not measured. One further issue in interpreting 
the cost-benefit findings should be mentioned. On average, incapacity benefits 
claimants have lower incomes relative to their needs than other individuals. If society 
values redistribution of income from rich to poor (either because an additional 
pound is more valuable to a poor person than to a rich person or because society 
cares about inequality of well-being itself) then gains and losses accruing to a 
low-income group such as Pathways participants should be valued more highly 
than gains and losses accruing to the rest of society as a whole. However, since 
Pathways produced net measured benefits both for Pathways participants and for 
the Exchequer, treating changes in the incomes of high and low income people 
identically is not a major issue in the cost-benefit analysis of Pathways. 
To summarise, there is some uncertainty surrounding the net benefit estimates 
reported at the start of this chapter because of costs and benefits that we do not 
measure. Some of the omitted factors are almost certainly benefits of the policy, 
notably the reduction in the excess burden of taxation that Exchequer savings 
permit. Others are almost certainly costs, such as expenditures and loss of time 
associated with starting work. Still others are more ambiguous: the effects of 
Pathways on the health and quality of life of participants and on the benefit 
payments and employment outcomes of third parties, for example, could be either 
positive or negative. However, Pathways was found to have positive net measured 
benefits even when it was conservatively assumed that programme effects lasted 
for 70 weeks. If its effects lasted longer, the net measured benefits would be larger. 
The unmeasured costs of the policy would have to outweigh the unmeasured 
benefits significantly if the programme were not to be beneficial overall.
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7 Estimated indirect impact  
 of Pathways
7.1 Summary
Individuals not mandated onto Pathways might still have been affected by it. 
Those receiving an incapacity benefit and not mandated onto the programme 
were entitled to participate voluntarily, benefit recipients not taking part in the 
programme might have been affected indirectly via Pathways affecting their local 
Jobcentre Plus or their personal adviser, while those applying for jobs might have 
experienced greater competition in the labour market.
This chapter uses administrative data on benefit records to examine the cumulative 
off-flow rates from various Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) benefits 
both before the programme was implemented in the pilot areas and a set of 
specially chosen comparison areas in order to explore whether there have been 
indirect effects of Pathways:
The main findings are as follows:
•	 Those	 moving	 onto	 Incapacity	 Benefit	 (IB),	 who	 were	 mandated	 onto	 the	
programme (i.e. those potentially directly affected by Pathways), were found 
to have moved off earlier than they would otherwise have done. However, the 
cumulative off-flow after 12 months was not statistically significantly different 
from what it would have been in the absence of the programme. This suggests 
that Pathways has been successful in getting individuals who would have 
moved off IB within 12 months to move off benefit sooner than they otherwise 
would have done but has not been successful in getting individuals who would 
still have been in receipt of IB after 12 months to move off benefit within 12 
months.
•	 Those	already	receiving	IB,	who	were	not	mandated	onto	the	programme	but	
could choose to participate voluntarily, were found to be around 0.7 percentage 
points more likely to have moved off the benefit 3, 6, 9 and 12 months after the 
programme had been implemented. Similar impacts were found in the October 
2003 and the April 2004 pilot areas and on both men and women.
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•	 There	 is	 also	 some	 evidence	 that	 women	 already	 receiving	 Income	 Support	
(IS) or Pension Credit with a disability premium, who, again, could only have 
participated in Pathways voluntarily, were more likely to move off benefit within 
12 months after the programme had been implemented. Since many of these 
individuals also claim IB, this finding is consistent with that above. 
•	 Among	those	already	receiving	Severe	Disablement	Allowance	(SDA),	who	also	
could only have participated in Pathways voluntarily, there was some statistically 
significant evidence that men in the April 2004 areas were more likely to move 
off benefit within 12 months after the programme had been implemented.
•	 For	most	of	 those	DWP	benefit	recipients	who	were	not	mandated	onto	the	
programme, and in general could not have participated in Pathways voluntarily, 
there was no statistically significant evidence of any impact of the programme 
on their likelihood of moving off benefit.
•	 The	main	exception	is	men	and	women	receiving	Jobseeker‘s	Allowance	(JSA)	
in the October 2003 areas. They were both found to have been around 3½ 
percentage points less likely to move off benefit within six months after the 
programme had been implemented. This is consistent with either Jobcentre 
Plus in the October 2003 areas being less able to cope with the introduction of 
Pathways, perhaps because these areas had less notice of the programme than 
the April 2004 areas or with the labour market in the October 2003 areas less 
able to respond quickly to greater number of IB recipients seeking work. 
7.2 Introduction
Prior to February 2005 only new claimants of IB and IS on grounds of disability 
who were aged between 18 and 59 were mandated onto Pathways. However 
the programme might have affected those not mandated onto the programme 
through at least three potential mechanisms50:
•	 First,	 individuals	already	 receiving	 IB	or	 IS	on	grounds	of	disability	and	 those	
claiming SDA, could choose to participate in the programme voluntary. Those 
receiving IB or IS on grounds of disability who were aged under 18 or over 59 
could also volunteer. Some of those aged 60 to 64 who were receiving Pension 
Credit could also choose to participate in some elements of the programme. 
50 A fourth possibility is that the introduction of Pathways might have affected 
individuals’ decisions over whether or not to apply for different DWP 
benefits. For example, they might decide to apply for IB as a result of being 
attracted to the possibility of receiving Return to Work Credit (RTWC), or 
alternatively, they might decide not to apply because they do not want to 
have to participate in a compulsory Work Focused Interview (WFI). However, 
the analysis in this chapter requires the assumption that whether or not an 
individual moves onto a benefit is not affected by the programme.
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•	 Second,	any	 impact	of	 the	pilot	on	DWP	advisers	 could,	 in	 turn,	affect	non-
Pathways participants. For example, if the advisors became better trained, then 
it might become more likely that non-Pathways participants were able to move 
off benefits than they would have done in the absence of the pilot. Alternatively, 
it could be that the pilot led to DWP staff focusing on Pathways participants 
in a way that reduced the likelihood of non-Pathways participants moving off 
benefit.
•	 Third,	 to	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 individuals	 mandated	 onto	 Pathways	 become	
more likely to move into paid employment, it could then become harder for 
other benefit recipients to find suitable employment simply because they are 
applying for the same jobs. Economic theory suggests that this could happen in 
the short run if businesses could not easily expand production to absorb all of 
the increase in labour supply, if unemployment was high, or if wages could not 
adjust downwards to induce employers to offer more jobs (for example, because 
existing contracts cannot easily be renegotiated or because of a constraining 
minimum wage). This effect could be significant in the short run, though it 
could not be permanent: in the long run wages and the number of jobs available 
are not fixed and production would expand to absorb the additional labour 
supply.
This chapter presents the findings from analysis of the trends in cumulative off-
flow rates from DWP benefits specifically looking for evidence of changes in 
benefit off-flow rates by individuals who were not mandated onto Pathways. 
The methodology employed in this chapter is to compare differences in cumulative 
off-flow rates of various DWP benefits in Pathways areas before and after the 
programme was implemented to those that occurred in a similar set of comparison 
areas where the programme was not implemented. Under certain assumptions, 
this ‘difference-in-differences’ approach will yield an estimate of the causal impact 
of the pilot on the cumulative off-flow rates of each benefit. The difference-in-
differences methodology, which was also used in Chapter 2,51 is described in 
more detail in Section 7.3. The data used in this analysis relate to benefit spells 
that were active during the period from the beginning of September 2002 to 
the end of November 2004. Information is available on receipt of Attendance 
Allowance, Bereavement Benefit, Disability Living Allowance (DLA), IB, IS, Invalid 
Care Allowance (which was renamed Carer’s Allowance on 1 April 2003), JSA, 
Pension Credit, Retirement Pension, SDA and Widow’s Benefit.52
While cumulative off-flow rates of several of these benefits would not be expected 
to be affected by Pathways, for example, perhaps most obviously the Retirement 
51 There are important differences in the details of how the method is 
implemented in this chapter and Chapter 2. The way it is used in this chapter 
is described in Section 7.3.
52 For brief descriptions of these benefits, see Phillips et al. (2006) and for full 
details see Child Poverty Action Group (2006).
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Pension, analysis of these benefits is included as a reality check on the findings 
for those benefits where a potential indirect impact is more plausible. Further 
details about these data, including descriptive statistics on how the cumulative 
benefit off-flow rates have varied over time by different areas and details of the 
background characteristics of claimants are described in Section 7.4. The results 
are presented in Section 7.5, while Section 7.6 concludes. 
7.3 Methodology
Estimating the causal impact of any programme on any outcome of interest requires 
– either explicitly or implicitly – an assessment of what would have occurred in 
the absence of the programme. The methodology used to identify the indirect 
impact of Pathways is a difference-in-differences approach. This is implemented 
within a linear regression framework in order to take into account the set of 
background characteristics summarised in Section 7.4 (and Tables 7.1 and 7.2) 
and to subtract out any pre-programme differences in the outcome measures (in 
this case, whether or not benefit spells were still ongoing after different periods of 
time) between pilot and comparison areas, thereby allowing for any differences in 
the impact of unobserved characteristics that remain constant over time. A brief 
discussion of the methodology is provided here; for more details see, for example, 
Blundell and Costa Dias (2000).
The ‘difference-in-differences’ methodology involves comparing the difference in 
benefit spell durations in the pilot areas before and after the programme was 
introduced with the difference between benefit spell durations in the comparison 
areas before and after the programme was introduced. The advantage of this 
approach is that it ‘differences out’ any time-constant effect of factors that may 
be correlated with both the outcome of interest and whether a benefit spell 
occurred in the treatment group (i.e. in the pilot areas after the programme has 
been implemented). This is the case even if any such factors are unobserved: as 
long as any effect that they have on the outcomes being investigated does not 
change over time, this methodology subtracts them out. Not doing this would be 
potentially problematic as it could lead to biased estimates of the impact of the 
programme on the relevant outcome of interest. 
As the samples in both the pilot and comparison areas are not a panel over time, 
but (typically) contain different benefit spells for the pre-programme and post-
programme data, the assumption that any unobservables have no different impact 
over time relies on the impact of unobservables’ not being cohort specific in a way 
that differs systematically between the pilot and comparison areas.
‘Difference-in-differences’, therefore, allows factors that are not observed to be 
controlled for (as long as their impact is constant over time). It also controls for 
changes over time in factors that are observed: in this case, the composition of 
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the data in terms of the observed background characteristics of benefit spells/
recipients. The model can be written as follows:53 
 Yi = γXi + δPOSTi + λPILOTi + βPOSTi*PILOTi + εi   (1)
where Yi denotes the outcome of interest (for example whether or not the benefit 
spell is still ongoing after six months) for benefit spell i and Xi denotes the observed 
characteristics of the benefit spell/recipient (those described in Tables 7.1 and 7.2). 
PILOTi is a dummy variable
54 indicating whether the benefit spell occurred in a 
Pathways pilot area or in one of the comparison areas, and POSTi is a dummy 
variable indicating whether the benefit spell occurred before or after Pathways 
was actually implemented (regardless of whether the benefit spell occurred in one 
of the seven pilot areas or in one of the comparison areas). εi is an error term. 
The term of particular interest is POSTi*PILOTi which is a dummy variable taking 
the value 1 for those benefit spells observed in one of the seven Pathways pilot 
areas after the programme was introduced and 0 otherwise. Hence, β is the main 
coefficient of interest. This measures the effect of being in an area subject to 
Pathways in a period in which the programme was in effect, controlling for all 
other observed factors. In addition it is net of any effect of being observed in the 
period after the programme was implemented that is constant across pilot and 
comparison areas (δ) and any effect of being in a pilot area that is constant over 
time (λ). Hence, it captures shifts in the outcome measure among those benefit 
spells in Pathways areas vis-à-vis those in the comparison areas that occurred after 
the programme was introduced. However, this can be interpreted as the causal 
impact of the intervention only under two assumptions: first, as discussed above, 
that the effect of unobserved characteristics on the outcomes of interest did not 
vary differentially between pilot and comparison areas over time; second, that the 
characteristics included in the regressions that are correlated with POSTi*PILOTi 
have a linear effect on the outcomes of interest as assumed in equation (1).
7.4 Data description
The data used in this chapter were taken from the National Benefits Database 
(NBD). This contains details of benefit claims since June 1999. However, not all 
benefit claims are included: for example, IS claims are extracted every two weeks 
while IB and SDA claims are extracted every six weeks. Therefore, some relatively 
53 This equation is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares regression. This method 
of implementing the difference-in-differences approach is based on the Wald 
estimator and has been described and used in a number of papers, including 
Ashenfelter (1978) and Heckman and Robb (1985).
54 A dummy variable is a variable which takes the value 0 or 1. In this case, 
PILOT=1 if the benefit spell occurred in a Pathways pilot area; PILOT=0 
otherwise. Separate dummy variables are included for each of the local 
authorities observed in the data.
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short spells are not observed at any point and, thus, will unfortunately not be in 
the data. Benefit claims that cease to be observed are assumed to have ended, and 
a benefit claim end date is assigned randomly over the period since the benefit 
claim was last observed.55
The extract of the NBD used in this chapter comprises receipt of the following DWP 
benefits: Attendance Allowance, Bereavement Benefit, DLA, IB, IS, Invalid Care 
Allowance (which was renamed Carer’s Allowance on 1 April 2003), JSA, Pension 
Credit, Retirement Pension, SDA and Widow’s Benefit. The data covered both 
benefit spells occurring in the seven Pathways pilot areas and those occurring in 
one of the carefully chosen comparison areas. Included in the data were all benefit 
spells that were ongoing at some point during the period from the beginning of 
September 2002 to the end of November 2004, with subsequent flows off benefit 
recorded up to the beginning of March 2007. Partly as a result of this, benefit claim 
start dates in the data run from 31 October 1947 (with the vast majority starting 
much later than this – for example 90 per cent of benefit start dates are after the 
22 August 1988) through to 30 November 2004, while (estimated) benefit claim 
end dates run from 2 September 2002 to the 2 March 2007.
In addition to information on benefit claim start and end dates, other information 
in the NBD that is used in this analysis includes the individuals’ sex, date of birth 
and local authority of residence. Benefit spells of the same individual can also 
be linked together. IB spells also specify whether the individual is in receipt of a 
payment or whether they are only receiving National Insurance credits, which can 
help individuals qualify for certain contributory benefits in the future. In addition, 
spells of both IB and DLA also contain some information on the individual’s health 
problem (although only one health problem per benefit claim). IS and Pension 
Credit spells also indicate whether or not the individual is in receipt of the disability 
premium. Unfortunately, the data do not contain precise information on whether 
IS benefit spells are on the grounds of disability. This means that it is not possible 
to identify perfectly who would have been mandated onto Pathways since this 
applies to those claiming IS on grounds of disability (rather than those receiving 
the IS disability premium).
7.4.1 Benefit outcomes among those mandated onto the  
 programme
In addition to looking at the impact of Pathways on the benefit claims of those 
not mandated onto Pathways, the data can also be used to investigate the impact 
on those who were mandated on the programme – i.e. it can be used to explore 
the direct impact of Pathways as well as the indirect impact. For the analysis 
of the direct impact – which has also been carried out in Bewley, et al. (2007) 
– only individuals aged between 18 and 59 (inclusive) who moved onto IB are 
examined. This is because, unfortunately, the data do not allow us to identify 
55 This measurement error in our dependent variable should not bias the 
estimates in our results, although it might cause greater imprecision.
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which individuals moved onto IS on the grounds of disability, which was the only 
other group mandated onto Pathways at this time. (Note that this is not the same 
as being in receipt of the IS with a disability premium, which is payable once an 
individual has received IS on grounds of disability for one year.)
The post-programme period is defined as individuals who moved onto IB between 
1 August 2004 and 30 November 2004.
Two potential pre-programme groups are defined: First the ‘standard’ control group 
which is defined as those moving onto IB immediately before the programme was 
implemented, which was the group used in the main quantitative evaluation of 
Pathways.56 In the October 2003 areas this is defined as those moving onto IB 
between 1 September 2003 and 26 October 2003, while in the April 2004 areas it 
is those moving onto IB between 1 January 2004 and 4 April 2004 (inclusive). One 
potential problem with this control group is that they might have been indirectly 
affected by the programme, since their claim is likely to be ongoing after the 
implementation of the programme in the pilot areas. Therefore, an alternative 
‘lagged’ control group is also examined. This is defined as those moving onto IB 
in a window exactly one year before the window used for the ‘standard’ control 
group (i.e. 1 September 2002 to 26 October 2002 or 1 January 2003 to 4 April 
2003). 
Constructing the data in this way means that the same individuals (although 
not the same benefit spells) can appear in both the post-programme and the 
pre-programme groups since they could have IB spells that begin in more than 
one window. Moreover, those individuals in comparison areas, which are used 
as controls for both October 2003 and April 2004 treatment areas, are included 
in the data twice. In the regression analysis, the results of which are presented 
in Section 7.4, the methodology allows for a lack of independence of different 
benefit spells of the same individuals. 
Figure 7.1 shows the percentage still receiving IB by time elapsed since moving 
onto IB by each of the six groups outlined above. Individuals are only counted as 
having moved off IB if their current claim has ended and they have not begun 
another, as yet uncompleted, spell. All of the lines are upward sloping, which 
shows that IB recipients become more likely to have moved off the benefit over 
time. Four of the lines on the figure – those relating to the cumulative off-flow 
rates in both the pilot and the comparison areas during the two periods examined 
prior to the pilot being introduced (the two ‘standard control’ lines and the two 
‘lagged control’ lines) – are very difficult to distinguish from each other. This is 
encouraging since it suggests that the pilot and comparison areas are similar, at 
least in terms of characteristics that determine movements off IB. 
56 Source: Adam, et al., 2006 and Bewley, et al, 2007. One difference is that 
the survey data used in both of these studies comprised those who made 
an enquiry about claiming a disability benefit, whereas the administrative 
data used here (and also in Bewley, et al., 2007) comprise those who made 
a successful claim.
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Looking at the cumulative off-flow rates during the period after the programme 
was introduced in the pilot areas (the two ‘post’ lines) it can be seen that from the 
third month onwards, more individuals moved off IB in the pilot areas than in the 
comparison areas. After six months the difference is relatively large. Beyond month 
six, the cumulative off-flow rate in the comparison areas rises more quickly than 
that in the pilot areas, and by 12 months only very slightly more individuals had 
moved off IB in the pilot areas compared to the comparison areas. This suggests 
that Pathways has been successful in getting individuals who would have moved 
off IB within 12 months to move off benefit sooner than they otherwise would 
have done but has not been successful in getting individuals who would still have 
been in receipt of IB after 12 months to move off benefit within 12 months.
Figure 7.1 Percentage of those who moved onto IB no longer  
 receiving, by month, area and time period
 
7.4.2 Benefit outcomes among those not mandated onto the  
 programme
The primary purpose of this chapter is to investigate the possibility that Pathways 
might have affected, either positively or negatively, on benefit claimants who were 
not mandated onto the programme. In principle, both those who were claimants 
at the time Pathways was introduced and those moving onto benefits after 
Pathways was in operation, could have been affected. However, at least in some 
cases, Pathways could also have directly affected the latter group. For example, 
consistent with the evidence presented in Bewley, et al. (2007), the programme 
might lead to some individuals moving from IB into paid work instead of moving 
from IB onto JSA, which would affect the composition of those moving onto JSA. 
Our analysis of the indirect effects of Pathways is, therefore, restricted to only those 
benefit spells that were ongoing when Pathways was implemented. Specifically 
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the duration of benefit spells that were ongoing at particular points in time 
that related to when the programme was introduced in the October 2003 areas 
(27 October) and the April 2004 areas (5 April), are examined. For examining the 
impact of the October 2003 pilot, the post-programme sample is all benefit spells 
in the relevant pilot or comparison areas that started before 27 October 2003 that 
had not ended before this date. Differences in these outcomes are compared to 
those benefit spells in the same areas that began before 27 October 2002 that 
had not ended before that date. Similarly, for examining the impact of the April 
2004 pilot, the post-programme sample is all benefit spells in the relevant pilot or 
comparison areas that started before 5 April 2004 that had not ended before that 
date and the pre-programme sample is the benefit spells in the same areas that 
began before 5 April 2003 that had not ended before that date. 
Only individuals who were aged 16 or over and were not more than five years 
above the State Pension Age on the relevant date are considered. Individuals who 
moved onto IB or IS in the next 12 months (at a time when they were aged 
over 17 or under 60) are excluded from this part of the analysis since, had the 
programme been in place, they might have been mandated on to the programme. 
Ideally only individuals who moved onto IB or IS on grounds of disability would 
have been removed since those moving onto IS on other grounds would not have 
been mandated onto the programme. However, there is not sufficient information 
in the data to identify this group.
Potential impacts of the programme on the following eleven benefits are investigated: 
the Retirement Pension, IB, IS/Pension Credit with a disability premium, SDA, IS/
Pension Credit without a disability premium, JSA, Invalid Care Allowance (which 
was renamed Carer’s Allowance on 1 April 2003), DLA, Bereavement Benefits, 
Attendance Allowance (which in this case only includes men aged 65 to 69, since 
Attendance Allowance can only be received from age 65 and the analysis here 
only considers those aged less than five years above the State Pension Age) and 
Widow’s Benefit (which could only be received by women). 
Constructing the data in this way means that the same individuals, and in fact 
the same benefit spells, can appear in both the post-programme and the pre-
programme groups since one spell can span from before, for example, October 
2002 until after October 2003. Moreover, those individuals in comparison areas 
which are used as controls for both October 2003 and April 2004 treatment 
areas are, as before, included in the data twice. In the regression analysis, the 
results of which are presented in Section 7.4, the methodology allows for a lack 
of independence of benefit spells of the same individuals.
Figure 7.2 shows the percentage still receiving each benefit by time elapsed since 
the relevant date (27 October 2002, 27 October 2003, 5 April 2003 and 5 April 
2004 respectively) for each of the 11 benefits listed above. Individuals are only 
counted as having moved off a benefit if their current claim has ended and they 
have not began another, as yet completed, spell on the same benefit. 
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In summary the graphs show that:
•	 Cumulative	off-flow	rates	from	Retirement Pension up to nine months were 
very similar in both the pilot and the comparison areas both before and after 
Pathways was implemented in the pilot areas. From nine to 12 months, they were 
slightly higher in the pilot areas than in the comparison areas; however, this is 
true both before and after Pathways was implemented in the pilot areas (Figure 
7.2a). This is reassuring in that it is consistent with there being no evidence of 
an impact of the introduction of Pathways in the pilot areas on the cumulative 
off-flow rate among these individuals and we would not expect the cumulative 
off-flow rate from the Retirement Pension to be affected. 
•	 Before	 Pathways	 was	 implemented,	 cumulative	 off-flow	 rates	 from	 IB were 
higher in the comparison areas than the pilot areas. However, after Pathways 
was introduced in the pilot areas there was no noticeable difference between the 
pilot and comparison areas (Figure 7.2b). This is consistent with the introduction 
of Pathways in the pilot areas increasing the cumulative off-flow rate among 
these individuals. The next section will examine whether this is robust enough 
to take into account the impact of changes in the background characteristics 
observed in the data.
•	 The	cumulative	off-flow	rate	among	 recipients	of	 IS/Pension Credit with a 
disability premium was very similar in the pilot areas and the comparison 
areas, both in the period before Pathways was implemented and the period 
after Pathways was implemented (Figure 7.2c). The most striking feature of the 
pattern of cumulative off-flow rates is the large increase at six and 12 months 
seen in both the pilot and comparison areas, in the period before Pathways was 
implemented. This is due to the introduction of the Pension Credit in October 
2003, which increased off-flow rates among recipients of IS/Pension Credit with 
a disability premium after six months among for those receiving benefits at 
5 April 2003 and after 12 months among those receiving benefits at 
27 October 2002.
•	 Cumulative	off-flow	rates	from	SDA were little changed in the pilot areas after 
Pathways was implemented, with a large fall seen in the comparison areas 
(Figure 7.2d). This is also consistent with the introduction of Pathways in the 
pilot areas increasing the cumulative off-flow rate among these individuals. The 
next section will examine whether this is robust enough to take into account the 
impact of changes in the background characteristics observed in the data.
•	 Cumulative	 off-flow	 rates	 from	 IS/Pension Credit without a disability 
premium were considerably lower after Pathways was implemented in the 
pilot areas, although a similar change was seen in both pilot and comparison 
areas (Figure 7.2e). This is consistent with there being no evidence of an impact 
from the introduction of Pathways on the cumulative off-flow rate among these 
individuals. 
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•	 There	 was	 a	 very	 different	 pattern	 of	 cumulative	 off-flow	 rates	 from	 JSA 
between the periods before and after the implementation of Pathways in the 
pilot areas. However, the change was very similar in both pilot and comparison 
areas (Figure 7.2f). Again this is consistent with there being no evidence of an 
impact of Pathways on the cumulative off-flow rate among these individuals. 
•	 Cumulative	 off-flow	 rates	 from	 Invalid Care Allowance were higher after 
Pathways was implemented in the pilot areas, although a similar change was 
seen in both pilot and comparison areas (Figure 7.2g). Again, this is consistent 
with there being no evidence of an impact of Pathways on the cumulative off-
flow rate among these individuals.
•	 Cumulative	off-flow	 rates	 from	DLA were slightly lower after Pathways was 
implemented in the pilot areas, although a similar change was seen in both pilot 
and comparison areas (Figure 7.2h). Again, this is consistent with there being 
no evidence of an impact of Pathways on the cumulative off-flow rate among 
these individuals.
•	 Cumulative	off-flow	rates	from	Bereavement Benefit differed both across time 
period and also across areas, and were highest in the comparison areas before 
Pathways had been implemented in the pilot areas and lowest in the comparison 
areas after Pathways had been (Figure 7.2i). This suggests the introduction of 
Pathways in the pilot areas was associated with a rise in the cumulative off-
flow rate among these individuals. However, it is difficult to see how this could 
be caused by Pathways. Thus, the next section will examine whether it can be 
explained by the impact of changes in the background characteristics observed 
in the data
•	 Cumulative	 off-flow	 rates	 from	Attendance Allowance were lower in the 
pilot areas than the comparison areas. However, this was true both after and 
before Pathways was implemented in the pilot areas (Figure 7.2j). Again, this 
is consistent with there being no evidence of an impact of Pathways on the 
cumulative off-flow rate among these individuals.
•	 Cumulative	off-flow	rates	from	Widow’s Benefit were very similar in the pilot 
areas and the comparison areas in the period after Pathways was implemented. 
In the period before Pathways was introduced in the pilot areas, the cumulative 
off-flow rates were lower in both the pilot and the comparison areas, although 
for the cumulative off-flow rates from seven to ten months, it was lower in 
the pilot areas than in the comparison areas (Figure 7.2k). This suggests the 
introduction of Pathways was associated with a rise in the cumulative off-flow 
rate between months seven and ten among these individuals. Again, it is difficult 
to see how this could be caused by Pathways. Hence, the next section will 
examine whether it can be explained by the impact of changes in background 
characteristics observed in the data.
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Figure 7.2 Percentage of benefit recipients moving off benefit, by  
 month, area and period
 (a) Retirement Pension (b) IB
 (c) IS/Pension Credit with (d) SDA 
 disability premium
 (e) IS/Pension Credit without (f) JSA 
 disability premium
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 (k) Widow’s Benefit

















































































































































The NBD contains details of the claimants’ sex and dates of birth. All benefit 
spells have the date at which the spell started and for spells that ended up to the 
2 March 2007, an estimated end date is known. IB spells also specify whether the 
individual is in receipt of a payment or whether they are only receiving National 
Insurance credits, which can help individuals qualify for certain contributory 
benefits in the future. Spells of both IB and DLA also contain some information 
on the individual’s health problem (although only one health problem per benefit 
claim). IS and Pension Credit spells also indicate whether or not the individual is 
in receipt of the disability premium. Benefit spells of the same individual can also 
be linked together.
For those who moved onto IB during the three time periods set out in Section 7.4.1, 
the average value of these background characteristics is shown in Table 7.1, split 
by whether the individual resides in a pilot area or a comparison area. In terms of 
age, sex, whether they only qualify for National Insurance credits and whether the 
one recorded health problem is a mental health problem.57 Individuals in the pilot 
areas are, on average, fairly similar to those in the comparison areas, although a 
slightly lower proportion of individuals in the pilot areas are women and a slightly 
higher proportion are in receipt of National Insurance credits only. In terms of 
the average length of claim, which by the construction of the data can only be 
observed for those whose claim was completed by the start of March 2007, the 
mean claim length among claims starting in the period just before the programme 
was introduced was slightly lower in the pilot areas than in the comparison areas 
(270 days compared to 284 days for the standard controls) and almost identical 
in the two areas one year before the programme was implemented (328.7 days 
compared to 328.9 days for the lagged controls). Among those observed in the 
period after the pilots were implemented in the pilot areas, the average claim 
length among completed claims was considerably lower in the pilot areas than in 
the comparison areas (218 days compared to 240 days). 
57 This has been classified as either being an Affective Disorder (Manic 
Episode, Depressive Episode, Recurrent Depressive Disorder, Persistent mood 
Disorder or an Unspecified Mood Disorder) or a Neurotic, Stress Related and 
Somatoform disorders (Phobic Anxiety Disorders, Other anxiety Disorders, 
Reaction to Severe Stress, Dissociative Disorders, Somatoform Disorders or 
Other Neurotic Disorders).
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Table 7.1 Observed background characteristics of those moving  
 onto IB, by area and time period
Pilot Comparison Pilot Comparison Pilot Comparison
Post Standard control Lagged control
Age at claim start 39.5 40.1 39.8 39.7 39.6 40.2
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Percentage 
women
42.2 42.3 41.1 42.2 41.1 41.5
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (0.5)
Percentage IB 
credits only
44.7 44.3 45.1 43.2 44.5 42.5
(0.4) (0.4) (0.5) (0.5) (0.4) (0.5)
Percentage mental 
health problem
29.6 29.7 30.0 30.3 29.0 28.4
(0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (0.4)
Claim length 
(days) 
218.3 239.8 270.1 283.7 328.7 328.9
(finished claims 
only)
(1.7) (1.9) (2.6) (2.9) (3.5) (3.9)
Number of spells 17,527 14,885 11,993 9,828 12,444 10,100
Number of 
completed spells
12,288 10,676 8,746 7,282 9,396 7,751
Note: Standard error of mean shown in parentheses. 
Table 7.2 provides a similar comparison for those who were already in receipt of 
IB on the dates set out in Section 7.4.2. Again, in terms of age, sex, whether they 
qualify for National Insurance credits only and whether the one recorded health 
problem is a mental health problem, individuals in the pilot areas are, on average, 
fairly similar to those in the comparison areas. Those in the pilot areas had, on 
average, been in receipt of IB for about two per cent longer than those in the 
comparison areas (5.2 years compared to 5.1 years at the date that the programme 
was implemented in the pilot areas and 4.9 years compared to 4.8 years one year 
before the programme was implemented in the pilot areas). Among those whose 
claim was completed by the start of March 2007, there was little difference in the 
completed average duration between those in the pilot areas and those in the 
comparison areas in the control period (1.66 years for both groups). However in 
the period after the programme was implemented, average completed durations 
were slightly lower in the pilot areas than in the comparison areas (1.25 years 
compared to 1.27 years).
For reasons of brevity, similar descriptives of background characteristics for the ten 
other broad types of benefit claim considered in the analysis are not presented in 
this chapter. 
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Table 7.2 Observed background characteristics of those already  
 receiving IB, by area and time period
Pilot Comparison Pilot Comparison
Post Control
Age at relevant datea 48.0 48.4 48.1 48.6
(0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3)
Percentage women 39.1 39.2 38.6 38.4
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Percentage IB credits only 32.9 32.1 31.6 30.7
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Percentage mental health problems 26.6 25.6 25.5 24.6
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Days since claim start 1,910 1,876 1,795 1,759
(2.9) (3.3) (2.7) (3.0)
Days to (estimated) claim end 455 464 608 607
(finished claims only) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.6)
Number of spells 214,860 171,136 212,380 169.213
Number of completed spells 80,235 65,289 92,929 75,468
Note: Standard error of mean shown in parentheses. a Relevant date for the post group refers 
to the 27 October 2003 for those in the October areas and 5 April 2004 for those in the April 
areas. For the control group the relevant dates are 27 October 2002 and 5 April 2003 for those 
in the October and April areas respectively. 
7.5 Results
This section presents the results from applying the difference-in-differences 
methodology set out in Section 7.3 to the data described in Section 7.4. Section 
7.5.1 describes the estimated impact on benefit outcomes among those mandated 
onto Pathways, while Section 7.5.2 describes the estimated impacts on benefit 
outcomes among those not mandated onto the programme. 
7.5.1 Evidence on the direct impact of Pathways: benefit  
 outcomes among those mandated onto the programme
The estimated impact, using the difference-in-differences methodology set out 
in Section 7.3, of Pathways on those moving onto IB who were mandated onto 
the programme is shown in Table 7.3. Similar analysis, and results, to these are 
presented in Bewley, et al. (2007).The impact is estimated for the likelihood of 
being in receipt of IB three, six, nine and 12 months after the programme was 
implemented and the impact is broken down by both sex and area. The estimates 
in Table 7.3 are based on those who moved onto IB just before the programme 
was implemented. 
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The results reported in Table 7.3 suggest that the programme led to more individuals 
moving off IB after three or six months. There is no statistically significant evidence 
of any positive impact of the programme on cumulative off-flow rates after either 
nine or 12 months. Breaking down the impact on cumulative off-flow rates after 
six months reveals a statistically significant increase (at least at the ten per cent 
confidence level) in cumulative off-flow rates for both men and women in the April 
2004 area (+2.7 percentage points and +3.5 percentage points respectively) and 
for men in the October 2003 areas (+4.1 percentage points) with no statistically 
significant increase among women in the October 2003 areas. 
Table 7.3 Difference-in-differences estimate of impact of  
 Pathways on exit rates of new claims of IB, by area and  
 sex – standard controls
Exit from benefit after:
3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months Sample size
Overall impact
All areas +2.1*** +2.7*** –0.2 –0.8 54,233
(0.7) (0.8) (0.9) (0.9)
October 2003 areas +2.0* +2.1 –0.4 –1.2 21,748
(1.0) (1.4) (1.4) (1.4)
April 2004 areas +2.2*** +3.0*** –0.1 –0.5 32,485
(0.8) (1.1) (1.1) (1.1)
Men
All areas +2.4*** +3.2*** +0.5 +0.0 31,464
(0.9) (1.1) (1.2) (1.2)
October 2003 areas +1.9 +4.1** +1.2 –0.3 12,587
(1.4) (1.8) (1.9) (1.8)
April 2004 areas +2.7** +2.7* –0.0 +0.2 18,877
(1.1) (1.4) (1.5) (1.4)
Women
All areas +1.7* +1.9 –1.2 –1.9 22,769
(0.9) (1.3) (1.3) (1.3)
October 2003 areas +2.0 –0.7 –2.6 –2.5 9,161
(1.5) (2.1) (2.1) (2.1)
April 2004 areas +1.5 +3.5** –0.2 –1.5 13,608
(1.2) (1.6) (1.7) (1.7)
Note: Standard errors clustered at the individual level shown in parentheses. Sample size refers 
to the number of unique clusters (individuals), for overall number of benefit spells see note to 
Figure 7.1. Statistical significance denoted by ***, ** and * for the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. Controls for age (five-year age bands), whether they hit the State Pension Age in the 
respective window, whether observed in the pre- or post-time period (interacted with whether 
they were in an October area or an April area), local authority dummies, whether IB claim is only 
for National Insurance credits and whether recorded health problem is a mental health problem. 
All controls interacted with sex.
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Alternative estimates of the impact of Pathways on the benefit outcomes of those 
mandated onto the programme are presented in Table 7.4. These use the lagged 
rather than the standard set of controls. Using these earlier benefit spells as controls 
generally leads to larger central estimates of the impact of the programme. 
Table 7.4 Difference-in-differences estimate of impact of  
 Pathways on exit rates of new claims of IB, by area and  
 sex – lagged controls
Exit from benefit after:
3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months Sample size
Overall impact
All areas +3.8*** +6.3*** +3.0*** +1.4* 54,956
(0.7) (0.8) (0.9) (0.9)
October 2003 areas +5.1*** +5.4*** +1.5 +1.4 22,019
(1.0) (1.3) (1.4) (1.4)
April 2004 areas +3.0*** +6.8*** +3.8*** +1.4 32,937
(0.8) (1.1) (1.1) (1.1)
Men
All areas +4.2*** +6.5*** +3.5*** +2.7** 31,957
(0.9) (1.1) (1.2) (1.1)
October 2003 areas +4.3*** +4.7*** +1.7 +2.4 12,740
(1.4) (1.8) (1.8) (1.8)
April 2004 areas +4.1*** +7.5*** +4.5*** +2.8* 19,217
(1.1) (1.4) (1.4) (1.4)
Women
All areas +3.3*** +6.0*** +2.3* –0.3 22,999
(1.0) (1.3) (1.3) (1.3)
October 2003 areas +6.2*** +6.3*** +1.3 +0.1 9,279
(1.5) (2.0) (2.1) (2.1)
April 2004 areas +1.5 +5.8*** +2.9* –0.5 13,720
(1.2) (1.6) (1.7) (1.7)
Note: Standard errors clustered at the individual level shown in parentheses. Sample size refers 
to the number of unique clusters (individuals), for overall number of benefit spells see note to 
Figure 7.1. Statistical significance denoted by ***, ** and * for the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. Controls for age (five-year age bands), whether they hit the State Pension Age in the 
respective window, whether observed in the pre- or post-time period (interacted with whether 
they were in an October area or an April area), local authority dummies, whether IB claim is only 
for National Insurance credits and whether recorded health problem is a mental health problem. 
All controls interacted with sex.
One possible reason for this is that Pathways has a positive impact on those 
who moved onto IB in the pilot areas just prior to the programme becoming 
mandatory for new claimants. This might occur, for example, if existing claimants 
chose to take part in the programme voluntarily or if they benefited from their 
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adviser becoming better trained. If this was the case, the results produced using 
the standard controls would be expected to understate the true impact of the 
programme. The estimated impacts using lagged controls, like those using the 
standard controls, peak at around six months and then fade – by 12 months 
of benefit claim the higher cumulative off-flow rate in the pilot areas after the 
programme was implemented is only statistically significantly different from zero 
among men. 
In summary, the results, looking at the impact of Pathways on those IB recipients 
mandated onto the programme, suggest that the programme led to individuals 
moving off IB earlier than they would otherwise have done but that by 12 months 
the cumulative off-flow rate was no different from what it would have been in 
the absence of the programme. This suggests that Pathways has been successful 
in getting individuals who would have moved off IB within 12 months to move off 
benefit sooner than they otherwise would have done, but has not been successful 
in getting individuals who would still have been in receipt of IB after 12 months to 
move off benefit within 12 months.
7.5.2 Evidence on the indirect impact of Pathways: benefit  
 outcomes among those not mandated onto the  
 programme
The estimated impact of Pathways on those already claiming Retirement Pension, 
who were not mandated onto the programme is shown in Table 7.5. These 
individuals would not have been able to volunteer to take part in Pathways, unless 
they were also claiming a disability benefit such as Pension Credit on grounds 
of disability. The estimates show that those recipients in the pilot areas after the 
programme had been implemented were not statistically significantly more or 
less likely to move off benefit. The very large sample sizes mean that this lack 
of statistical significance is due to small points estimates rather than large point 
estimates that are imprecisely measured. Breaking down the impact by area and 
sex also suggests little impact of the programme on cumulative off-flow rates from 
Retirement Pension. While it is fairly obvious that the programme would not have 
an impact on off-flows among this group (since the vast majority off individuals 
only move of this benefit when they die) the empirical finding of no evidence of 
any impact is reassuring, suggesting that the data and the methodology employed 
are not, in this case, providing an counterintuitive result. 
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Table 7.5 Difference-in-differences estimate of impact of  
 Pathways on exit rates of existing Retirement Pension  
 claims, by area and sex
Exit from benefit after:
3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months Sample size
Overall impact
All areas –0.0 –0.0 –0.0 +0.0 873,596
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
October 2003 areas –0.0 –0.0 –0.0 –0.0 332,574
(0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
April 2004 areas –0.0 +0.0 –0.0 +0.0 541,022
(0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1)
Men
All areas –0.0 –0.0 –0.0 +0.0 419,317
(0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
October 2003 areas +0.0 –0.0 –0.1 –0.1 159,816
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2)
April 2004 areas –0.1* –0.0 –0.0 +0.1 259,501
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Women
All areas –0.0 –0.0 –0.0 –0.0 454,279
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1)
October 2003 areas –0.1** –0.0 –0.0 –0.0 172,758
(0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
April 2004 areas +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 –0.0 281,521
(0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1)
Note: Standard errors clustered at the individual level shown in parentheses. Sample size refers 
to the number of unique clusters (individuals), for overall number of benefit spells see note to 
Figure 7.2(a). Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by ***, ** and * 
for the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Controls for duration of benefit claim (linear and 
squared), age (five-year age bands), whether observed in the pre- or post-time period (interacted 
with whether they were in an October area) or an April area and local authority dummies. All 
controls interacted with sex. 
The estimated impact of Pathways on those already claiming IB who were not 
mandated onto the programme is shown in Table 7.6. Again, the impact is 
estimated for the likelihood of being in receipt of IB three, six, nine and 12 months 
after the programme was implemented, and the impact is broken down by both 
sex and area. The estimates show that those recipients in the pilot areas after 
the programme had been implemented were around 0.7 percentage points more 
likely to have moved off IB after three, six, nine and 12 months. It is plausible 
that this was caused by the programme – not least because individuals already 
claiming IB might have chosen to participate in Pathways, in which case they 
might have benefited directly from it. Similar overall impacts are found on both 
men and women.
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Pathways was extended on 7 February 2005 to cover those who had been in 
receipt of IB for up to two years at the time Pathways was implemented for those 
moving into IB in that area (i.e. either October 2003 or April 2004). For the former 
group, this is unlikely to affect the estimates presented in Table 7.6. However, 
those receiving IB in the April 2004 areas could have been mandated onto the 
programme after ten months, which, in principle, could have an effect on their 
subsequent outcomes. However, the extent to which this was actually the case 
was somewhat mitigated since IBPAs had, until April 2006, to administer all first 
WFIs. Indeed the results in Table 7.6 are similar in the October 2003 and the April 
2004 pilot areas, suggesting no obvious immediate effect of the extension to the 
stock. 
Table 7.6 Difference-in-differences estimate of impact of  
 Pathways on exit rates of existing IB claims, by area  
 and sex
Exit from benefit after:
3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months Sample size
Overall impact
All areas +0.6*** +0.8*** +0.6*** +0.7*** 767,589
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
October 2003 areas +0.4*** +0.4*** +0.5*** +0.6** 366,771
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
April 2004 areas +0.8*** +1.2*** +0.7*** +0.8*** 400,818
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
Men
All areas +0.6*** +0.8*** +0.5*** +0.7*** 469,322
(0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2)
October 2003 areas +0.2 +0.2 +0.3 +0.5** 225,226
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
April 2004 areas +0.9*** +1.3*** +0.8*** +1.0*** 244,096
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
Women
All areas +0.6*** +0.9*** +0.6*** +0.6*** 298,267
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
October 2003 areas +0.6*** +0.8*** +0.9*** +0.8*** 141,545
(0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3)
April 2004 areas +0.6*** +0.9*** +0.5* +0.5 156,722
(0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3)
Note: Standard errors clustered at the individual level shown in parentheses. Sample size refers 
to the number of unique clusters (individuals), for overall number of benefit spells see note to 
Figure 7.2(b). Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by ***, ** and * 
for the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Controls for duration of benefit claim (linear and 
squared), age (five-year age bands), whether they hit the State Pension Age in the respective 
window, whether observed in the pre- or post-time period (interacted with whether they were in 
an October area or an April area), local authority dummies, whether IB claim is only for National 
Insurance credits and whether recorded health problem is a mental health problem. All controls 
interacted with sex. 
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The estimated impact of Pathways on those already claiming IS or Pension Credit 
with a disability premium, who were not mandated onto the programme is shown 
in Table 7.7. The estimates suggest that the programme might have led to a small 
increase in the cumulative off-flow rate from these benefits, although many of the 
estimated coefficients are not statistically significantly different from zero. Since 
these claimants would have been allowed to participate in Pathways this could be 
due to a direct, rather than an indirect, impact of the policy.
Table 7.7 Difference-in-differences estimate of impact of  
 Pathways on exit rates of existing IS/Pension Credit  
 with disability premium claims, by area and sex
Exit from benefit after:
3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months Sample size
Overall impact
All areas +0.2* +0.2 +0.2 +0.5** 377,884
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
October 2003 areas +0.2 +0.4* +0.2 +0.7** 170,297
(0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.4)
April 2004 areas +0.2 +0.1 +0.3 +0.3 207,587
(0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3)
Men
All areas +0.2 +0.3 +0.2 +0.3 202,098
(0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3)
October 2003 areas +0.2 +0.4 +0.1 +0.6 90,246
(0.2) (0.3) (0.4) (0.5)
April 2004 areas +0.2 +0.2 +0.2 +0.1 111,852
(0.2) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4)
Women
All areas +0.2 +0.2 +0.1 +0.6** 175,786
(0.1) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3)
October 2003 areas +0.2 +0.4 +0.3 +0.8** 80,051
(0.2) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4)
April 2004 areas +0.2 +0.1 +0.4 +0.5 95,735
(0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4)
Note: Standard errors clustered at the individual level shown in parentheses. Sample size refers 
to the number of unique clusters (individuals), for overall number of benefit spells see note to 
Figure 7.2(c). Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by ***, ** and * 
for the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Controls for duration of benefit claim (linear and 
squared), age (five-year age bands), whether they hit the State Pension Age in the respective 
window, whether observed in the pre- or post-time period (interacted with whether they were 
in an October area or an April area) and local authority dummies. All controls interacted with sex. 
The estimated impact of Pathways on those already claiming SDA, who were not 
mandated onto the programme, is shown in Table 7.8. Again, these individuals 
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would have been allowed to participate voluntarily in Pathways. The estimates 
show that those recipients in the pilot areas after the programme had been 
implemented were more likely to move off benefit, with the estimated co-efficient 
being statistically different from zero after 12 months (+0.5 percentage points). 
Breaking down the impact by area and sex reveals that the cumulative off-flow rate 
after 12 months was statistically significantly higher among men in the April 2004 
areas after Pathways was in place (+1.1 percentage points). While the estimated 
effect on women was also positive it was not statistically significantly different 
from zero. 
Table 7.8 Difference-in-differences estimate of impact of  
 Pathways on exit rates of existing SDAclaims, by area  
 and sex
Exit from benefit after:
3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months Sample size
Overall impact
All areas +0.0 +0.3 +0.2 +0.5** 98,468
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
October 2003 areas –0.0 +0.1 –0.1 +0.3 43,217
(0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4)
April 2004 areas +0.1 +0.4* +0.4 +0.7** 55,251
(0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3)
Men
All areas –0.1 +0.2 +0.1 +0.6* 42,075
(0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3)
October 2003 areas –0.2 +0.1 –0.4 –0.1 17,532
(0.3) (0.4) (0.5) (0.5)
April 2004 areas –0.0 +0.3 +0.4 +1.1** 24,543
(0.2) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4)
Women
All areas +0.1 +0.3 +0.3 +0.5 56,393
(0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3)
October 2003 areas +0.1 +0.1 +0.1 +0.6 25,685
(0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5)
April 2004 areas +0.1 +0.4 +0.4 +0.4 30,708
(0.2) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4)
Note: Standard errors clustered at the individual level shown in parentheses. Sample size refers 
to the number of unique clusters (individuals), for overall number of benefit spells see note to 
Figure 7.2(d). Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by ***, ** and * 
for the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Controls for duration of benefit claim (linear and 
squared), age (five-year age bands), whether they hit the State Pension Age in the respective 
window, whether observed in the pre- or post-time period (interacted with whether they were in 
an October area or an April area), local authority dummies and whether recorded health problem 
is a mental health problem. All controls interacted with sex. 
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The estimated impact of Pathways on those already claiming IS or Pension Credit 
without a disability premium, who were not mandated onto the programme, is 
shown in Table 7.9. These individuals would only have been able to participate 
voluntarily in Pathways if they were receiving IS or Pension Credit on grounds of 
disability (and it is, unfortunately, not possible to generate such an indicator in the 
data). 
Generally, the estimates show that those recipients in the pilot areas after the 
programme had been implemented were not statistically significantly more or less 
likely to move off benefit. Breaking the results down by area and sex suggests that 
the programme might have led to an increase in the three month cumulative off-
flow rate from these benefits among women in the April 2004 areas.
Table 7.9 Difference-in-differences estimate of impact of  
 Pathways on exit rates of existing IS/Pension Credit  
 without disability premium claims, by area and sex
Exit from benefit after:
3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months Sample size
Overall impact
All areas +0.3** +0.2 +0.1 +0.3 393,873
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3)
October 2003 areas +0.0 +0.3 –0.2 +0.1 167,371
(0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4)
April 2004 areas +0.5** +0.0 +0.4 +0.4 226,502
(0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3)
Men
All areas +0.4 +0.4 +0.5 +0.8** 131,343
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4)
October 2003 areas +0.1 +0.6 –0.1 +0.5 57,600
(0.4) (0.5) (0.5) (0.6)
April 2004 areas +0.6* +0.2 +0.9 +1.0* 73,743
(0.4) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5)
Women
All areas +0.3 +0.0 –0.0 +0.0 262,530
(0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3)
October 2003 areas –0.0 +0.2 –0.3 –0.2 109,771
(0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5)
April 2004 areas +0.5* –0.1 +0.2 +0.1 152,759
(0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4)
Note: Standard errors clustered at the individual level shown in parentheses. Sample size refers 
to the number of unique clusters (individuals), for overall number of benefit spells see note to 
Figure 7.2(e). Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by ***, ** and * 
for the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Controls for duration of benefit claim (linear and 
squared), age (five-year age bands), whether they hit the State Pension Age in the respective 
window, whether observed in the pre- or post-time period (interacted with whether they were in 
an October area or an April area), and local authority dummies. All controls interacted with sex. 
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The estimated impact of Pathways on those already claiming JSA, who were not 
mandated onto the programme is shown in Table 7.10. These individuals would 
not have been able to volunteer to take part in Pathways. The estimates show that 
men and women in the October 2003 pilot areas after the programme had been 
implemented were 3.6 percentage points and 3.4 percentage points, respectively, 
less likely to have moved off JSA after six months. These are a sizeable difference, 
which might have been caused by the programme – for example, through it 
leading to a reduction in DWP resources being targeted towards this group or 
due to (potentially short-term) inflexibilities in the local labour market. The overall 
reduction in cumulative off-flow rates from JSA had diminished by nine months. 
No evidence of any difference in cumulative benefit off-flow rates was found 
among either men or women in the April 2004 areas. 
Table 7.10 Difference-in-differences estimate of impact of  
 Pathways on exit rates of existing JSA claims, by area  
 and sex
Exit from benefit after:
3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months Sample size
Overall impact
All areas –1.3*** –1.7*** –0.6* –0.5 203,841
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4)
October 2003 areas –1.9*** –3.6*** –1.3** –1.6*** 89,247
(0.8) (0.8) (0.8) (0.8)
April 2004 areas –0.9 –0.2 –0.1 +0.5 114,594
(0.6) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5)
Men
All areas –1.7*** –1.7*** –0.5 –0.4 154,305
(0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.4)
October 2003 areas –2.5*** –3.6*** –1.3* –1.2* 68,580
(0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9)
April 2004 areas –0.9 –0.0 +0.1 +0.3 85,725
(0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.5)
Women
All areas –0.3 –1.8** –1.0 –0.6 49,536
(0.8) (0.8) (0.7) (0.7)
October 2003 areas +0.0 –3.4*** –1.4 –2.9*** 20,667
(1.3) (1.3) (1.2) (1.1)
April 2004 areas –0.6 –0.7 –0.7 +1.1 28,869
(1.1) (1.0) (0.9) (0.8)
Note: Standard errors clustered at the individual level shown in parentheses. Sample size refers 
to the number of unique clusters (individuals), for overall number of benefit spells see note to 
Figure 7.2(f). Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by ***, ** and * 
for the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Controls for duration of benefit claim (linear and 
squared), age (five-year age bands), whether they hit the State Pension Age in the respective 
window, whether observed in the pre- or post-time period (interacted with whether they were 
in an October area or an April area) and local authority dummies. All controls interacted with sex. 
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The estimated impact of Pathways on those already claiming Invalid Care Allowance 
(which was renamed Carer’s Allowance on 1 April 2003), who were not mandated 
onto the programme is shown in Table 7.11. These individuals would not have been 
able to volunteer to take part in Pathways. The estimates show that recipients in 
the pilot areas after the programme had been implemented were not statistically 
significantly more or less likely to move off benefit. Breaking down the impact by 
area and sex also suggests little impact of the programme on cumulative off-flow 
rates from Invalid Care Allowance.
Table 7.11 Difference-in-differences estimate of impact of  
 Pathways on exit rates of existing Invalid Care  
 Allowance claims, by area and sex
Exit from benefit after:
3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months Sample size
Overall impact
All areas –0.1 –0.0 +0.2 +0.3 157,140
(0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3)
October 2003 areas –0.5** –0.5** –0.4 –0.3 69,737
(0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5)
April 2004 areas +0.2 +0.4 +0.7* +0.7 87,403
(0.2) (0.3) (0.4) (0.5)
Men
All areas –0.4 –0.6 –0.3 +0.3 43,165
(0.3) (0.5) (0.6) (0.6)
October 2003 areas –1.0** –1.2* –0.9 –0.4 19,895
(0.5) (0.7) (0.8) (0.9)
April 2004 areas +0.2 –0.1 +0.1 +0.8 23,270
(0.5) (0.6) (0.8) (0.9)
Women
All areas –0.1 +0.2 +0.4 +0.3 113,975
(0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4)
October 2003 areas –0.4 –0.2 –0.2 –0.2 49,842
(0.3) (0.4) (0.5) (0.6)
April 2004 areas +0.2 +0.5 +0.9* +0.7 64,133
(0.3) (0.4) (0.5) (0.5)
Note: Invalid Care Allowance was renamed Carer’s Allowance on 1st April 2003. Standard 
errors clustered at the individual level shown in parentheses. Sample size refers to the number 
of unique clusters (individuals), for overall number of benefit spells see note to Figure 7.2(g). 
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by ***, ** and * for the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels respectively. Controls for duration of benefit claim (linear and squared), age 
(five-year age bands), whether they hit the State Pension Age in the respective window, whether 
observed in the pre- or post-time period (interacted with whether they were in an October area 
or an April area) and local authority dummies. All controls interacted with sex. 
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The estimated impact of Pathways on those already claiming Disability Living 
Allowance, who were not mandated onto the programme, is shown in Table 7.12. 
These individuals would not have been able to volunteer to take part in Pathways. 
The estimates show that those recipients in the pilot areas after the programme 
had been implemented were not statistically significantly more or less likely to 
move off benefit. The very large sample sizes mean that this lack of statistical 
significance is due to small points estimates rather than large point estimates 
that are imprecisely measured. Breaking down the impact by area and sex also 
suggests little impact of the programme on cumulative off-flow rates from DLA.
Table 7.12 Difference-in-differences estimate of impact of  
 Pathways on exit rates of existing DLA claims, by area  
 and sex
Exit from benefit after:
3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months Sample size
Overall impact
All areas –0.0 –0.1 –0.1 –0.0 609,283
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
October 2003 areas –0.1** –0.2** –0.2* –0.2 287,801
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
April 2004 areas +0.1 +0.0 +0.0 +0.1 321,482
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Men
All areas –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 +0.0 323,307
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
October 2003 areas –0.3** –0.3** –0.3** –0.4* 154,407
(0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2)
April 2004 areas +0.0 +0.0 +0.1 +0.4* 168,900
(0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2)
Women
All areas +0.0 –0.0 –0.0 –0.1 285,976
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
October 2003 areas –0.0 –0.1 –0.0 –0.0 133,394
(0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2)
April 2004 areas +0.1 +0.0 –0.0 –0.1 152,582
(0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2)
Note: Standard errors clustered at the individual level shown in parentheses. Sample size refers 
to the number of unique clusters (individuals), for overall number of benefit spells see note to 
Figure 7.2(h). Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by ***, ** and * 
for the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Controls for duration of benefit claim (linear and 
squared), age (five-year age bands), whether they hit the State Pension Age in the respective 
window, whether observed in the pre or post time period (interacted with whether they were in 
an October area or an April area) and local authority dummies. All controls interacted with sex. 
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The estimated impact of Pathways on those women already claiming Bereavement 
Benefit, who were not mandated onto the programme is shown in Table 7.13. 
These individuals would not have been able to volunteer to take part in Pathways. 
The estimates show that generally, although with the notable exception of men in 
the April 2004 areas, that there is no statistically significant evidence of an impact 
on cumulative off-flow rates from Bereavement Benefits. 
Table 7.13 Difference-in-differences estimate of impact of  
 Pathways on exit rates of existing Bereavement Benefit  
 claims, by area and sex
Exit from benefit after:
3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months Sample size
Overall impact
All areas +3.2*** +4.4*** +4.4*** +1.9* 15,060
(1.0) (1.2) (1.2) (1.0)
October 2003 areas +2.9* +4.1** +1.0 –1.3 5,700
(1.7) (1.9) (1.8) (1.6)
April 2004 areas +3.1** +4.5*** +6.2*** +3.8*** 9,360
(1.2) (1.5) (1.5) (1.3)
Men
All areas +1.8 +7.7*** +5.5*** +5.2*** 5,629
(1.6) (2.0) (2.0) (1.8)
October 2003 areas +0.2 +4.8 –3.4 –0.3 2,186
(2.7) (3.1) (3.1) (2.8)
April 2004 areas +2.3 +9.3*** +10.7*** +8.5*** 3,443
(2.0) (2.6) (2.6) (2.3)
Women
All areas +4.0*** +2.5* +3.8*** –0.0 9,431
(1.3) (1.5) (1.5) (1.2)
October 2003 areas +4.5** +3.6 +3.8 –1.9 3,514
(2.1) (2.4) (2.3) (1.9)
April 2004 areas +3.5** +1.6 +3.6* +1.0 5,917
(1.6) (1.9) (1.9) (1.5)
Note: Standard errors clustered at the individual level shown in parentheses. Sample size refers 
to the number of unique clusters (individuals), for overall number of benefit spells see note to 
Figure 7.2(i). Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by ***, ** and * 
for the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Controls for duration of benefit claim (linear and 
squared), age (five-year age bands), whether they hit the State Pension Age in the respective 
window, whether observed in the pre- or post-time period (interacted with whether they were in 
an October area or an April area), and local authority dummies. All controls interacted with sex. 
Evidence of an impact on men in the April 2004 areas is very curious: after six and 
nine months the cumulative benefit off-flow rate is found to be substantially higher 
in the pilot areas after the programme has been implemented (+9.3 percentage 
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points after six months and +10.7 percentage points after nine months). Rather 
than being due to an increase in the exit rate from Bereavement Benefit in the pilot 
areas, the result is actually driven by a larger fall in the exit rate in the comparison 
areas than in the pilot areas (as shown in Figure 7.2(i)). The implausibility of a 
differential trend of this magnitude being a causal impact of the programme 
suggests that it would have occurred in the absence of the programme and has 
been caused by a different factor. 
The estimated impact of Pathways on those men aged 65 to 69 already claiming 
Attendance Allowance, who were not mandated onto the programme, is shown 
in Table 7.14. These individuals would not have been able to volunteer to take 
part in Pathways. The estimates show that those recipients in the pilot areas after 
the programme had been implemented were not statistically significantly more or 
less likely to move off benefit. 
Table 7.14 Difference-in-differences estimate of impact of  
 Pathways to Work on exit rates of existing Attendance  
 Allowance claims, men aged 65 to 69, by area
Exit from benefit after:
3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months Sample size
Men
All areas –0.1 +0.9 +0.4 +1.1 7,182
(1.2) (1.5) (1.7) (1.8)
October 2003 areas +1.2 +1.0 +1.8 +1.0 3,052
(1.8) (2.2) (2.5) (2.7)
April 2004 areas –1.0 +0.9 –0.5 +1.3 4,130
(1.5) (2.0) (2.2) (2.4)
Note: Standard errors clustered at the individual level shown in parentheses. Sample size refers 
to the number of unique clusters (individuals), for overall number of benefit spells see note to 
Figure 7.2(j). Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by ***, ** and * 
for the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Controls for duration of benefit claim (linear and 
squared), whether observed in the pre- or post-time period (interacted with whether they were 
in an October area or an April area) and local authority dummies. 
The estimated impact of Pathways on those women already claiming Widow’s 
Benefit, who were not mandated onto the programme is shown in Table 7.15. 
These individuals would not have been able to volunteer to take part in Pathways. 
While there is no statistically significant evidence of any impact on cumulative off-
flow rates in the April 2004 areas, in the October 2003 areas it is 1.2 percentage 
points higher after nine months. As with Bereavement Benefit it is difficult to see 
how this could be a causal impact of Pathways.
Estimated indirect impact of Pathways
110
Table 7.15 Difference-in-differences estimate of impact of  
 Pathways to Work on exit rates of existing Widow’s  
 Benefit claims, by area
Exit from benefit after:
3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months Sample size
Women
All areas +0.3 +0.3 +0.6* –0.1 61,272
(0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4)
October 2003 areas +0.3 +0.3 +1.2** –0.1 26,048
(0.4) (0.5) (0.6) (0.6)
April 2004 areas +0.3 +0.3 +0.2 –0.2 43,256
(0.3) (0.4) (0.5) (0.5)
Note: Standard errors clustered at the individual level shown in parentheses. Sample size refers 
to the number of unique clusters (individuals), for overall number of benefit spells see note to 
Figure 7.2(k). Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by ***, ** and * 
for the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Controls for duration of benefit claim (linear and 
squared), age (five-year age bands), whether they hit the State Pension Age in the respective 
window, whether observed in the pre- or post-time period (interacted with whether they were in 
an October area or an April area) and local authority dummies. 
7.6 Conclusions
This chapter has examined cumulative off-flow rates from various DWP benefits 
both before and after Pathways was implemented in pilot areas and a set of 
specially chosen comparison areas. For those mandated onto the programme, any 
differences in the trend would, were certain assumptions to hold, be the direct 
impact of the programme. However, evidence that Pathways appeared to have an 
impact on exits from Bereavement Benefit amongst men in the April 2004 areas – 
something there is no reason to believe that Pathways should cause – suggests that 
a degree of caution is needed in interpreting our findings as necessarily reflecting 
a causal impact of the policy.
Those who moved onto IB, who were mandated onto the programme, were found 
to have moved off earlier than they would otherwise have done, with cumulative 
benefit off-flow rates after three and six months being statistically significantly 
higher than they would have been in the absence of the programme. However, 
the cumulative off-flow after 12 months was no different from what it would have 
been in the absence of the programme.
Those who were not mandated onto the programme might still have been affected 
by it. This could most obviously be due to their volunteering to take part in the 
programme. Alternatively, other indirect effects could arise. For example, benefit 
recipients might find that their Jobcentre Plus adviser becomes better trained 
or conversely, has less time to spend with them, as a result of the programme. 
Alternatively, they might find it harder to find paid work if greater numbers of 
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those mandated onto the programme are subsequently moving into the labour 
market. 
The results suggest that those already receiving IB, who were not mandated onto 
the programme but could participate voluntarily, were around 0.7 percentage 
points more likely to have moved off the benefit three, six, nine and 12 months 
after the programme had been implemented. Similar impacts were found in the 
October 2003 and the April 2004 pilot areas and on both men and women. There 
is also some evidence that women already receiving IS or Pension Credit with a 
disability premium, who, again, would only have participated voluntarily, were 
more likely to move off benefit after the programme had been implemented. 
Since many of these individuals also claim IB, this finding is consistent with that 
above. 
Among those DWP benefit recipients who could not have participated in Pathways 
to Work (either through compulsion or voluntarily), for most there was no statistically 
significant evidence of any impact of the programme on their likelihood of moving 
off benefit. The one exception is men and women receiving JSA in the October 
2003 areas. The results suggest that they were both around 3½ percentage points 
less likely to move off benefit within six months after the programme had been 
implemented. This is consistent with either Jobcentre Plus in the October 2003 
areas being less able to cope with the introduction of Pathways to Work, perhaps 
because these areas had less notice of the programme than the April 2004 areas, 
or with the labour market in the October 2003 areas less able to respond quickly 
to the greater number of IB recipients seeking work. 
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8 Estimating the nationwide 
 impact of Pathways to  
 Work
8.1 Summary
The impact of Pathways as applied in the initial seven pilot areas might not be 
the same across the whole of the Great Britain as it was in these initial areas. This 
is not least because these initial areas were not necessarily chosen randomly: for 
example, the first three pilot areas were selected on the basis of having a relatively 
high number of individuals receiving incapacity benefits. If the characteristics of 
those moving onto incapacity benefits in these areas differ from the characteristics 
of those moving onto incapacity benefits elsewhere in the country and these 
different characteristics are associated with a larger or smaller impact of Pathways, 
the impact of the programme in the pilot areas will not be the same as that 
elsewhere in the country. 
This chapter uses administrative data on Incapacity Benefit (IB) claims from the 
whole of Great Britain, including the initial areas in which Pathways was piloted, 
to examine both the extent to which individuals in the initial pilot areas differ in 
terms of observed characteristics from the rest of Great Britain and the extent 
to which these observed characteristics are associated with a higher or lower 
average estimated impact of Pathways, as it was implemented in the initial seven 
pilot areas, on the likelihood of an IB claim having ended after six months. These 
estimates are used to extrapolate what, under certain assumptions, the impact of 
Pathways to Work programme as applied in the initial seven pilot areas on this 
outcome, would have been in those parts of Great Britain where the programme 
was not piloted.
Estimating the nationwide impact of Pathways to Work
114
The main findings are as follows:
•	 There	 is	evidence	 that	 the	 impact	of	Pathways,	as	 implemented	 in	 the	 initial	
seven pilot areas, on the likelihood of an individual’s not being in receipt of IB 
after six months varies by certain background characteristics. Specifically, the 
programme is estimated to have had a slightly larger impact on: 
– those moving onto receipt of National Insurance credits (i.e. who did not 
meet the contribution conditions for receiving IB); 
– those residing in local authorities (LAs) that in the past have had lower 
cumulative rates of exit from IB after six months.
•	 Outside	 London,	 the	 original	 pilot	 areas	 are	 found	 to	 be	 broadly	 similar	 to	
the rest of Great Britain. This is true both in terms of the observed individual 
characteristics of those moving onto IB (their sex, age, health and whether or 
not they are only in receipt of National Insurance credits) and also in terms of 
the historic LA average six month cumulative exit rate from IB. 
•	 In	 contrast,	 considerable	 differences	 are	 found	 on	 average	 between	 those	
moving onto IB in London and those moving onto IB in both the original seven 
pilot areas and elsewhere in Great Britain. For example, individuals moving 
onto IB in London are considerably more likely to be in receipt of only National 
Insurance credits, as opposed to also receiving a payment of IB. In addition, the 
historic average LA cumulative six month exit rates from IB within London are 
typically much lower than that seen in the pilot areas. Problematically for this 
study, several areas of London have much lower historic cumulative six months 
exit rates from IB than is seen anywhere in the original seven pilot areas. 
•	 Under	the	additional	assumption	that	all	of	the	characteristics	with	which	the	
impact of Pathways varies, which also differ between the original seven pilot 
areas and the area(s) for which the impact of the programme is to be estimated, 
are taken into account in the analysis, it is possible to estimate what the impact 
of Pathways as applied to the initial seven pilot areas would have been outside 
these areas. With the exception of London, the available evidence gives no 
reason to suggest that the impact of Pathways, as implemented in the initial 
seven pilot areas, on the likelihood of those moving onto IB not being in receipt 
of the benefit after six months, would be significantly different in the rest of 
Great Britain from what it has been in these initial pilot areas. However, an 
extrapolation of the estimated impact of the programme that was implemented 
in the initial seven pilot areas to London would be questionable. This is because 
the evidence suggests that many parts of London are very different from all of 
the original pilot areas in ways that are associated with a differential impact of 
the programme. Therefore, what the impact of Pathways might be in London 
– which accounts for around one-in-nine individuals moving onto IB in Great 
Britain – remains uncertain. However, the estimates in this chapter give no 
evidence that would suggest the impact of Pathways, as applied in the initial 
seven pilot areas in London, would be smaller than that seen in these initial pilot 
areas. 
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A crucial caveat is that the methodology used in this chapter rests on the assumption 
that there are no elements not taken into account which are correlated with the 
impact of Pathways that also vary across the country. Otherwise the extrapolation 
of estimates of the programme based on pilot areas to the rest of the country, 
would be invalid. For instance, if different areas implemented the policy differently, 
it might well be that the figures obtained for the pilot areas do not represent the 
effect of this differently implemented policy in the rest of the country. In that case, 
the roll out would involve, in some sense, a different policy than that implemented 
in the original pilot areas. Similarly, the impact of the national roll-out of Pathways 
might well differ from the results presented in this chapter because the policy 
being extended nationwide differs from that implemented in the original pilot 
areas. For example, across the 40 per cent of the country covered by Pathways 
before the end of 2006 – including all of the original pilot areas – the scheme was 
operated by Jobcentre Plus, whereas the programme that is being extended to 
the rest of the country (in October 2007 and April 2008) is to be operated by the 
private and voluntary sectors. 
8.2 Introduction
Pathways to Work might have a different impact on claimants of incapacity benefits 
in the areas where the programme was initially piloted from what it would have 
had on claimants elsewhere in Great Britain. This could be the case for at least 
three reasons:
•	 First,	the	impact	of	Pathways	to	Work	might	differ	by	individual	characteristics	
and the prevalence of these characteristics might be higher or lower in the 
pilot areas than in the rest of the country. For example, if the programme had a 
smaller impact on the outcomes of those moving into incapacity benefits with 
mental health problems and a smaller proportion of new claimants of incapacity 
benefits in the areas where the programme was being piloted had mental health 
problems, the impact of the programme in the pilot areas would be larger than 
the impact nationwide. 
•	 Second,	the	impact	of	the	programme	might	vary	by	the	underlying	success	of	
the local Jobcentre Plus organisation in terms of getting those receiving incapacity 
benefits to return to work. For example, if the programme had a larger impact 
on the outcomes of those covered by organisations that would otherwise have 
been less successful, and the pilot areas comprised organisations that would 
have been relatively successful even without Pathways, then the impact of the 
programme in the pilot areas would be smaller than the impact nationwide.
•	 Third,	 the	 impact	of	 the	programme	might	vary	by	 the	characteristics	of	 the	
local labour market. For example, if the programme had a larger impact on the 
outcomes of those in areas where there were greater employment opportunities 
for those with some health problems, and the pilot areas typically had better 
employment opportunities for those with some health problems, the impact of 
the programme in the pilot areas would be larger than the impact nationwide.
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Differences between the nationwide impact of Pathways and that seen in the 
pilot areas would only arise to the extent to which the pilot areas differ from the 
rest of Great Britain in ways that are associated with a greater or smaller impact 
of Pathways. If the characteristics of the pilot areas did not differ from the rest of 
the country or if the impact of Pathways did not vary by any of the characteristics 
that did vary between the pilot areas and the rest of the country, the impacts that 
occurred in the pilot areas would also occur nationwide.
Had the pilot areas been chosen at random, it might be reasonable to assume 
that the characteristics of these areas were similar to the rest of country and, 
therefore, that the impact of Pathways would be the same in these pilot areas as it 
would be in the rest of Great Britain. However, this was not the case: for example 
the first three pilot areas were selected on the basis of having a relatively high 
number of individuals receiving incapacity benefits. Therefore, rather than make 
the questionable assumption that the impact of the programme outside the initial 
pilot areas would have been the same as that found in the pilot areas, the analysis 
presented in this chapter estimates what, under certain assumptions, the impact 
across the rest of Great Britain would have been.
Specifically, this chapter presents the findings, from analysis, of the extent to which 
the initial seven pilot areas differ from the rest of Great Britain in terms of the 
observed characteristics of those moving onto IB and the extent to which these 
observed characteristics are associated with a higher or lower average impact of 
Pathways on the likelihood of a new IB claim ending within six months. These 
estimates are used to extrapolate what the impact of Pathways, as implemented 
in the initial seven pilot areas, on this outcome of interest would be in parts of 
Great Britain where the programme was not initially piloted. The key additional 
assumption required here is that all of the characteristics with which the impact 
of Pathways varies, which also differ between the original seven pilot areas and 
the area(s) to which the impact of the programme is to be extrapolated, are taken 
into account in the analysis. The methodology for doing this is described in more 
detail in Section 8.3. 
The data used in this analysis are administrative data on spells of IB across the 
whole of Great Britain, including the original seven pilot areas. Further details 
about these data and, in particular, differences in observed characteristics between 
the initial seven areas in which Pathways was piloted and the rest of Great Britain, 
can be found in Section 8.4.The results are presented in Section 8.5, while Section 
8.6 concludes. 
8.3 Methodology
To assess how the impact of the Pathway to Work programme in the rest of 
the country might differ from that in the initial seven pilot areas, the effect in 
the pilot areas is estimated using a difference-in-differences methodology. This is 
implemented within a linear regression framework in order to take into account 
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the set of background characteristics summarised in Section 8.4 and to subtract 
out any pre-programme differences in the outcome measures between pilot and 
comparison areas, thereby allowing for any differences in the impact of unobserved 
characteristics that remain constant over time. 
The methodology employed is very similar to that used in Chapter 7, which looks 
at the indirect effects of the programme (see Section 7.3 for a brief discussion 
of the methodology used there). The only difference is that the impact of the 
programme is now allowed to vary with a larger set of background characteristics. 
Once this has been done, any evidence of variation in the impact of the programme 
across different groups is then used to assess the extent to which the impact of 
the programme might vary in the rest of Britain from the pilot areas.
The model that is estimated can be written as follows:58
Yi = γXi + δPOSTi + λPILOTi + βPOSTi*PILOTi + Xi * (δ2 POSTi + λ2 PILOTi + β2 
POSTi*PILOTi) + εi        (1)
where Yi denotes the outcome of interest for IB spell i (in this case whether or 
not the recipient is still receiving IB after six months) and Xi denotes the observed 
characteristics of the benefit spell/recipient (for example the sex and age of 
the recipient). PILOTi is a dummy variable
59 indicating whether the benefit spell 
occurred in a Pathways to Work pilot area or in one of the comparison areas and 
POSTi is a dummy variable indicating whether the benefit spell occurred before 
or after Pathways was actually implemented (regardless of whether the benefit 
spell occurred in one of the seven pilot areas or in one of the comparison areas). 
εi is an ‘error term’ capturing variation in Yi not captured by the other explanatory 
variables. 
The total impact of the programme will not only depend on β, the coefficient of 
the interaction term POSTi*PILOTi, but also on β2, the vector of coefficients on 
the interaction between the term POSTi*PILOTi and the observed characteristics 
of the benefit spell/recipient with which the impact of the programme is being 
allowed to vary. 
Once these coefficients have been estimated, it is straightforward to predict the 
estimated impact of the programme across individuals with different observed 
characteristics as it simply depends on β, β2 and the characteristics associated 
with the benefit spell for which the impact of the programme is to be estimated. 
58 This equation is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares regression. This method 
of implementing the difference-in-differences approach is based on the Wald 
estimator and has been described and used in a number of papers including 
Ashenfelter (1978) and Heckman and Robb (1985).
59 A dummy variable is a variable which takes the value 0 or 1. In this case, 
PILOT=1 if the benefit spell occurred in a Pathways to Work pilot area; 
PILOT=0 otherwise. Separate dummy variables are included for each of the 
LAs observed in the data.
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This could be done, for example, by taking all those moving onto IB in the whole 
of Great Britain in a particular time period, rather than just those moving onto IB 
in the pilot areas.60 The key additional assumption is that all of the characteristics 
with which the impact of Pathways varies, which also differ between the original 
seven pilot areas and the area(s) to which the impact of the programme is to be 
estimated, are taken into account in the analysis (in that they are included in Xi). 
Unfortunately, this assumption is not testable.
8.4 Data description
The data used in this chapter were taken from the National Benefits Database 
(NBD), which is described in Section 7.4. The extract of the NBD used in this 
chapter comprises IB spells from the whole of Great Britain. The data included all 
new IB spells that began during selected time periods61, with subsequent flows 
off benefit recorded up to the beginning of March 2007. Any subsequent moves 
onto, and off, IB are also included in the data. In addition to information on IB 
claim start and end dates, other information in the NBD that is used in this analysis 
includes each individual’s sex, date of birth and LA of residence. The data contain 
some information on individuals’ health (although only one health problem is 
given per benefit claim) and also indicate whether individuals are in receipt of 
a payment of IB or whether they are only receiving National Insurance credits, 
which can help individuals qualify for certain contributory benefits in the future. 
IB spells for the same individuals are linked together. Only individuals who were 
aged between 18 and 59 (inclusive) were retained in the analysis because those 
moving onto IB outside these age ranges were not mandated onto Pathways in 
the initial seven pilot areas. 
8.4.1 Variation in background characteristics of IB claimants
Key to this analysis is the extent to which the characteristics of those in the initial 
seven pilot areas differ from those in the rest of the country since, even if the impact 
of Pathways does vary by individual characteristics, if individual characteristics do 
not vary across the country then the average estimated impact of the programme 
would also not vary. 
Table 8.1 compares the observed background characteristics of those moving onto 
IB in the seven pilot areas to other areas in Great Britain. The initial pilot areas are 
found to be very similar to the rest of the country for most of these individual 
60 Since it is not straightforward to estimated standard error of the estimated 
impact analytically it is instead computed using bootstrapping with 1,000 
repetitions. For a description of the bootstrapping method, see for example 
Efron and Tibshirani (1993).
61 Specifically, September 2001 to October 2001, January 2002 to March 2002, 
August 2002 to November 2002, January 2003 to March 2003 and August 
2003 to December 2004 (all dates are inclusive).
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characteristics, except that the percentage only moving onto receipt of National 
Insurance credits is slightly lower in pilot areas than in the rest of Great Britain 
(44.5 per cent compared to 48.4 per cent). 
Table 8.1 Descriptive background statistics of those moving onto  
















Aged 45 or over 38.4 38.1 38.0 33.6 37.5
(0.3) (0.1) (0.1) (0.3) (0.1)
Female 42.3 42.1 42.1 43.1 42.2
(0.3) (0.1) (0.1) (0.3) (0.1)
Mental health problem 29.6 29.8 29.8 28.0 29.6
(0.3) (0.1) (0.1) (0.3) (0.1)
NI credits only 44.5 46.8 46.6 62.7 48.4
(0.3) (0.1) (0.1) (0.3) (0.1)
Number of spells 32,398 156,438 173,942 21,970 195,912
Note: Mental health problem has been classified as either being an Affective Disorder (Manic 
Episode, Depressive Episode, Recurrent Depressive Disorder, Persistent mood Disorder or an Un-
specified Mood Disorder) or a Neurotic, Stress Related and Somatoform disorders (Phobic Anxiety 
Disorders, Other anxiety Disorders, Reaction to Severe Stress, Dissociative Disorders, Somatoform 
Disorders or Other Neurotic Disorders).
Note: Standard error of mean shown in parentheses. 
One area of Great Britain where the average characteristics of those moving onto 
IB are found to differ significantly from those in the seven pilot areas (and indeed 
from the rest of the country) is London. Those moving onto IB in the capital are 
found, on average, to be considerably younger (33.6 per cent are aged 45 or 
over compared to 38.0 per cent across the rest of Great Britain) and much more 
likely to have moved onto only receipt of National Insurance credits rather than 
an actual payment of IB (62.7 per cent compared to 46.6 per cent across the rest 
of Great Britain). They are also found to be slightly less likely to be recorded as 
having a mental health problem (28.0 per cent compared to 29.8 per cent across 
the rest of Great Britain). This suggest that, if the impact of Pathways varies by 
either the age of the claimant or whether or not they are only moving onto receipt 
of National Insurance credits, the overall impact of the programme in London 
could differ from that found in the original seven pilot areas. This could also have 
a reasonably significant impact on the overall impact of Pathways across Great 
Britain since around one-in-nine of those moving onto IB do so in London (21,970 
spells out of 195,912 in Table 8.1). 
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8.4.2 Variation in past cumulative exit rates from IB by LA
The approach taken in this chapter allows the impact of Pathways on those 
moving onto IB to vary by observed characteristics and then examines whether 
the distribution of these characteristics in the original seven pilot areas is similar 
to that in the rest of Great Britain. One potential problem with this approach is 
that the impact of the programme could vary by unobserved characteristics that 
also vary across the country. In order to try to capture at least some of these 
characteristics, the impact of the programme is allowed to vary by the average 
cumulative exit rate from IB in each LA. This rate is computed with a two-year lag 
before the introduction of Pathways in order to capture characteristics unaffected 
by the programme. The attraction of using the LA exit rate from IB is that it is likely 
to be a neat summary of how the unobserved characteristics of individuals affect 
the success of the local Jobcentre Plus and how local labour markets differ from 
area to area in terms of their effects on exit rates among those moving onto IB. 
The variation in average LA six month cumulative exit rates among those moving 
onto IB in a recent time period is shown in Figure 8.1. Areas are weighted by the 
number of individuals moving onto IB between 1 August 2004 and 30 November 
2004, the period over which the impact of the programme is measured. As was the 
case with the individual characteristics presented in Table 8.1, with the exception 
of London, the pilot areas are found to be similar to the rest of Great Britain (for 
example, the median LA six month cumulative exit rate in the original pilot areas 
is exactly the same as that seen across the rest of Great Britain, excluding London). 
As with the individual characteristics, London is, on average, very different from 
both the pilot areas and the rest of Great Britain. For example, after six months, 
the mean LA cumulative exit rate among those moving onto IB in London was just 
23.0 per cent as compared to 34.0 per cent in the original seven pilot areas and 
33.0 per cent in the rest of Great Britain. In fact, the 75th percentile of the LA 
six month exit rate in London (25.0 per cent) is substantially lower than even the 
25th percentile of the LA cumulative six month exit rate elsewhere in Great Britain 
(30.5 per cent).
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Figure 8.1 Variation in the distribution of LA IB cumulative six  
 month exit rates, by area of Great Britain
8.5 Results
This section presents the results from applying the methodology set out in Section 
8.3 to the data described in Section 8.4. Section 8.5.1 describes the estimates of 
how the impact of Pathways on those moving onto IB in the original seven pilot 
areas varies by the characteristics associated with the benefit claim or claimant. 
Section 8.5.2 presents the findings from extrapolating the impacts found in the 
pilot areas to other parts of Great Britain. 
8.5.1 Evidence of the impact of Pathways to Work programme  
 varying by individual and LA characteristics
The estimated impact, using the difference-in-differences methodology set out 
in Section 8.3, of Pathways on those moving onto IB who were mandated onto 
the programme is shown in Table 8.2. The impact is estimated for the likelihood 
of being in receipt of IB six months after the programme was implemented. 
This outcome is chosen since, as described in Chapter 7 on indirect effects (and 
in particular Table 7.3), the evidence suggests that, if anything, the impact of 
Pathways on the percentage of those moving onto IB who are still in receipt of the 
benefit is strongest at this point and it is natural to look for evidence of variation 
in the impact of the programme by background characteristics when that overall 
impact is found to be strongest. 
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The estimates presented in columns 1, 2 and 3 are based on using those who 
moved onto IB just before the programme was implemented as controls, while 
those in columns 4, 5 and 6 use those who moved onto IB one year before the 
programme was implemented as controls. Using those who moved onto IB just 
before the programme was implemented as controls is consistent with the estimates 
of the impact of Pathways in the initial seven pilot areas that have been produced 
using data from a specially designed large-scale telephone survey (see both Adam, 
et al. (2006) and Bewley, et al. (2007)). However, Bewley, et al. (2007) also use 
administrative data to examine the impact of the programme in these areas and 
present evidence which suggests that using those moving onto IB immediately 
before the pilots began as controls is invalid and that it is, instead, preferable to 
use those who moved onto IB one year before the pilots began.
Columns 1 and 4 of Table 8.2 present the estimated impact when this impact is 
not allowed to vary by any background characteristic. These show that the overall 
estimated impact of Pathways is to increase the likelihood of an individual moving 
onto IB having moved off that benefit after six months by either 2.3 percentage 
points or 6.0 percentage points depending on whether the ‘standard controls’ 
(column 1) or the ‘lagged controls’ (column 4) are used. 
The results presented in columns 2 and 5 of Table 8.2 allow the impact of Pathways 
to vary by age (specifically whether or not the individual was aged 45 or over when 
the IB claim began), sex, whether or not they are recorded as having a mental 
health problem and whether the individual moves onto receipt of a payment of 
IB or only National Insurance credits. These estimates suggest that, if anything, 
the impact of Pathways on the likelihood of an individual who moves onto IB still 
being in receipt of that benefit after six months is stronger for those who (at least 
initially) only moved onto receipt of National Insurance credits (rather than an 
actual payment of IB).
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Table 8.2 Estimated variation in the impact of Pathways on the  
 likelihood of those moving onto IB not being in receipt  
 of IB after six months, by background characteristics
Impact of programme 
interacted with
Six month exit rate  
Standard controls  
(sample size = 54,192)
Six month exit rate  
Lagged controls  
(sample size = 54,299)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant +2.30** +1.17 +1.28 +5.99*** +3.82** +3.40**
(1.13) (1.77) (1.68) (1.11) (1.59) (1.55)
Aged 45 and over n/a –1.20 –1.17 n/a –1.22 –1.28
n/a (1.53) (1.54) n/a (1.93) (1.94)
Female n/a –1.10 –1.11 n/a –0.53 –0.56
n/a (1.82) (1.82) n/a (1.78) (1.79)
Mental health problem n/a +2.23 +2.18 n/a +3.03 +2.93
n/a (1.88) (1.87) n/a (2.02) (2.03)
NI credits only n/a +3.12* +2.91* n/a +4.35** +4.19**
n/a (1.66) (1.65) n/a (1.96) (1.92)
LA six month exit rate n/a n/a –0.88*** n/a n/a –0.67***
(less average in pilot 
areas)
n/a n/a (0.23) n/a n/a (0.22)
Joint test on all 
coefficients
4.13** 1.87 3.77*** 28.94*** 7.03*** 8.17***
(p-value) (0.05) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Joint test on 
interactions
n/a 1.51 3.52*** n/a 1.66 2.90***
(p-value) n/a ( 0.21) (0.01) n/a (0.17) (0.02)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the LA level to allow for lack of independence 
between benefit spells in the same area. Statistical significance denoted by ***, ** and * for the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Coefficients (and standard errors) reported above relate 
to those on the interaction between the background characteristic interacted with whether 
they are observed in a pilot area after the introduction of the policy. The characteristics are also 
included interacted with both whether or not they are observed in a pilot area and whether or 
not they are observed in a post-time period. Other controls included: whether they hit the State 
Pension Age in the relevant window, whether the IB claim is only for National Insurance credits 
(interacted with sex), whether recorded health problem is a mental health problem (interacted 
with sex), the LA six-month exit rate (interacted with sex) and age (five year age bands, all 
interacted with sex). Mental health problem has been classified as either being an Affective 
Disorder (Manic Episode, Depressive Episode, Recurrent Depressive Disorder, Persistent Mood 
Disorder or an Unspecified Mood Disorder) or a Neurotic, Stress Related or Somatoform disorder 
(Phobic Anxiety Disorder, Other Anxiety Disorder, Reaction to Severe Stress, Dissociative Disorder, 
Somatoform Disorder or Other Neurotic Disorder).
The results presented in columns 3 and 6 also allow the impact to vary by the 
average percentage of those moving onto IB who had moved off benefit after 
six months observed in the same LA in the recent past (before Pathways had 
been implemented in any of the pilot areas). As explained in Section 8.3.2, this 
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measure is likely to be a summary of factors that are associated with higher or 
lower exit rates among those moving onto IB, including unobserved characteristics 
of individuals in each area, the success of the local Jobcentre Plus and features 
of the local labour market. These estimates suggest that, if anything, the impact 
of Pathways on the percentage of claimants not receiving IB after six months is 
stronger for those who move onto IB in LAs with relatively low rates of exit from 
IB after six months in the past. In other words, if anything, Pathways is increasing 
the percentage of IB claimants who have moved off benefit after six months by 
more in the areas that, at least in the past, tended to have a higher percentage of 
individuals still in receipt of IB. 
The estimates are consistent with the variation in the impact of Pathways by the 
percentage of new claimants not receiving IB after six months in that LA in the 
past being fairly sizeable. For example, the difference between the 25th percentile 
and the 75th percentile of the percentage of new claimants not receiving IB after 
six months in that LA among those in the initial seven pilot areas is 5.8 percentage 
points (36.9 per cent less 31.1 per cent, as reported in Figure 8.1). Multiplying 
this by the estimated coefficient in column 6 of Table 8.2 of –0.67 suggests that 
difference in historic LA cumulative six-month off-flow rates from IB is consistent 
with a difference in estimated impact of Pathways of 3.9 percentage points. This 
is relative to an estimated average impact of the programme in the pilot areas of 
+6.0 percentage points (column 4 of Table 8.2). 
The test statistics presented in the bottom of Table 8.3 suggest that, when tested 
jointly, the interactions between individual and LA characteristics (columns 3 and 
6) and the impact of Pathways are highly statistically significant. 
8.5.2 Estimates of the impact of Pathways across Great Britain
Using the evidence on variation in the estimated impact of Pathways in the original 
seven pilot areas to predict the impact of the programme across the rest of Great 
Britain should be done with care. This is even more so given that the impact 
of Pathways is found to vary by the historic average LA cumulative six-month 
exit rates among those moving onto IB (as reported in Table 8.3) and this LA 
cumulative six-month exit rate is very different in London from that seen in the 
original seven pilot areas (as shown in Figure 8.1). Therefore, before presenting 
the results from extending the estimated impact of Pathways as applied to the 
initial seven pilot areas to the rest of Great Britain this section first presents further 
evidence on differences between those individuals moving onto IB in London and 
those moving onto IB elsewhere in the country. 
Figure 8.2 contains a plot of the distribution of exit rates at six month for each LA 
in Great Britain (on the x-axis) against the relevant size of the area as measured by 
the number of individuals moving onto IB (on the y-axis). The original pilot areas 
are denoted by the dark triangles, London by the lighter squares, and the rest of 
Great Britain by empty diamonds. What is clear from this figure is that many LAs 
in London have much lower percentages of individuals typically moving off IB after 
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six-months than is observed in any of the areas where the programme was initially 
piloted. In contrast the areas where the programme was piloted are, at least in 
this dimension, largely representative of the rest of Great Britain. Moreover, since 
around one-in-nine of those moving onto IB are in London, it is not a sufficiently 
small area that this discrepancy can be safely ignored. (In contrast, the one area that 
is not a pilot area and not in London which lies far on the left of the distribution of 
exit rates observed in the pilot areas in Figure 8.2 makes up less than 0.1 per cent 
of those moving onto IB in the relevant time period.) 
Figure 8.2 Distribution of LAs by exit rate at six months and  
 number of IB claimants
 
The evidence presented in Figure 8.2 would cast doubt on the robustness of 
extrapolating the estimated impact of Pathways on those moving onto IB in the pilot 
areas to London. This is because doing so would involve extending the variation in 
estimated impact of the programme by the historic cumulative six month exit rate 
from IB by LA (shown in Table 8.3) outside the range observed within Pathways 
pilot areas.62 Therefore, rather than extending the estimated impact of Pathways 
in the original seven pilot areas to the whole of the rest of Great Britain, the results 
presented below focus on extending the estimated impact to the rest of Great 
Britain excluding London. 
The results are presented in Table 8.3. Column A reports the results using the 
standard controls and only allowing the impact of the programme to vary by 
individual characteristics and not LA characteristics. These results, therefore, relate 
to the estimates of the impact of the programme in the pilot areas that were 
presented in column 2 of Table 8.2. Column B uses standard controls and allows 
the impact of the programme to vary by the historic LA cumulative six-month 
62 This is known as a lack of common support. See for instance Heckman, 
Lalonde and Smith (1999) or Lechner (2000).
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exit rate from IB. Therefore, these results relate to the estimates of the impact of 
the programme in the pilot areas that were presented in column 3 of Table 8.2. 
Column C also uses standard controls but does allow the impact of Pathways to 
vary by the observed characteristics in the data in a more flexible way, which is 
described in more detail below. Columns D, E and F repeat columns A, B and C 
but instead use lagged controls and these results are, therefore, based on the 
estimates of the impact of the programme that were presented in columns 5 and 
6 of Table 8.2 respectively. 
When the estimated impact of the programme is restricted so that it can only 
vary by individual characteristics (columns A and D) there is very little difference 
between the estimated impact in the pilot areas (row 1) and the rest of Great 
Britain excluding London (row 2), with this small difference not being statistically 
significant in either case. For example, taking the lagged controls, the estimated 
impact in the original seven pilot areas is an increase in the percentage not in 
receipt of IB six months after moving onto the benefit of 6.0 percentage points, 
with a standard error of 1.05 percentage points. Extrapolating this estimated 
impact to the rest of Great Britain, excluding London, would give an estimated 
impact of 6.1 percentage points, again with a standard error of 1.05 percentage 
points. As a result the central estimate of the impact of the programme across the 
whole of Great Britain, excluding London, is little different from that in the pilot 
areas (row 3). The estimated impact of the programme in London is slightly higher 
than that in the original seven pilot areas. This is because the impact of Pathways 
on the likelihood of having moved off IB after six months is found to be slightly 
higher for those who are only in receipt of National Insurance Credits rather than 
an actual payment of IB (columns 2 and 5 of Table 8.2) and those in London were 
found to be relatively more likely to be in this situation (Table 8.1). However, it is 
still the case that the estimated impact in London is not statistically significantly 
different from that estimated in the original seven pilot areas.
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Table 8.3 Estimated impact of Pathways on the likelihood of  
 those moving onto IB not being in receipt of IB after six  
 months, by area, choice of controls and specification















(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
(1) Pilot areas only +2.31 +2.74* +2.50 +5.97*** +5.40*** +5.67***
(1.43) (1.48) (1.60) (1.05) (1.06) (1.14)
(2) Great Britain 
excluding London 
and pilot areas
+2.38* +2.66** +2.60* +6.07*** +5.75*** +5.80***
(1.44) (1.34) (1.44) (1.05) (0.95) (0.98)
(3) Great Britain 
excluding London
+2.37* +2.67** +2.59* +6.06*** +5.72*** +5.79***
(1.44) (1.33) (1.43) (1.05) (0.95) (0.97)
(4) London +2.88* +12.57*** +6.56 +6.75*** +13.62*** +8.52
(1.59) (3.88) (8.76) (1.20) (2.64) (5.97)
Note: Standard errors estimated by bootstrapping with 1,000 repetitions, with each individual, 
rather than each benefit spell, being counted as the block. Standard errors clustered at the LA 
level to allow for lack of independence between benefit spells in the same area. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by ***, ** and * for the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. 
Allowing the estimated impact of Pathways to vary by the historic LA cumulative 
six-month exit rate from IB, changes the picture slightly (columns B and E). As 
before the estimated impact found for the rest of Great Britain outside the pilot 
areas but excluding London (row 2) and, therefore, the estimated impact across 
the whole of Great Britain except for London (row 3), are very similar to those 
found for the original seven pilot areas (row 1). For example, taking the lagged 
controls the estimated impact in the original seven pilot areas is an increase in the 
percentage not in receipt of IB six months after moving onto the benefit of 5.4 
percentage points, with a standard error of 1.06 percentage points. Extrapolating 
this estimated impact to the rest of Great Britain, excluding London, would give 
an estimated impact of 5.8 percentage points, also with a standard error of 
0.95 percentage points. Again, these differences are not statistically significant. 
However, extending the estimated impact from the pilot areas to London (row 4) 
gives much larger – perhaps implausibly large – estimated impacts. This is due to 
the estimated impact of the programme being higher in LAs with lower historic 
cumulative six-month exit rates from IB (columns 3 and 6 of Table 8.2) and LAs in 
London typically having considerably lower cumulative six-month exit rates than 
in any of the pilot areas or the rest of Great Britain (as shown in Figure 8.1 and 
Figure 8.2). 
The methodology employed in this chapter will only correctly measure what the 
impact of Pathways as applied to the initial seven pilot areas would have been in 
other areas under the assumption that the impact of the programme does not vary 
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by any characteristics that are not taken into account that also varies across the 
country. Unfortunately, the administrative data used in this analysis only contains a 
relatively limited set of background information. Even so the estimates presented 
in columns A, B, D and E of Table 8.3 only allow the impact of Pathways to vary 
by the characteristics observed in the data in a fairly restrictive way: namely the 
individuals sex, whether or not the individual is aged 45 or over, whether or not 
they are recorded as having a mental health problem, whether they are only in 
receipt of National Insurance credits as opposed to also receiving a payment of IB, 
and the historic average cumulative six-month exit rate from IB seen in their LA. 
Columns C and F present the results with a more flexible specification and, 
therefore, should be seen as the preferred results. Specifically, the policy impact 
is now allowed to vary by the five-year age band within which the individual lies 
(and whether or not they hit the State Pension Age in the next six months) rather 
than simply allowing it to vary by whether or not they are aged 45 or over; and 
rather than only allowing the impact of the policy to vary by the historic average 
cumulative six-month exit rate from IB seen in their LA, it is also allowed to vary by 
its square.63 Furthermore, the variation in the impact of the policy by all of these 
characteristics, and those set out in Table 8.2, is allowed to be different by sex. So, 
for example, the impact of Pathways is allowed to vary by whether or not they are 
recorded as having a mental health problem and the historic average cumulative 
six-month exit rate from IB seen in their LA in a way that differs between men and 
women.
Despite this much more flexible specification for how the impact of Pathways is 
allowed to vary by the observed characteristics, the interpretation of the results 
presented in columns C and F is little changed from those presented in columns A, 
B, D and E. It is still the case that estimated impact of the policy across Great Britain, 
excluding London is not statistically different to that measured in the original seven 
pilot areas. Furthermore, extrapolating the estimated impact to London, which as 
above would be highly questionable, would still lead to a higher estimated impact 
in London albeit, not as implausibly high as previous estimates might suggest. 
8.6 Conclusions
This chapter has examined the possible nationwide impact of Pathways as applied 
in the initial seven pilot areas on cumulative off-flow rates from IB after six months. 
This has been done by estimating the impact in the original seven pilot areas in 
a way that allows the estimated impact to vary by both individual and LA level 
63 Adding a cubic term did not, on visual inspection, lead to a large change 
in the estimated relationship. The inclusion of both a cubic and a quadratic 
term was found to lead to extremely large predicted impacts of the policy 
for those areas (such as many LAs in London) with a lower historic average 
cumulative six-month exit rate from IB than seen in any of the original seven 
pilot areas.
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characteristics and then using data from the rest of Great Britain to extrapolate 
these estimated impacts to other parts of the country. 
Some evidence is found that the impact of Pathways does indeed vary by certain 
background characteristics. In particular, the likelihood of an individual not being in 
receipt of IB after six months, which on average is increased by the programme, is 
found to be increased by more for IB claimants who are only in receipt of National 
Insurance credits relative to those who are in receipt of an actual payment. The 
impact is also found to be larger in LAs where the cumulative exit rate from IB in 
the past has typically been lower. 
The initial seven pilot areas are, on average, found to be similar to those in the rest 
of Great Britain outside London in terms of their age, sex and health. One slight 
exception is that a slightly lower proportion of those moving onto IB in the pilot 
areas are only in receipt of National Insurance credits (as opposed to an actual 
payment of IB) than in the rest of the Great Britain. In contrast, a much higher 
proportion of those moving onto IB in London are only in receipt of National 
Insurance credits than in the original pilot areas. Those moving onto IB in London 
are also, on average, somewhat younger than those moving onto IB either in the 
original seven pilot areas or elsewhere in Great Britain. 
In addition, cumulative exit rates from IB after six months in London have, in the 
past, typically been much lower than in the original pilot areas. This is not just 
true on average – most individuals moving onto IB in London are in LAs that have 
had lower historic cumulative exit rates from IB after six months than is observed 
in any of the LAs within the initial seven pilot areas. Given that the evidence 
suggests that the impact of Pathways does vary by this LA level characteristic, this 
is problematic for using the estimates of the impact of the programme in the pilot 
areas to assess what the impact might be in London. 
Under the additional assumption that all of the characteristics with which the 
impact of Pathways varies, that also differ between the original seven pilot areas 
and the area(s) to which the impact of the programme is to be estimated, are 
taken into account in the analysis it is possible to estimate what the impact of 
Pathways as applied to the initial seven pilot areas would have been outside these 
areas. Overall the evidence presented in this chapter gives no reason to suggest 
that the impact of Pathways as applied in the initial seven pilot areas would be 
significantly different in the rest of Great Britain, but outside London, to what 
it has been in the original seven pilot areas. Unfortunately, extrapolating the 
estimated impact of the programme in the pilot areas to London – which is about 
one-ninth of those who move onto IB in Great Britain – is not appropriate since 
the evidence suggests that many parts of London are considerably different from 
all of the original pilot areas in ways that are associated with a differential impact 
of the programme. However, the estimates in this chapter give no evidence that 
would suggest the impact of Pathways in London would be smaller than that seen 
in the initial seven pilot areas.
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A crucial caveat is that the methodology used in this chapter rests on the assumption 
that there are no elements not taken into account which are correlated with the 
impact of Pathways that also vary across the country. Otherwise the extrapolation 
of estimates of the programme based on pilot areas to the rest of the country 
would be invalid. For instance, if different areas implemented the policy differently, 
it might well be that the figures obtained for the pilot areas do not represent the 
effect of this differently implemented policy in the rest of the country. In that case 
the roll-out would involve, in some sense, a different policy to that implemented 
in the original pilot areas. Similarly, the impact of the national roll-out of Pathways 
might well differ from the results presented in this chapter, not least because the 
policy being extended nationwide differs from that implemented in the original 
pilot areas. For example, across the 40 per cent of the country covered by Pathways 
before the end of 2006 – including all of the original pilot areas – the scheme was 
operated by Jobcentre Plus, whereas the programme that is being extended to the 
rest of the country (in October 2007 and April 2008) is set to be operated by the 
private and voluntary sectors.
Estimating the nationwide impact of Pathways to Work
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9 Conclusions
9.1 The measured costs and benefits of Pathways
This report examines whether the financial benefits generated by Pathways for 
those moving onto incapacity benefits are larger or smaller than the programme’s 
costs. The key conclusion is that the Pathways’ measured benefits exceed the 
measured cost of the programme for the individuals affected by the programme, 
for the Exchequer and for society as a whole. There are potentially significant 
costs and benefits of Pathways that we do not measure but the unmeasured costs 
would have to outweigh the unmeasured benefits significantly if the programme 
were not to be beneficial overall.
The estimated costs and benefits of Pathways are summarised in Table 9.1. 
Assuming conservatively that the effects of Pathways lasted for 70 weeks, it was 
found that the programme’s net financial benefits for society as a whole are £701 
per enquiry about incapacity benefits. This figure is based on estimated financial 
benefits of £1,041 and estimated costs of £340. The estimates imply that for every 
pound invested in Pathways, society reaps benefits of £3.06 (£1,041/£340). 
Table 9.1 Present value of total measured financial benefits per  













£ £ £ £ £ £ £
70 weeks 526 515 340 175 1,041 340 701
150 weeks 935 1,088 340 748 2,023 340 1,683
Note: Assumes 3.5 per cent discount rate. See Chapters 4 and 5 for details.
Of the £701 in net social benefits estimated to have been generated by Pathways 
under the 70-week-impact assumption, £526 resulted from an increase in the 
average disposable income of individuals who made an enquiry about incapacity 
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benefits and the remaining £175 is attributable to a net improvement in the 
Exchequer’s budgetary position. The return to the Exchequer was £1.51 (£515/£340) 
for each pound invested in Pathways. The increases in the disposable incomes of 
individuals are mainly attributable to earnings in the additional employment that 
result from Pathways. In addition, when individuals enter employment because 
of Pathways, they may receive Working Tax Credit (WTC) and Return to Work 
Credit (RTWC) awards. These increases in income from earnings, tax credits and 
the RTWC more than offset the reductions in state benefits and increases in tax 
payments that also accompany moves into employment (and moves off Incapacity 
Benefit (IB)). As indicated in Chapter 5, benefits to the Exchequer came from a 
variety of sources, the most important of which are reductions in outlays on IB 
payments and increases in tax receipts.
As shown in Table 9.1, the assessed net financial benefits of Pathways are highly 
sensitive to assumptions about the length of time over which programme effects 
continue. If it is assumed somewhat more optimistically, that Pathways’ effects 
persist for 150 weeks, rather than for only 70 weeks, programme financial 
benefits increase to £2,023 per incapacity benefit enquiry but programme costs 
remain at £340. Thus, social net benefits increase to £1,683 with £935 accruing to 
individuals and £748 to the Exchequer. Hence, under the 150 week assumption, 
the return to the Exchequer for each pound invested would be over £3 (£3.20 = 
£1,088/£340) and the return to society as a whole would be nearly £6 (£5.95 = 
£2,023/£340). 
These estimates of Pathways’ benefits and costs are averaged over a sample of 
individuals who made enquiries at Jobcentre Plus offices about claiming incapacity 
benefits. Many of these people did not receive any of the services or financial 
payments provided by the programme. However, as seen in Chapter 2, estimates 
that are based on administrative data indicate that the percentage of those 
making enquiries about incapacity benefits who actually participated in the various 
components of Pathways was fairly low: 







Over 80 per cent of the programme‘s estimated costs of £340 per incapacity 
benefit enquiry are attributable to Jobcentre Plus staff salaries (mainly due to 
follow-up WFIs), the CMP and (especially) RTWC payments. It also seems likely that 
64 The corresponding participation rates for those who actually became IB 
claimants are 25 per cent, 12 per cent and seven per cent, respectively.
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most of the benefits of Pathways emanate from these programme components. 
Given the substantial impact that Pathways had on benefit exits, the relatively 
low rates of participation in Pathways’ components suggest that some of the 
effect of Pathways on employment may have occurred among people who did 
not participate in follow-up WFIs or Choices programmes or receive payments. 
In particular, it is quite possible that some individuals who made enquiries about 
incapacity benefits left the benefit rolls soon after entering them or never entered 
them in the first place, in order to avoid the mandatory follow-up WFIs. Thus, 
the introduction of mandatory follow-up WFIs might have had an effect even on 
those who did not attend them.
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are a number of reasons why participation in 
the components of Pathways was not higher among those making enquiries 
about incapacity benefits. One important factor is that about 22 per cent of those 
making enquiries did not subsequently become incapacity benefit claimants. 
Equally important, except for the follow-up WFIs, participation in Pathways’ 
various components was voluntary. In addition, many individuals who did become 
claimants were exempt from the mandatory follow-up WFIs because of the severity 
of their medical condition or because they were deemed likely to return to work 
without the need for follow-up WFIs.65 Moreover, some claimants left incapacity 
benefits before a follow-up WFI would have happened. Indeed, it is quite possible 
that some individuals who made enquiries about incapacity benefits left the 
benefit rolls soon after entering them or never entered them in the first place, 
precisely in order to avoid the mandatory follow-up WFIs. Given the substantial 
impact that Pathways had on benefit exits, the relatively low participation rates 
reported above suggest that some of the effect of Pathways on employment may 
have occurred among people who did not participate in the various components 
of Pathways. Thus, the introduction of mandatory follow-up WFIs might have had 
an effect even on those who did not attend them.
9.2 Omitted benefits and costs
There is some uncertainty surrounding the net benefit estimates reported in Table 
9.1 because of costs and benefits that were omitted from our estimates. 
One potentially important effect of Pathways that is ignored in our estimates of 
costs and benefits is the programme’s indirect effects on the benefit payments and 
employment status of individuals not mandated onto Pathways. Our estimates of 
the benefits of Pathways are based on the programme’s effects on benefit exit and 
employment outcomes for those making an enquiry about incapacity benefits; 
but others could also see these outcomes affected, for several reasons. Existing 
claimants of incapacity benefits could volunteer to participate in Pathways and 
might, therefore, have been affected by it. They, and claimants of other benefits, 
65 This screening was intended to exclude about a third of those not excluded 
because of the severity of their medical condition.
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might also have found that their Jobcentre Plus adviser became better trained 
or, conversely, that their adviser had less time to spend with them as a result 
of Pathways. Alternatively, they might have found it harder to find paid work if 
greater numbers of those mandated onto the programme were competing for 
the same jobs. Chapter 7 presented evidence that existing recipients of incapacity 
benefits (who could volunteer for Pathways) were slightly more likely to move off 
benefit within 12 months of Pathways’ being implemented. However, Jobseeker‘s 
Allowance (JSA) recipients in the October 2003 areas were around 3½ percentage 
points less likely to move off the benefit within six months of Pathways’ being 
implemented, although this negative impact was smaller at 12 months and not 
apparent at all in the April 2004 areas. Recipients of most other benefits were 
unaffected.
Other potentially important costs and benefits omitted from our estimates 
include: 
•	 Increases in work-related expenditures and losses of non-market time 
attributable to increases in employment. Although Pathways mandates 
follow-up WFIs, it does not force individuals to take jobs. Hence, it seems unlikely 
that costs resulting from work-related expenditures and losses of non-market 
time among those who entered employment as a result of Pathways exceeded 
their increases in disposable income. Nonetheless, these costs could be sizeable, 
potentially offsetting a large fraction of the income gain that these individuals 
experienced.
•	 Pathways’ effects on quality of life. Pathways could have either positive 
or negative effects on the quality of life, which would respectively increase or 
decrease the net benefits to participants. For example, attending WFIs might 
have been a stressful and unpleasant experience, or the CMP might have helped 
people to develop valuable coping skills.
•	Reductions in the ‘deadweight costs’ of taxation. Net revenue raised for 
the Exchequer has an additional value because it allows tax rates to be lower 
than they otherwise would be, not only returning money to households but also 
reducing the economic inefficiency that taxes cause.
•	 Pathways’ effects on NHS utilisation. Changes in NHS utilisation do not 
affect claimant net benefits, but they do influence the Exchequer’s budgetary 
position and social net benefits. NHS utilisation could have either increased (for 
example, because of stress caused by WFIs or as part of participants’ efforts to 
make themselves ready for work) or decreased (for example, if becoming more 
active improved participants’ health conditions or if those who moved into work 
as a result of Pathways became less likely to use NHS services because of time 
constraints). 
These unmeasured costs and benefits were assessed in Chapter 6 using whatever 
relevant information existed. For example, surveys of respondents found that 
Pathways reduced the likelihood that claimants reported having a health condition 
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that affected their day-to-day activities ‘a great deal’ but had little impact on 
their reported level of satisfaction with their lives. However, any conclusions about 
the unmeasured costs and benefits of Pathways must, ultimately, be a matter of 
judgement because, by definition, they were not valued.
9.3 Wider applicability of the findings
As Pathways is being introduced throughout Great Britain, it is important to 
consider the relevance of the findings in this report, which rely on data from 
to only the original seven pilot sites, to the remainder of the country. Excluding 
London, the original pilot areas are broadly similar to the rest of Great Britain. This 
is true in terms of both the observed individual characteristics of those moving 
onto incapacity benefits (their sex, age, health and whether or not they are only in 
receipt of National Insurance credits) and the historic local authority (LA) average 
six-month cumulative exit rate from incapacity benefits. 
In contrast, considerable differences are found between those moving onto 
incapacity benefits in London (which is not represented among the original 
pilot sites and which accounts for around one-in-nine individuals moving onto 
incapacity benefits in Great Britain) and those moving onto incapacity benefits, 
both in the original seven pilot areas and elsewhere in Great Britain. Specifically, 
several areas of London have much lower historic cumulative six-month exit rates 
from incapacity benefits than is seen anywhere in the original seven pilot areas. 
The available evidence does not suggest that the effects of Pathways on the chances 
of new incapacity benefits claimants’ leaving the benefit within six months would 
be different in the original pilot sites from the rest of Great Britain outside London. 
This would not necessarily be the case, however, if the programme introduced in 
the rest of Great Britain differed from the one that operated in the pilot sites. In 
fact, there is good reason to suspect that the policy being extended nationwide 
differs in important respects from the one implemented in the original pilot areas. 
One reason for this is that the scheme in the original pilot areas was operated by 
Jobcentre Plus, whereas the programme that is being extended to most of the 
rest of the country is instead being operated by the private and voluntary sectors. 
Pathways might also have different effects when operating in the context of the 
Employment and Support Allowance that is set to replace incapacity benefits for 
new claimants from October 2008.
9.4 Concluding remarks
The overall findings in this report provide a favourable impression of the benefits 
of the Pathways for those moving onto incapacity benefits and for the Exchequer. 
They suggest that the measured financial benefits of the programme exceed the 
measured costs both for those making incapacity benefits enquiries and for the 
Exchequer and hence, for society as a whole. Moreover, with the exception of 
London, it appears likely that these findings can be generalised to the whole of 
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Great Britain, at least to the extent that the model of Pathways which is rolled out 
in the remainder of the country is similar to the one that operated in the original 
pilot sites. 
Considerable uncertainty surrounds our estimated net benefits, both because of 
uncertainty over how long the effects of Pathways persist and because of potentially 
large costs and benefits that we do not measure. However, Pathways was found 
to have positive net measured benefits even when it was conservatively assumed 
that programme effects lasted for only 70 weeks. If its effects lasted longer, the 
net measured benefits would be larger. The unmeasured costs of the policy would 
have to outweigh the unmeasured benefits significantly if the programme were 




Methodological variants and 
checks done in the estimation 
of the cost-benefit analysis
This appendix details methodological variants and checks done in the estimation 
of the cost-benefit analysis presented in Chapter 5.
A.1 Employment and benefit receipts estimation for  
 different cohorts
Separate results for the October 2003 and April 2004 cohorts are shown in Tables 
A.1 and A.2. The results do differ between the two cohorts. However, perhaps 
because of the lack of precision in producing these point estimates with much 
smaller sample sizes, the results match those in Bewley et al. less closely, and 
indeed, in some cases look rather strange: for example, in both areas the policy 
seems if anything to be increasing the proportion of individuals who are out of 
work and receiving Incapacity Benefit (IB). This is not the case for the pooled 
results in Table 5.3 or in the Bewley et al. estimation or when separate estimation 
is done for the two cohorts using four outcomes instead of six (see Section A.2). It 
would seem perverse to assess the costs and benefits of the policy on the basis of 
its having almost the opposite effect on the target group than intended and than 
is suggested by more robust estimation. Our preferred approach is, therefore, to 
use the pooled cohort results.
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Table A.1 Predicted impact of Pathways at time of final interview: 
 October 2003 areas only















(1) 1-15 hours, no IB 3.0 1.9 +1.1 1.9 1.2 +0.7
(2) 16-29 hours, no IB 8.7 6.7 +2.0 7.5 5.7 +1.8
(3) 30+ hours, no IB 23.8 22.1 +1.7 21.7 20.1 +1.6
(4) 1-15 hours, IB 1.2 1.0 +0.3 1.5 1.1 +0.3
(5) Not employed, IB 43.9 43.6 +0.3 49.5 49.1 +0.5
(6) Not employed, no IB 19.4 24.8 –5.3 18.0 22.8 –4.9
Table A.2 Predicted impact of Pathways at time of final interview: 
 April 2004 areas only















(1) 1-15 hours, no IB 4.8 2.4 +2.4 3.6 1.7 +1.9
(2) 16-29 hours, no IB 11.3 8.2 +3.0 8.7 6.1 +2.6
(3) 30+ hours, no IB 24.4 21.9 +2.4 22.4 19.6 +2.8
(4) 1-15 hours, IB 0.8 1.6 –0.8 1.2 2.3 –1.1
(5) Not employed, IB 44.3 43.3 +1.0 47.6 45.2 +2.4
(6) Not employed, no IB 14.5 22.6 –8.1 16.5 25.1 –8.5
A.2 Results from a multinomial logit estimation of  
 benefit receipt and employment but not hours of  
 work
Table A.3 Pooled cohorts, four outcomes













Employed, no IB 31.7 25.5 +6.1 36.8 30.1 +6.6
Not employed, IB 48.3 49.1 –0.8 42.8 44.1 –1.3
Not employed, no IB 17.1 20.6 –3.5 18.5 22.5 –4.1
Employed, IB 2.9 4.8 –1.9 2.0 3.3 –1.3
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Table A.4 October cohort, four outcomes













Employed, no IB 29.2 24.8 +4.4 34.1 29.0 +5.1
Not employed, IB 49.5 49.0 +0.6 43.9 43.6 +0.4
Not employed, no IB 18.0 22.8 –4.8 19.5 24.8 –5.3
Employed, IB 3.3 3.5 –0.2 2.5 2.7 –0.1
Table A.5 April cohort, four outcomes













Employed, no IB 33.0 24.1 +9.0 39.5 30.7 +8.8
Not employed, IB 47.6 43.1 +4.5 44.5 42.5 +2.0
Not employed, no IB 16.5 23.9 –7.4 14.6 22.1 –7.6
Employed, IB 2.8 8.9 –6.1 1.4 4.6 –3.2
A.3 Estimation of earnings
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression approach used in the estimation of 
earnings in Chapter 5 fails to take into account two potentially important issues:
•	 First,	 there	 is	 a	 selection	 effect:	 those	 individuals	 actually	 observed	 being	
employed (in a particular hours’ category) may be unusual in terms of their 
unobserved characteristics and this might bias the estimation. In particular, we 
might expect that the people who move into work are typically those with 
relatively high earning potential for their age, education level, etc. However, 
a simple OLS model would make predictions for everyone based only on the 
earnings of workers and would, therefore, overestimate the likely earnings of 
the FRS sample, which contains both kinds of individual.




command if they moved into work (in a particular hours category). Pathways 
might make people more productive or better able to cope with their health 
problem. If so, it might increase the hourly wage they command or persuade 
them to take jobs with longer hours than they otherwise would have (though 
note that if Pathways pushes them into a different hours category, this will be 
picked up in the discrete choice estimation described in the previous section). 
On the other hand, the additional income provided by the Return to Work Credit 
(RWTC) might persuade people to take lower-paid jobs than they otherwise 
would. In any case, a simple OLS model that pooled individuals across pilot 
and comparison areas before and after the introduction of Pathways, without 
taking explicit account of which groups were subject to Pathways, would yield 
a single set of earnings predictions (averaged over all these groups) both with 
and without the policy, leading to an underestimate of the benefits of Pathways 
if the policy increased earnings or an overestimate of the benefits of Pathways 
if the policy reduced earnings.
The obvious solution to the second of these problems would be to take explicit 
account of the policy in the model by including an indicator for whether each 
individual in the Pathways to Work Evaluation Dataset (PED) is observed in a pilot 
area after Pathways was introduced, in the same way as in the discrete choice 
model described above. The coefficient on this indicator variable would reflect the 
effect of Pathways on earning potential, allowing us to make predictions for the 
Family Resources Survey (FRS) sample as if all individuals were subject to the policy. 
However, this would still leave the problem of selection bias.
The standard solution to the selection issue is to estimate a Heckman maximum 
likelihood sample selection model.66 This entails finding a variable (an ‘instrument’) 
that predicts whether an individual is observed being employed (in the relevant 
hours category) but, conditional on their being employed (in that hours category), 
is uncorrelated with earnings.
To the best of our knowledge, the only plausible candidate for an instrument is 
being subject to the policy: whether an individual is subject to Pathways helps 
to predict whether they will move into work (in a particular hours category), as 
evidenced by the non-zero impact estimates reported in the previous section. 
However, for this to be a valid instrument, we would have to assume that Pathways 
did not affect the earnings an individual would receive if they moved into work 
(in a given hours category). Thus, to deal with the first issue (selection effects), we 
would have to assume away the second issue (impact of the policy on earnings).
There, thus, appear to be two somewhat unsatisfactory ways forward: we could 
assume that there is no selection bias and estimate OLS models using a treatment 
indicator to identify the effect of the policy on earnings; or we could assume 
that the policy has no effect on earnings and estimate Heckman selection models 
66 Heckman (1979), Greene (1981).
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using a treatment indicator as an instrument for moving into work (in the relevant 
hours category). 
In fact, the problem is even more intractable than just suggested. In addition to 
the classical selection issue discussed above, there is also a policy selection issue: 
individuals who move into work (in a particular hours’ category) as a result of 
the policy might have different earning potential from both those who would 
have moved into work anyway and those who would not move into work even 
with Pathways. Thus, even if we had another instrument for moving into work and 
estimated Heckman selection models using this other instrument and including 
the treatment indicator as an ordinary regressor, we would still not be able to 
identify whether the coefficient on the treatment indicator reflected the impact of 
Pathways on earnings or a pre-existing difference in the earning potential of those 
who moved into work as a result of the policy. Treating earnings differences as an 
effect of Pathways when in fact they were a policy selection effect would induce 
the opposite bias to that from ignoring a genuine effect of the policy: we would 
overestimate the benefits of Pathways if there was a seemingly positive impact of 
the policy on earnings and underestimate the benefits of Pathways if there was a 
seemingly negative impact of the policy on earnings.
Thus the available alternatives to a simple OLS regression appear to be:
•	 an	 OLS	 regression	 with	 a	 treatment	 indicator	 as	 a	 regressor,	 assuming	 that	
individuals who move into work (in a particular hours category) as a result 
of Pathways have the same earnings potential (conditional on observed 
characteristics) as both those who do not move into work and those who 
would have moved into work even without the policy. Under this alternative, 
the coefficient on the treatment indicator would be interpreted as the effect of 
Pathways on earning potential. If the assumption is correct, this would allow us 
to recognise any impact of Pathways in increasing (reducing) earnings power as 
increasing (reducing) the benefits of the policy. However, if the assumption is 
wrong, then we might overestimate the potential earnings available for moving 
into work and therefore, overestimate the benefits of the policy (the classic 
selection problem) or we might wrongly count as a benefit (cost) of the policy 
something that is really caused by the policy moving unusually high- (low-) 
earning individuals into work (the policy selection problem);
•	 a	Heckman	selection	model	using	being	subject	to	Pathways	as	an	instrument	
for being employed (in a particular hours category), assuming that Pathways has 
no effect on earning power beyond its effect on moving people into work (in a 
particular hours category). If the assumption is correct, we do not need separate 
earnings predictions with and without the policy and our earnings predictions 
would not be biased by the possible unrepresentativeness of those observed 
moving into work. However, if the assumption is wrong, then the instrument is 
invalid. 
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We experimented with both these approaches, unsatisfactory though they seem. 
The coefficient on an indicator for whether an individual made an enquiry in the 
pilot areas after Pathways was introduced proved not statistically significant in all 
three regressions, as shown in Table A.6. 
Table A.6 Coefficient of the policy effect in the earnings  
 equations
Those who are employed:
 Less than  
16 hours
Between 16 and  
30 hours
More than  
30 hours
Coefficient +0.085 –0.013 +0.003
Standard error 0.230 0.109 0.064
 
Figure A.1 compares the log earnings distribution predicted (before adding random 
variation) by the simple OLS model and by a Heckman selection model with the 
treatment indicator used as an instrument in the first stage estimation, alongside 
the distribution of actual log earnings for individuals observed being employed 
in PED, pooling all hours categories. Predicted log earnings are marginally higher 
for the OLS estimation than for the Heckman estimation, suggesting that (under 
the assumptions of the Heckman model) those who did not move into work 
might if anything command slightly lower earnings (conditional on their observed 
characteristics) than those who did move into work. However, the difference is 
very small, corresponding to around three per cent higher earnings on average; 
the coefficient on the selection effect (lambda) in the second stage regression 
is 0.02 with a standard error of 0.19, meaning that (at conventional levels of 
statistical significance) we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no selection 
(i.e. that there is no difference in the earning potential of those who move into 
work and those who do not, once we control for their observed characteristics). 
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Figure A.1 Distribution of actual log earnings and those predicted  
 by OLS and Heckman selection models (without adding  
 residuals)
 
Hence, we find no firm evidence that Pathways affects earnings, under the 
assumption of no selection effects; and no firm evidence of sample selection bias, 
under the assumption of no policy effect. This not necessarily evidence that neither 
source of potential bias is a problem: the assumptions are not convincing – indeed, 
each assumes the other away – and it is perfectly possible that both issues create 
bias in our results. However, we have no way of disentangling the different issues, 
and the results do demonstrate that even arbitrarily making heroic assumptions to 
sanction one model or the other would not make a big difference to the results. 
The most prudent course is, therefore, the simplest: to use the straightforward 
OLS model, without accounting for either selection effects or any impact of the 
policy on earning potential.
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